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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between goodness and happiness,
between wickedness and punishment is so strong,
that given one of these conditions, the other is
frequently assumed. Misfortune, sickness, and
accident are often taken as signs of badness and
guilt. If (a person) is unfortunate, then he
has committed a sin.
Heider (1958, p. 235)
Illness is a universal phenomenon, and every society develops ways
of defining and coping with illness. It is a fact of life with which
everyone must live, although the effects of disease and reactions to
illness may vary widely across individuals and cultures. Individuals
and groups vary in their susceptibility to certain diseases, in their
beliefs and attitudes toward illness, and in the ways in which they
explain and adapt to illness. These variations in the distribution,
definition, and reaction to illness have led to the recognition of
illness as a psychosocial as well as biological phenomenon, and have
increasingly become the objects of social and psychological inquiry.
A psychosocial view of illness raises many questions for which
social psychological analyses are relevant. For example, how do people
conceive of health and illness? What does disease mean to the indivi-
dual, and how does this meaning change during the course of illness?
How do an individual's or a society 1 s notions regarding disease
causation differ from the prevailing "scientific" view? How are lay
notions of etiology related to efforts of prevention and treatment?
How are concepts of health and illness related to individual and
1
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cultural values? Is illness viewed as morally neutral or "bad"? Are
individuals perceived by themselves or others as responsible or account-
able for illness? How does illness alter an individual's self-
perception, or perceptions and judgments by others? How are social
attitudes toward the sick related to cultural values and conceptions of
illness? Social psychology's history of theory and research on
attitudes, person perception, and social judgment seem to uniquely
qualify the field to address many of these questions.
The focus of the present paper is on responses to illness, parti-
cularly observers 1 reactions to victims of physical illness. From a
social psychological perspective, the definition of a person as ill is,
at least in part, itself a social judgment (cf. Branson, 1973; Fabrega,
1974; Freidson, 1970; Sedgwick, 1973; Veatch, 1973). More importantly,
illness, especially chronic or disabling illness, can be viewed as a
universal form of misfortune, a negative event which "singles out" some
individuals in a seemingly random or haphazard fashion, for pain,
suffering, and possibly death. The inability to predict illness and to
restore health reliably are major sources of uncertainty and powerless-
ness in human life (Pflanz § Keupp, 1977). It is these general features
of illness- -universality, unpredictability, and uncontrollability- -which
have required all societies to explain and deal with disease in some
manner, and which make illness an interesting context in which to ex-
plore basic social psychological processes.
The thesis underlying this paper is that notions of morality and
responsibility are inherent in reactions to physical illness. Despite
widespread acceptance in Western society of the "medical model" in
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which illness is generally regarded as a natural event beyond the
individual's control (King, 1962; Mechanic, 1968, 1978; Parsons, 1951;
Veatch, 1973), lay concepts of disease are intimately related to
larger social and moral values , and function in part to explain the
selective occurrence of illness and to reduce the threat posed by the
unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of illness. Blaming the victim
of physical illness- -by imputing a moral value to illness, or perceiv-
ing sickness as a consequence of immorality or irresponsibility- -serves
both to explain the undeserved suffering of the sick person, and to
permit observers a means of avoiding a similar fate by rendering illness
more predictable and controllable by an individual or a society.
Overview
This thesis will begin with a brief review of the nature of social
attitudes toward the sick person historically and cross-culturally.
Following this review, the social definition and social consequences of
illness will be examined, including pertinent concepts and findings
from the clinical and sociological literatures. Finally, social
psychological models of reactions to victimization, including the
stigma approach (e.g., Fabrega § Manning, 1972; Goffman, 1963;
Safilios-Rothschild, 1970), and the "just world hypothesis" and other
attributional perspectives (e.g., Heider, 1958; Lerner, 1970; Lerner
q Miller, 1978; Walster, 1966; Wortman, 1976) will be presented.
4
A Brief Social History of Attitudes Toward the Physically 111
Current social attitudes toward the physically ill and disabled
undoubtedly reflect complex historical and cultural influences. Disease
has always isolated its victims, although social attitudes toward the
sick and the social position of the sick have varied considerably
across cultures and centuries, ranging from total rejection to com-
passion, and even semi -deification (see, e.g., Safilios-Rothschild,
1970; Siegerist, 1945). These dramatic changes in attitudes toward
victims of physical illness are, from a social psychological perspective,
both interesting and potentially illuminating.
In primitive societies, magic, medicine, and religion are closely
intertwined, and illness is generally viewed as the result of super-
natural causes (e.g., Ackerknecht, 1946; Caudill, 1953; King, 1962; Read,
1966). In some primitive cultures, the definition of a person as ill is
based exclusively on social criteria; if the person suffering from
illness can continue to lead a normal life within the tribe, s/he is
considered normal and does not elicit any special social reaction.
However, if an individual is incapacitated by a more serious disease,
the victim is abandoned by the tribe, including the victim's family
(Sigerist, 1945). More often, illness is believed to result from spirit
intrusion, soul loss, sorcery, or breach of taboo. Reactions to the
sick person, like treatment of the illness (e.g., atonement, exorcism,
appeasement of gods), follow logically from beliefs regarding the
etiology of illness; the victim is believed to possess special spiritual
powers and is elevated to the prestigious position of "medicine man" or
5
witch-doctor, or, more commonly, is feared and shunned by kith and kin
alike.
Rejection of the notion of an "innocent victim" is evident in
ancient Hebrew culture, where disease was viewed as punishment for sin:
Disease and suffering are inflicted by way of chastisement,
in retribution for the sins of the individual, of his parents,
or even of his clan. This was a concept of pitiless logic
and of the clearest simplicity. . ."Where such a view pre-
vailed, the sick man found himself burdened with a certain
amount of odium. He suffered, but it was believed that he
suffered deservedly. His disease proclaimed his sin for all
to see. He was branded, and socially isolated in a
particularly severe way. Disease, however, was not only a
punishment; it was also an atonement for guilt, and thus a
redemption. (Sigerist, 1945, p. 68)
The victim of disease in ancient Greek society shared this burden
of odium, because of a perceived deviation from perfection rather than
moral standards. Health and other forms of "perfection" were highly
valued, and the "inferior" --the weak, the sick, and the disabled- -were
tolerated only as long as improvement was considered possible. Mal-
formed babies and other "inferior" persons were killed, and medical
treatment was considered unethical for "hopeless" cases (Safilios-
Rothschild, 1970; Sigerist, 1945).
Social attitudes toward the sick changed dramatically with the
advent of Christianity- -from disgrace to grace, punishment to purifica-
tion. Through Christian doctrine, suffering was transformed from a
punishment for past sins to a means of spiritual purification and
perfection. Charity toward the sick and the disabled became an important
duty; sympathy and care for the ill allowed the healthy to share the
grace of suffering. Thus, as Sigerist (1945) and Safilios- Rothschild
(1970) noted, Christianity produced fundamental and lasting changes in
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society's attitudes toward the sick; it promoted a preferential
social position for the sick which has, to some extent, persisted.
The Middle Ages in Europe witnessed a return to religious and
supernatural explanations of disease. The visibly diseased and dis-
abled were believed to be cursed or possessed by the Devil, and were
held responsible for other misfortunes such as natural disasters and
epidemics. The fear and hatred for the physically ill often resulted
in persecution and torture.
The modern "scientific'' model of disease in Western society views
illness as an organic aberration which results from natural, amoral
conditions beyond the individual's control. This perspective has been
heralded as at once more objective and less punitive than magical
-
religious conceptions of illness. The notion of blamelessness is
central to this more "scientific" and "humanitarian" view of illness;
illness is a non-culpable form of deviance over which the individual
has no control, and for which the individual is not to blame (see, e.g.,
King, 1962; Parsons, 1951; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Sedgwick, 1973;
Veatch, 1973). On this view, the ill should be neither ostracized nor
worshipped; instead, they should be viewed neutrally (or with "Christian
compassion") , and isolated only insofar as confinement is necessary to
their own or others' health.
These descriptions highlight the characteristic social attitudes
toxvard disease and its victims in different cultures and during different
historical periods. Contemporary attitudes toward victims of physical
illness probably reflect the influence of each of these conceptions (viz.,
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retribution, inferiority, blessedness, and objective neutrality). For
example, Sigerist 's (1945) observation that "until recently, there were
still people who considered mental diseases a punishment for a dis-
orderly life and venereal diseases a singularly appropriate chastise-
ment because they manifested themselves in the organs with which people
had sinned' 1 (p. 70) is probably still true to some extent today, as is
King's (1962) suggestion that "even among the highly educated members
of our society, the idea occurs occasionally that painful and disabling
illness may be some kind of punishment by God for sin" (p. 128).
Vestiges of "pre-scientific" views may be especially common in the
reaction to particular diseases, such as venereal diseases (Sigerist,
1945), leprosy (Sigerist, 1945), tuberculosis (Sigerist, 1945; Sontag,
1978), and cancer (Sontag, 1978).
In addition to highlighting cultural and historical influences on
attitudes toward victims of physical illness, these different con-
ceptions indicate the range of cultural variation in medical myths,
beliefs, and practices, and suggest some general factors which may
determine the nature of attitudes toward the sick, including character-
istics of the illness (e.g., severity, visibility, etc.), beliefs about
disease causation and individual responsibility for illness, and
cultural values regarding health and illness, such as the degree of
stigmatization associated with a particular illness (cf . Safilios-
Rothschild, 1970). Before reviewing more recent evidence regarding
attitudes toward the physically ill, it may be instructive to examine
more carefully these and other factors which may affect social definitions
and judgments about illness.
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The Social Definition of Illness
Disease, illness, and sickness each have their own technical and
colloquial meanings, and it is important at the outset to consider
some distinctions among these terms. Conventionally, and throughout
the remainder of this paper, "disease" refers to the more limited
medical concept of an objective state of organic pathology. "Illness"
refers to the more general subjective experience of discomfort, pain,
or "ill health." Typically, disease is defined in morally neutral,
objective, "scientific" terms. For example, the Oxford English
Dictionary defines disease as "a condition of the body, or of some
part or organ of the body, in which its functions are disturbed or
deranged; a morbid physical condition." Illness, however, includes much
more than bodily dysfunction; illness is defined as "the quality or
condition of being ill" in any of several senses- -"1. Bad moral
quality, condition, or character . . . 2. Unpleasantness, disagreeable-
ness; troublesomeness
;
hurtfulness, noxiousness, badness. 3. Bad or
unhealthy condition of the body; the condition of being ill; disease,
ailment, sickness, malady." To be ill, then, is to be in a socially
as well as biologically altered state; "illness" denotes (and connotes)
much more than physical morbidity, and has social as well as physical
consequences. It is illness, not disease, to which the individual and
others respond.
In a discussion of medical metaphors, Szasz (1975, 1977) has made
9
a similar observation about the meanings of "ill" and "sick":
The terms ill and sick are often used interchangeably.
For example, we can say 'Jones has pneumonia, he is quite
ill. 1 And we can say just as well, 'Jones has pneumonia,
he is quite sick. f 111 , however, has a history and scope
that have nothing to do with medicine or disease. It
means, roughly, bad , unfortunate , tragic , or something of
that sort. For example, we can speak of ill will or
ill fate, but we cannot speak of sick will or sick fate.
XSzasz, 1977, p. 141)
Sick, perhaps more closely linked to medicine or disease, also has
moral and metaphorical uses (e.g., a "sick joke"). With these
distinctions in mind, this section will consider some socially impor-
tant features of illness.
Features of illness
Before considering some of the specific aspects of illness which
may influence individuals' reactions, some of the essential features
of illness should be noted. Generally, illness is unpredictable, un-
controllable, and undesirable. Unlike many events in an individual's
life, illness is an unanticipated and typically undesirable and
involuntary condition. Illness also usually involves some loss of
control by the individual over normal activities, although the degree of
disruption varies with the nature and the severity of the illness. For
these reasons, serious physical illness almost always represents a
Mcrisis" (Moos $ Tsu, 1977). Davis (1963), in an intensive study of
the "passage through crisis" of polio victims and their families,
defined the crisis as "a relatively sudden and unanticipated disruption,
of extensive and protracted significance, in the everyday activities,
understandings, and expectations of a social unit" (p. 17).
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The onset of illness is very difficult, if not impossible, to
predict with any certainty. Despite medical advances in knowledge of
disease causation, and epidemiological progress in the identification
of "at risk" groups, the occurrence of a particular illness in a parti-
cular individual is still largely unpredictable (with the possible
exception of some genetic disorders). Thus, although a society may be
encouraged by its increasing ability to predict the frequency and dis-
tribution of illness in the population as a whole, illness is exper-
ienced at an individual level, and it is at this level that illness is
largely unpredictable. In spite of epidemiological evidence and other
data which indicate that individuals differ in their general suscepti-
bility to illness, and that illnesses are not distributed among persons
at random (e.g., Bakan, 1968; Brown, 1976; Hinkle, Pinsky, Bross, §
Plummer, 1956; Hinkle $ Wolff, 1975; Wolff, 1953), the individual
likely perceives illness as "singling out" individuals in an arbitrary
manner. Thus, the onset of illness may be the most important and least
predictable phase of illness.
The diagnosis and prognosis of an illness are also potential
sources of uncertainty for the individual. The uncontrollable nature of
illness derives from the unknown etiology of many diseases, and the
unknown prevention, treatment, or cure. The uncertainty and powerless
-
ness in the experience of illness are often enhanced by the lack of
correspondence between knowledge of the causes of disease and knowledge
of effective treatment. That is, there are diseases which can
effectively be treated despite an unknown etiology, and other diseases
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for which the causes are known and a diagnosis can reliably be made,
but for which no effective treatment is available.
The undesirability of illness seems patent; illness is, by
definition, a negative event. This is not to say that the evaluation
of a particular condition as negative and as constituting illness does
not vary across individuals and cultures, but that the definition of a
condition as illness, by an individual or society, implies that the
condition is perceived as both abnormal and negative. Further, the
undesirability of illness often does not rest solely on the biological
deviance or social devaluation of the condition; illness is a major
source of pain and suffering, and can disrupt and threaten an individ-
ual's life (cf. Fabrega, 1974; Freidson, 1970; Sedgwick, 1973; Veatch,
1973). However, like the attribution of illness itself, the perception
of illness as negative, as a misfortune, is in part a social judgment
(Shontz, 1975).
These general characteristics notwithstanding, it is clear that
illnesses are remarkably diverse in nature; illnesses vary along a
number of dimensions, and the specific characteristics of an illness
will determine the extent to which the illness is perceived as un-
predictable, uncontrollable, and undesirable. Although, social
psychologically, the response to a specific disease entity is of less
interest than the response to illness in general, an understanding of
the impact of illness must acknowledge the diversity among illnesses.
The compromise between the abstract entity "illness" and the diversity
of specific diseases needed for the present analysis is knowledge of
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some of the important dimensions along which illnesses may vary. For
instance, illnesses may be chronic, common, contagious, fatal, confined
to a developmental period, ethnic group, or sex, etc., and these
characteristics can be expected to play a major role in the personal and
social meaning of illness.
Classifications of illness
Every society has its own classification of illnesses, and these
classification systems differ in the extent and nature of conditions
classified as illness, and in the nature and complexity of the distinc-
tions made among illnesses. Medical classifications in contemporary
Western society are highly complex and differentiated; the major dis-
tinctions are based on etiological aspects of the disease (e.g.,
communicable, congenital, psychosomatic disease), the duration and course
of the disease (e.g., acute versus chronic, self-limiting versus pro-
gressive), and the prognosis (e.g., disabling, fatal disease). Medically,
diseases are also classified according to the symptoms and the organ or
system of the body affected (e.g., heart disease; disease of the
respiratory, circulatory, or digestive system).
Many of these characteristics, such as whether the disease is
clearly the result of an external agent, whether the disease is contagious
and could conceivably reach epidemic proportions, and the nature of the
disease cycle, have socially and psychologically significant consequences.
For example, communicable diseases are caused by various micro-organisms
(i.e., an "external agent M ) , are transmitted between individuals by
direct or indirect contact, and are often self-limiting (Coe, 1970).
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These features of communicable diseases may affect the perceived
culpability of the individual in contracting the disease, the incidence
of the disease, the perceived threat of the disease to the individual
and others, and interpersonal contact with the sick person (e.g.,
isolation or quarantine of the victims).
Although there is obviously some overlap between medical and lay
classifications of illness (e.g., King, 1962), and many medical
distinctions among illnesses have important consequences for the
individual and others, lay classifications and belief systems regarding
illness seem to reflect more heavily the personal and social consequences
of disease. Illness is experienced, interpreted, and acted upon in a
personal and social context, and the psychological and social aspects
of illness are probably at least as relevant to the individual's
experience of illness as the biological aspects.
In a factor analytic study of beliefs and feelings about three
diseases (viz., poliomyelitis, cancer, and mental illness), Jenkins and
Zyzanski (1968) identified three dimensions which were important in
perceptions of these diseases: a "human mastery" dimension (i.e.,
the completeness of knowledge about the disease and the effectiveness of
intervention) , a social acceptability-social stigma dimension, and a
personal involvement dimension. Fabrega and Manning (1972) identified
two dimensions in addition to the duration of the disease epidode and
the prognosis, or possibility of cure, that are important in the response
of individuals to illness--the degree of discomfort or disability, and
the discreditation or stigmatization of the illness. Similarly, Fabrega
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(1974), describing the nature of a
Mphenomenologic framework" of
disease which would articulate the important experiential dimensions
associated with illness, suggested that the four dimensions of dis-
comfort, disability, discreditation, and danger might be significant
for the individual.
Robinson (1971) collected semantic differential data on the con-
cept of "illness, 11 and found that the dimensions for which the average
response differed from the midpoint by at least one point were bad,
ill, and cruel . Robinson (1971) proposed several possible interpreta-
tions of the association of illness with "bad":
Illness could be seen in the sense of 'bad for' , or
causing problems for, the ill person and perhaps
others. This is consistent with the notion of ill-
ness interfering with normal bodily functioning and
the normal business of life. Clearly, illness could
also be interpreted as bad in the sense of unwholesome,
unfresh, or diseased. Finally, bad could be seen as
implying not only evil. . .but immorality, (p. 45)
Herzlich (1973) examined the illness classifications and distinc-
tions made by a hundred intensively interviewed respondents, and noted
the extent to which the important distinctions for her respondents
differed from medical or organic classifications. Unlike medical
classification systems, the etiology of illness did not figure
prominently in the classifications by her respondents, except to
distinguish illness from other states such as accidents and physical
disability. Herzlich 's interviews also revealed few references to
organic, objective, or impersonal factors; the individuals interviewed
did not typically distinguish illnesses on physiological or biological
bases.
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What did emerge from these in-depth interviews was a personal or
psychosocial frame of reference- -distinctions referring to the severity,
the pain, and the duration of illnesses. It is interesting to note that
the seriousness of an illness was not a specific attribute, but "an
accentuation of one of the features of a disorder 1 '; that is, a disease
was viewed as serious if it was chronic, fatal, or irreversible.
Herzlich (1973) suggested that "seriousness thus plays the role of
a super attribute expressing the relation of the individual to the ill-
ness rather than simply the nature of the illness itself" (p. 67). In
general, Herzlich concluded that the attributes used by individuals in
describing and understanding illness
have all the function of indicating the implications
of the illness for the present or future life of the
individual, and the way in which the person is in-
volved in the illness. . . their function is not to
simplify the multiplicity of diseases, but rather to
render it meaningful by defining the relation to the
individual in each case. The variety of individual
relations and responses to illness is implicitly
present in each of these classifications of illness.
(Herzlich, 1973, pp. 68-69)
It appears, then, that although some medical distinctions among
diseases, such as the duration and prognosis, are important in reactions
to illness, they are important because of their personal and social
meaning for the individual. The pain, discomfort, disability, or stigma
associated with an illness have significant personal and social con-
sequences for the individual, and help define the meaning of the
illness and reactions to it.
The relative unimportance of the etiological aspects of illness in
these descriptions is interesting, since most analyses of concepts
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of disease (e.g., Balint, 1957; King, 1962; Pflanz § Keupp, 1977;
Sigler § Osmond, 1973; Veatch, 1973) have focused heavily on beliefs
regarding disease causation. Ho\\rever, descriptions of the characteris-
tics of illness primarily address the nature of the illness or disease
episode, rather than the onset or etiology of the illness. While pain,
discomfort, and duration may define the individual's present and future
relation to illness (Herzlich, 1973) , it is etiological beliefs which
elaborate the individual's past relation to the illness. Causal beliefs
about illness play a significant role in personal and social reactions
to illness; etiological beliefs explain the occurrence of illness in a
particular individual, and delimit the extent to which the individual is
assigned or absolved from responsibility for the illness.
Lay explanations of illness
Unlike medical or scientific explanations of illness, which often
focus on how an illness occurs (e.g., germ theory), lay explanations
are frequently preoccupied with why the illness occurred. Although
patients often "know" something about an illness, through scientific
or folk knowledge, or direct experience (Wadsworth, 1976), they still
seek to understand why they (or particular individuals) are ill.
That is, a person may know that his or her illness is caused by a virus,
but this knowledge does not explain the singular or selective
occurrence of the illness-
-
fTWhv me? M
r
Zola (1972) observed that when an individual is asked what caused
his or her illness (e.g., diabetes or heart disease), the scientific
terminology, if not the content, of the answer is often quite accurate.
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But if such inquires into the perceived causes of an illness are follow-
ed by probes such as "Why did you get X now?", or "Of all the people
in your community, family, etc., who were exposed to X, why did you
get . . . ?," then "the rational scientific veneer is pierced and con-
cern with personal and moral responsibility emerges quite strikingly.
Indeed the issue 'Why me? 1 becomes of great concern and is generally
expressed in quite moral terms of what they did wrong" (p. 491).
Often, in response to the actual or rhetorical question "Why?",
the ill person seems to provide an answer to the more personally and
socially significant question "Why me?" This difference in the purpose
of medical and lay explanations- -the lfhow" versus the "why" of illness—
may account for the lack of correspondence between scientific medical
beliefs and lay beliefs, in spite of the general integration of medical
beliefs with other aspects of culture:
One can find . . . lay explanations for the causes of common
ailments alongside scientific methods of treating diseases.
For example, the appearance of symptoms such as fever, sore
throat, and frequent coughing are often attributed to the
behavior of the victim- -something he did or did not do-
rather than to the appropriate biological cause such as a
virus. Thus, the explanation that one "catches" a cold by
not dressing properly or not taking vitamins regularly,
etc., is commonly found even in areas where the best
scientific medicine is available. (Coe, 1971, p. 121)
Although there is evidence which demonstrates the persistence of
unverified folk beliefs in spite of available medical knowledge (e.g.,
King, 1962), attributions to the behavior of the ill person could also
be interpreted as efforts to explain the selective occurrence of illness—
why a particular person became ill- -rather than what actually caused the
illness. If almost everyone is exposed to germs and viruses, it makes
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sense that laypersons would look to the behavior (or other character-
istics) of the person to explain why one person "caught" a cold or
flu, while another did not.
Illnesses which are not widespread in a social group, which
single out individuals, seem especially likely to require answers to
the question "Why me?" Sontag (1978) , in a fascinating discussion of
the popular mythology of TB and cancer, noted that the "singling out"
of its victims is what once made tuberculosis seem so "interesting" or
"romantic," and "also made it a curse and source of special dread":
In contrast to the great epidemic diseases of the past
(bubonic plague, typhus, cholera), which strike each
person as a member of an afflicted community, TB was under-
stood as a disease that isolates one from the community.
However steep its incidence in a population, TB--like
cancer today- -always seemed to be a mysterious disease of
individuals, a deadly arrow that could strike anyone, that
singled out its victims one by one . . . People could
believe that TB was inherited . . . and also believe that
it revealed something singular about the person afflicted.
In a similar way, the evidence that there are cancer-prone
families and, possibly, a hereditary factor in cancer can
be acknowledged without disturbing the belief that cancer
is a disease that strikes each person, punitively, as an
individual. No one asks TrWhy me?" who gets cholera or
typhus. But "Why me?" (meaning "It's not fair") is the
question of many who learn they have cancer, (pp. 37-58)
Wo 1fenstein (1957) similarly observed that "a person may feel he is
being punished when misfortune befalls him singly. But when he becomes
involved in a large-scale disaster he may be more disposed to feel:
this cannot be aimed at me" (p. 202). So important is the perceived
selective occurrence of illness, the notion of individuals being
"singled out" for illness, that, according to anthropological research,
some local traditional classifications of illness distinguish between
"public" illnesses (e.g., cholera or influenza epidemics) and "private"
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or hereditary illnesses (Read, 1966). Today, with the control of
infectious diseases and the increased incidence of chronic illness,
most serious illnesses do appear to "single out" individuals and to
raise the question "Why me?"
Causal beliefs about illness seem to have an important role in
defining the personal and social significance of illness. Etiological
beliefs not only explain why the illness occurred in a particular
individual, but also delimit the extent to which the individual is
held responsible or accountable for the illness. Indeed, during the
initial phase of illness, the individual may be more concerned about
his or her past relation to the illness, in terms of a role in the
etiology of the illness, than in the nature of the illness, including
the prognosis (Balint, 1957; Korsch § Negrete, 1972; Wadsworth, 1976).
For example, Abrams and Finesinger (1953) discuss a patient with a
malignant tumor who was "more disturbed about whether or not her past
infection was the cause . . . than with the fact that she was dying"
(p. 476).
The clinical literature provides considerable evidence that when
events in life seem capricious and uncontrollable, as with the onset
of serious illness, people have a need to find a general purpose or
pattern of meaning in the course of events (Moos § Tsu, 1977). Although
much of the evidence derives from unsystematic observations, the avail-
able data suggest that very often the search for meaning or an explana-
tion of the illness takes the form of identifying the cause or assigning
responsibility for the occurrence of the illness.
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Bard and Dyk (1956), for example, intensively interviewed 100
patients who had undergone one of three surgical procedures:
gastrectomy , colostomy, or radical mastectomy. Of the 100 patients,
approximately half expressed spontaneous, unsolicited beliefs regarding
the cause of their illness, beliefs which were "cast in terms of
assigning culpability or responsibility for the illness" (p. 153).
The self-blame beliefs or attributions made by these patients generally
identified the illness as (a) punishment for wrong-doing in the past
(generalized wrong- doing or a specific act) , or (b) evidence of
personal failure. The patients' attributions regarding their illnesses
also revealed beliefs in retribution, fatalism, etc. Bard and Dyk
(1956) concluded that
When confronted with serious illness, individuals must
establish a belief explaining the event. The more serious
the disease (threat) , the more necessary the belief which
has as its purpose the preservation of emotional integrity
or the prevention of emotional disorganization. A sense of
mastery essential for functioning requires the discovery of
meaning in an otherwise disordered and chaotic situation . . .
Even minor threats to health, such a common colds, arouse
speculation ... As the threat to health increases in
severity and becomes a threat to survival, engaging in
speculative activity to establish a belief becomes more
necessary . . . The irrationality of beliefs probably
increases in direct proportion to the seriousness of the
threat so that one would expect to find fewer irrational
beliefs expressed in relation to the common cold than to
cancer . (pp . 159-160)
Abrams and Finesinger (1953) also reported a marked tendency of
cancer patients to explain the cause or responsibility for the disease.
Thirty of their 60 patients blamed their own past actions, citing
actions which ranged from a fall to sins. Almost all of the remaining
patients attributed the disease to someone else, specifying causes
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which ranged from contagion to acts of another person toward the patient,
such as the sexual demands of a marital partner. Moses and Cividali
(1966) observed that 30 of their cancer patients blamed others, and 8
patients blamed themselves.
An individual may perceive him or herself as responsible for the
illness because of a direct causal role in the occurrence of the illness,
or for failure to have prevented the illness from occurring. For
example, Kubler-Ross (1969) described a patient with Hodgkin's disease
who maintained that he had caused his illness by eating improperly.
Similarly, Bard and Dyk (1956) observed that some patients held them-
selves responsible for their illnesses for reasons such as irregular
or rapid eating habits, eating "inferior" food, or working too hard.
Taylor and Levin (1976) reported that many women blame their breast
cancer on premarital sex or other guilt-provoking acts.
People also fault themselves for failure to have prevented the
illness. Breast cancer patients, for instance, may blame themselves
for having delayed in seeking medical help (Abrams § Finesinger, 1953).
Chodoff
,
Friedman, and Hamburg (1964) , in a report of the coping
process of parents of terminally ill children, described a mother who
believed her daughter had "caught" leukemia from the tumors of a
family pet which she, herself, should have removed from the household.
Similar concerns about possible blameworthiness or negligence were
also observed by Davis (1963) in his study of families of polio victims.
The child's illness appeared to challenge the parents' conceptions
of themselves as responsible and devoted parents, and they worried that
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they could have done something to have prevented the illness, or to have
lessened its severity. Such beliefs may be associated with what Davis
(1963) described as a "key assumption in the American value system"-
-
namely, that misfortune rarely touches those who take the proper pre-
cautionary measures
.
In addition to specific acts of commission or omission, people
may perceive their illness, or the illnesses of others, as punishment
for prior deeds or misdeeds. Davis (1963) noted that even if parents
had followed all known precautionary measures, they may still blame
themselves because of an attitude toward misfortune which can "give rise
to guilt feelings of a theoretical or metaphysical kind. Here the
belief is that the family is somehow guilty of having pursued a faulty
scheme of life that in unknown but predetermined ways resulted in mis-
fortune to the child." In other families, the belief that "the child 1 s
disease was retribution for unknown transgressions was expressed in
more conventional ways such as, T What have we done that God has singled
us out for this? 1 " (Davis, 1963, p. 37). Schoenberg and Senescu
(1970) cited an example of a Catholic woman who was coerced by her
husband to use contraception in order to limit their family size.
After several years of diaphragm use, the woman developed cervical
cancer, and viewed the disease as punishment for her transgression.
Evidence of beliefs that illness represents some sort of divine
retribution for prior transgressions or sins has also been reported by
other researchers (Abrams and Finesinger, 1953; Bard and Dyk, 1956;
Chodoff et al., 1964).
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In some instances, the medical treatment, as well as the illness
itself, may be viewed as punishment (Schoenberg $ Senescu, 1970).
Lambert and Lambert (1979), for example, noted that mastectomees who
delayed in seeking medical care may believe that their delay con-
tributed to the severity of the disease, and may view the extensiveness
of the surgery (radical versus simple mastectomy) as punishment for
such action.
There are exceptions, consistent with the historical conceptions
discussed earlier, to these reactions to illness as misfortune. Ill-
ness is sometimes viewed as the result of divine will, but an act
which reflects positively on the sick person, because it is a comment
on their spiritual qualities or inner strength, or because it represents
an opportunity for spiritual purification and enrichment. Several of
Bard and Dyk's (1956) patients expressed this view: "God fits the
burden to the back that can bear it. God must love me a lot," and
"God chastizes those whom He loves" (p. 151). Similarly, Davis (1963)
reported that the Catholic parents of a polio victim "chose to regard
it as a stigma indicative of their son's blessedness and calling to
the cloth" (p. 38). Herzlich (1973) also noted this conception of
illness, albeit less common, in the views of her respondents. Some
individuals perceived pain and illness as having formative value,
through which the sick person or invalid attains a "personality ideal":
" f The invalid grows in stature because he has an experience which
others do not have. You can see people who have gained greatly
psychologically, who have become exceptional people' " (p. 119).
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Siegler and Osmond (1973), describing historically recurring
models of illness, argued that the most common alternative to the
medical model is "the moral one in which the illness is precisely the
patient's fault: it is the punishment for immoral behavior 1 ' (p. 46).
Siegler and Osmond maintain that both views, the medical and the
moral, are almost always present. The clinical literature suggests
that patients themselves may adopt a moral rather than medical view
of their illness, perhaps because the moral model has greater personal
and social meaning for the individual. Very often, what is taken as
a causal explanation- -a response to the question "Why?"- -may, implicitly,
be a response to the more personally and socially significant question,
tfWhy me?" Indeed, since the causes of serious illness are often
unknown or beyond an individual's control, understanding why he or she
(or another person) was "singled out" may be more crucial in the
individual's efforts to make sense of the misfortune than the actual
causes of the illness.
The anthropological literature contains evidence of similar moral
beliefs regarding disease causation. In more primitive societies,
illness is often believed to represent retribution or sanction for
past sins, and illness is frequently inseparable from norms for moral
and social conduct (e.g., Coe, 1971; King, 1962; Susser $ Watson, 1971).
According to King (1962), illness is often believed to result from
spirit intrusion, "soul loss," and breach of taboo:
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Not infrequently do we hear people ascribe their illness
or that of someone else to punishment by the Deity for
wrongdoing . . . When someone of good character becomes
ill with an incurable disease, those close and dear to him
often ask "Why did it happen to him?"- -by which they imply
that such diseases should not strike good people. The
idea of breach of taboo as a cause of disease has been
pushed from the conscious lives of most of us, but not
eliminated, (p. 100)
Many of these causal beliefs, including self-blame and the blame
of others, may serve to deny the "intolerable conclusion that no one
is responsible" and that the event has come about impersonally and
meaninglessly (Chodoff et al., 1964). They provide a personal
explanation and meaning for a potentially life-threatening event
(Lambert § Lambert, 1979). But illness is a social phenomena as
well as a personal event, and once the illness is known (or can be
observed) by others, it has more than just a personal meaning.
Indeed, the causal beliefs and guilt expressed by ill persons
often reveal concerns and fears about how others will perceive and
react to them- -"health and illness are experienced and thought of
by the individual in reference to society" (Herzlich, 1973, p. 104).
Hamburg and Adams (1967), for example, observed that severely burned
patients and patients with severe poliomyelitis made efforts to test
significant others to determine whether they would still be regarded
with positive feelings despite their damaged conditions, and whether
they could still win affection and respect in ways that had proved
effective in the past. Lambert and Lambert (1979) maintain that
family members, especially, should be encouraged to examine their
reactions to the illness: "For example, do they see the individual
as weak, do they feel that the illness places a stigma upon them, or
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do they feel responsible for the illness?" (p. 257).
Concern about how they will be perceived by others is particularly
strong for persons for whom the illness (or treatment) involves
permanent disability or disfigurement. Davis (1963) reported that the
families of polio victims, perhaps cognizant of their own prior
attitudes toward disabled persons, believed that their misfortune would
be accompanied by a loss of status. Similarly, Golden and Davis (1977),
in a report of the reactions of parents of infants with Down's
Syndrome, indicated that the "parents may view the child as unworthy
or at least believe that others will perceive him that way" (p. 47).
Perhaps because of the unknown cause and uncertain cure, cancer,
and the social consequences of cancer, may seem particularly frighten-
ing (Levine, 1962). Abrams and Finesinger (1953) concluded that guilt
among cancer patients was related to a common belief that cancer is a
disease of unclean origin, a mark of disgrace (cf. Sontag, 1978).
Hinton (1973), in a discussion of the stresses which people with cancer
must bear, noted a perceived loss of social status and a sense of
alienation: "Patients sensed that many did not care about them as
individuals any longer and some people positively wanted no more to
do with them" (p. 63). Bard and Sutherland (1955) reported that a
large proportion of breast cancer patients were deeply concerned that
others might learn of their illness and mastectomy:
Unfortunately, concern about others knowing is often
reinforced by attitudes in the community regarding the
disabled. If a patient experiences a lowering of self-
esteem, it is not difficult for her to conceive of social
isolation or at least as being regarded as inferior as
a consequence of radical mastectomy, (p. 668)
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Similarly, Moos and Tsu (1977) noted that the terminally ill
patient fears "that because of changes in body appearance or function,
the physical or economic burdens of his care, or simply his new status
as a dying person, family, friends and physicians may reject or
abandon him" (p. 398). However, the actual reactions of others may
sometimes be much more positive than the reaction anticipated or feared
by a patient and his or her family. Davis (1963) reported that the
considerable attention and sympathy from the friends and neighbors of
parents of polio victims "clearly played an important part in mitigat-
ing the parents ' feelings that they might have been negligent or were
otherwise blameworthy for the child's illness" (p. 39).
These observations indicate that it is not enough for the sick
person to cope individually. Illness has important social consequences,
and requires personal and social adjustment by the individual and
others. The adjustment and reaction of the individual is in part a
function of the reactions- -real or imagined—of others.
Social consequences of illness
One of the major concerns of the sick person is how others will
perceive and react to him or her (Lambert § Lambert, 1979). Just as
illness has an impact on an individual's self-perception, it is
likely to affect the perception of the person by others. Beyond the
obvious effects of illness on a person's physical activity and well-
being, illness can affect a person's social status and relations with
others. Based on prior experience and culturally shared beliefs and
values regarding illness, the individual likely anticipates how others
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will react to him or her. Thus, individuals' reactions to illness
depend in part on their beliefs about how society and significant
others will perceive them, and the actual reactions of others to them
and their illness (Herzlich, 1973; Lambert § Lambert, 1979; Robinson,
1973; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970).
The reactions of others- -real or imagined--can affect not only the
individual's personal reaction and adjustment to illness, but whether
he or she seeks medical care or accepts treatment. Safilios-Rothschild
(1970) noted that in Greece, for example, persons afflicted with tuber-
culosis are very strongly motivated to deny and conceal symptoms as
long as possible, because TB carries a social stigma for the individual
and his or her family which cannot be removed, regardless of the treat-
ment outcome. Susser and Watson (1971) made similar observations about
the stigma associated with TB and the acceptance of treatment:
To (the patient), tuberculosis may conjureup "galloping
consumption"; he may regard it as a sentence of death;
he may see it as a curse on his family, a punishment for
sin. Some people . . . attach a stigma to the disease,
and consider the whole family of a patient as contaminated
and dangerous (Rosenbluth § Bowlby, 1955) . This attitude
will help to strengthen the patient's feelings of guilt.
If he is forced by illness to consult the doctor, he may
subsequently ignore the doctor's course of treatment,
hoping to conceal his condition from other members of his
group, and thereby ward off the stigma attaching to it.
(p. 65)
There is also evidence that such reactions may vary according to
education, social class, and ethnic origin. Jenkins (1966), in a
study of group differences in perceptions and beliefs about tuber-
culosis, found that blacks were more familiar with TB than were whites
and Latin Americans, that they perceived it as powerful, mysterious,
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and embarrassing, and that they believed that "bad" people were more
likely to get TB than "good11 people.
When an individual is sick, ,rhe feels that something is wrong with
him as_ a whole individual , and his sickness is apt to permeate every-
thing that he does and all the ways in which he perceives himself"
(Coe, 1970, p. 91). This also appears to be true with respect to the
perceptions of others- -observers tend to form negative impressions of
the person, and to view him or her as inferior in terms of all
attributes on the basis of a visible or known negatively valued
attribute (e.g., Bynder § New, 1976; Dembo, Ladieu- Leviton, § Wright,
1956; Goffman, 1963; Hunt, 1966; Wright, 1964). Bynder and New (1976)
argued that physical disability is an example of physical impairment
transformed into "social incapacity" imposed upon the person by others.
Goffman (1963) has observed that it is common for people to view
another person's physical disability as evidence of a moral defect; as
a result, the person's entire identity may be "spoiled" by the dis-
ability.
With respect to disability, a frequent consequence of chronic
illness, research has shown that people express more rejecting
attitudes toward disabled than nondisabled persons. A number of studies
have found that the disabled are the target of prejudice and discrimin-
ation similar to that expressed toward racial, ethnic, and religious
minorities (see Chesler, 1965, for a review). For example, Centers and
Centers (1963) found that "normal" children designated airputee class-
mates as the least liked by themselves and others, and perceived
them as the least attractive, the least fun to play with, and the
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saddest children in the class. Further, there is evidence that dis-
abled students prefer nondisabled students as often as do the non-
disabled students themselves (Ingwell, Thoresen, $ Smith, 1967).
Despite the evidence of negative evaluation and social rejection
of the sick and disabled, there are strong social and moral norms
which proscribe open rejection or mistreatment of sick and disabled
persons (Jordan, 1963). Safilios -Rothschild (1970) suggested that
the source of this proscription may be the "cultural belief that the
disabled are 'inferior 1 and it is therefore inhuman and cruel for
their 'superiors' to reject or mistreat them. Safilios -Rothschild
(1970) further proposed that "magical thinking" may reinforce this
normative proscription at the individual level by "suggesting that
the rejection or mistreatment of the disabled could result in the
non-disabled being punished with a similiar affliction" (p. 129).
It is interesting to note that although observers' reactions
seem to have an important influence on the individual's reaction and
adjustment to his or her illness, the individual's reaction may have
little impact on the reactions of others. Shontz (1975) has argued
that almost all serious illness is regarded as misfortune, and that
this is a social judgment which is almost invariably accompanied
by the assumption that the unfortunate person suffers as a result of
the illness. This judgment by observers, according to Shontz, is
independent of the reaction of the person about whom the judgment
is made. That is, the sick person may regard him or herself as
fortunate, but this reaction may have little effect on observers, who
may impose suffering if they fail to observe it in those deemed
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"unfortunate, 11 The demand that the unfortunate suffer establishes a
self-fulfilling prophecy by which enforced suffering is attributed to
the misfortune itself, and the ill person is placed in an inferior
status position and devalued. Ultimately, Shontz (1975) argued, the
sick person may become convinced that he or she is unfortunate, and
perhaps even that his or her devaluation is deserved.
The social aspects of illness, revealed by lay classifications
and explanations of illness, and personal and social reactions to
illness, suggest three general classes of variables that may affect
social judgments about illness: (a) characteristics of the illness,
such as the severity, visibility, parts of the anatomy affected, the
possibility of contagion, and the prognosis, (b) prevailing beliefs
about disease causation, and about the role of the individual in the
etiology and prevention of illness, and (c) cultural values regarding
health and illness, including the degree of stigmatization associated
with a particular illness. Despite the lack of systematic evidence
of the effect of illness on perceptions of a person, there are
theories in sociology and social psychology which indicate how
observers' perceptions of a person should be influenced by knowledge
that he or she is ill. These theoretical formulations suggest mechan-
isms by which the characteristics of illness and cultural beliefs
about illness may be linked to observers' perceptions of the physically
ill, and indicate additional factors which may affect observers
1
judgments regarding illness. Within sociology, role theory and label-
ing theory address many questions regarding social reactions to the
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physically ill, and social psychological theories of social perception
and attribution suggest additional cognitive and motivational factors
that may affect observers' perceptions of victims of physical illness.
Sociological Perspectives
Medical sociology has long been concerned with the study of
responses to illness, or more generally, behavior and interpersonal
relations in health and illness. From a sociological viewpoint, ill-
ness is defined in terms of the situation and social behavior, as
well as biology. Illness is generally regarded as a form of social
deviance, and the sick person is seen as temporarily occupying a
unique social position. With Parsons' (1951) classic analysis of the
roles of patient and doctor in our society, the concept of the "sick
role" gained prominence, and has provided the conceptual framework for
much of the research in this area.
The sick role
In essence, Parsons (1951) viewed sickness as a form of deviance
which presents problems for both the individual and the social system,
because it hinders the effective performance of social roles. Society,
which has a functional interest in controlling and minimizing the
incidence of illness, develops a special, temporary social role for
the sick person. By adhering to this defined role, the sick person
adjusts both to the illness and to the demands of society. Through
the sick role, the sick person is granted privileges typically
denied to other types of social deviants, and sickness becomes a
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'legitimated' 1 form of social deviance. Four institutionalized
expectations acconpany the sick role: The sick person is exenpted
from "normal social role responsibilities, which of course is relative
to the nature and severity of the illness" (Parsons, 1951, p. 436).
The sick person is not blamed for the illness, and cannot be expected
to get well by an act of decision or will. However, the person must
regard the state of being ill as undesirable, and must want to "get
well." Finally, the sick person has an obligation to seek technically
competent help, to cooperate with the physician, and to comply with
prescribed health regimens (Parsons, 1951; see Levine § Kozloff, 1978,
for a recent review)
.
For the present analysis, the most critical feature of the sick
role is the person's exemption from responsibility for the illness .
As noted earlier, the role of the sick person, historically, was not
well differentiated from the roles of the criminal, the possessed, or
the religiously inspired (Veatch, 1973). In contemporary society,
being sick, according to Parsons (1951), is "distinguished from other
deviant roles precisely by the fact that the sick person is not
regarded as 'responsible' for his condition, 'he can't help it' "
(p. 440) .On this view, illness is a disvalued condition that results
from "natural" causes, and the sick person is usually not blamed by
others for his or her condition:
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Most physical illnesses fall within definitions of
"sickness 11 rather than "badness." We rarely hold
people responsible or accountable for their physical
ills, and although from time to time persons might not
take necessary precautions to avoid risks of illness,
we assume that illness is an event that happens to
people, and that it is not motivated. There are, of
course, occasions where physical illness may be viewed as
trbadness M if there is reason to believe that the patient's
condition was self-inflicted for special advantages . . .
And there are other situations where patients are con-
sidered as "crocks" and "malingerers" because no clear
evidence of illness can be found ... In such cases,
doctors and other evaluators may be dubious as to
whether the patient's condition is really an event
(something that happens to a person involuntarily)."
(Mechanic, 1968, pp. 46-47)
The exemption from responsibility for the condition is a corollary
of the acknowledgment that the sick person, once he or she is ill,
cannot willfully return to a state of health. Generally, according to
Parsons, the sick person is exempted from responsibility for the
condition, and recovery is perceived as not under his or her willful
control: "The sick person is, therefore, in a state \\rhere he is
suffering or disabled or both, and possibly facing risks of worsening,
which is socially defined as either 'not his fault' or something from
which he cannot be expected to extricate himself by his own effort,
or generally both" (Parsons, 1951, p. 440). These features of the sick
role, as described by Parsons, conform closely to the medical model
and medical expectations of the patient. Illness is seen as deriving
from natural causes, rather than any human action or intention.
Clearly, one of the major functions of the medical model has been
the removal of individual culpability, and the moral and punitive
consequences, for illness (Sontag, 1978; Veatch, 1973; Zola, 1972).
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Medicine, in contrast to the legal system, deals with acts or
conditions for which the individual is believed not responsible, and
thus the individual is "treated 11 rather than "punished11 (e.g., Robinson,
1973; Zola, 1972). Generally, it has been considered humane and
enlightened to extend the medical model to other forms of social
deviation, such as criminal behavior and alcoholism. Despite this
ideal, however, moral judgments and issues of individual responsibility
can still be discerned in all aspects of illness- -from etiology to
treatment and recovery.
The sick role requires that the person try to get well as quickly
as possible, a requirement that includes seeking competent care and
following prescribed treatment. Zola (1972) has argued that while the
sick person may not be "directly condemned for being sick," the
condemnation may be displaced to the person's response to illness and
efforts to regain health:
Though his immoral character is not demonstrated in his
having a disease, it becomes evident in what he does about
it. Without seeming ludicrous, if one listed the traits
of people who break appointments, fail to follow treatment
regimen, or even delay in seeking medical aid, one finds
a long list of 'personal flaws. 1 Such people seem to be
ever ignorant of the consequences of certain diseases, in-
accurate as to symptomatology, unable to plan ahead or
find time, burdened with shame, guilt, neurotic tendencies,
haunted with traumatic medical experiences or members of
some lower status minority group- -religious, ethnic, racial
or socio-economic. In short, they appear to be a sorely
troubled if not disreputable group of people, (pp. 490-491)
Moreover, failure to improve following medical intervention may
lead to the sick person being perceived as a lfbad" patient (e.g.,
Reynolds § Bice, 1971). Roth (1963) and Siegler and Osmond (1973)
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have noted that patients themselves may adopt this moral basis for
categorizing patients, and may equate recovery with being a "good"
patient: "The 'good' patient believes, so to speak, that he should
get time off for good behavior" (Roth, 1963, p. 38).
The medical view of illness as biological and occurring on an
individual basis, and the emphasis on treatment, rather than prevention,
also serve to focus attention on the individual in illness. Social and
environmental causes of illness are generally regarded as of secondary
importance; once illness has occurred, the source and the treatment of
the problem are located in the individual (cf . Caplan $ Nelson, 1973)
.
Thus, the medical ,fbattle" almost always takes place at an individual
level (cf. Sontag, 1978):
. . . cancers today are recognized to result, in 60-90 per cent
of the cases, from artificially created, environmental
carcinogens, yet the prescribed treatment is ex post radiation,
chemotherapy, and surgical removal rather than environmental
prevention. Although, "normal" mental illness (depression,
chronic anxiety, etc.) is similarly recognized to result
from adverse social organization, again, the prescribed treat-
ment is some combination of drugs, psychotherapy, trans-
cendental meditation, and other forms of instrumental victim-
blaming "cures." (Kelman, 1975, p. 629)
This focus on the individual is especially interesting in light of the
fact that many of the greatest advances in disease control have been
produced by non-medical intervention, particularly social, political,
and environmental change (Dubos, 1971).
More importantly, the issue of personal responsibility" seems
to be re-emerging within medicine (Veatch, 1973; Zola, 1972). The
control of infectious diseases and the increase in the incidence of
chronic illness has been accompanied by a shift from the classical
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medical doctrine of specific etiology to a multicausal view of illness
which implicates both the individual and the social and physical
environment in the disease process (Coe, 1970; Dodge § Martin, 1970).
The implications for the individual of this shift from the infectious
etiological model (viz., germ theory) to a multiple causation model
have been succintly stated by Illich (1976): "As long as disease is
something that takes possession of people, something they "catch" or
"get," the victims of these natural processes can be exempted from
responsibility for their condition . . . The medical diagnosis of
substantive disease entities that supposedly take shape in the
individual's body is a surreptitious and amoral way of blaming the
victim" (p. 165).
When prevention is emphasized over treatment, it is usually the
personal burden of the individual: "People are being told that they
are responsible for their own health and, consequently, for their
illness. Sickness is becoming as disreputable as poverty was a
generation ago. It is being viewed as personal failure" (Gustaitis,
1978, p. 22). A prominent spokesperson for the responsibility of
the individual is Knowles (1977), who asserted that the individual has
a "moral responsibility" to maintain his own health, and that the
"primary critical choice" facing the individual is "to change his
personal bad habits or stop complaining. He can either remain the
problem or become the solution to it" (p. 78). Veatch (1973) has
described the extent to which the individual is currently held re-
sponsible for illness:
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Certainly a heart attack is partially preventable, and
an individual who fails to watch diet, exercise, and
standards for physical examination may be seen as blame-
worthy if he has a coronary. Exposure to bacteria may
be willful, through failure to observe sanitary and
innoculation precautions known or thought to be effective.
A parent may be blamed and feel guilty if his child suffers
an attack of a preventable disease. The elaborate pre-
cautions taken by parents of the previous generation to
avoid contact with children with polio suggests the extremes
to which traditional illnesses can be culpable. Even cancer
is now subject to the norms of the "seven danger signals."
Genetic counseling and screening is moving rapidly to make
even genetic disease a culpable event, albeit culpable at
the parental level. (Veatch, 1973, pp. 65-66)
This new "blame -the -sick" perspective may be, in part, an inad-
vertent consequence of the "self-help" movement in health care
(Crawford, 1977; Gustaitis, 1978). What began as a reaction to the
overmedicalization of American life, and the professional and male
domination of health care, the self-help movement "lends itself to
the purposes of victim-blaming" because of its emphasis on individual
control and responsibility for health (Crawford, 1977).
Individuals are not only being held responsible for their failure
to prevent illnesses, but they are more and more frequently being
identified as the cause of their own illnesses, and told that they can
willfully cure themselves or ward off disease. Perhaps the most
extreme example of this view are the persistent efforts to establish
a "cancer personality" (e.g., Greene, 1966; LeShan, 1966; Paloucek §
Graham, 1966; Schamale § Iker, 1966). Psychosomatic theories of
illness, and notion of "lifestyle," "stress," and "personality" as
causes of disease, are becomingly increasingly popular, and even more
seriously jeopardize the notion of blamelessness inherent in the
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medical model and the sick role. The popularity of ideas regarding the
possible psychogenesis of illness may herald a return to a self-blaming
conception of illness in which the individual is further held respon-
sible because of the stress, emotions, or psychological conflict which
are believed to have induced the illness and possibly hindered
recovery (e.g., Herzlich, 1973; Sontag, 1978; Veatch, 1973; Zola, 1972):
Theories that diseases are caused by mental states and can
be cured by will power are always an index of how much is
not understood about the physical terrain of a disease.
Moreover, there is a peculiarly modern predilection for
psychological explanations of disease, as of everything
else. Psychologizing seems to provide control over the
experiences and events (like grave illnesses) over which
people have in fact little or no control. Psychological
understanding undermines the "reality 1 ' of a disease. . . .
Illness is interpreted as, basically, a psychological event,
and people are encouraged to believe that they get sick
because they (unconsciously) want to, and that they can
cure themselves by the mobilization of will; that they can
choose not to die of the disease. . . . Psychological
theories of illness are a powerful means of placing blame
on the ill. Patients who are instructed that they have,
unwittingly, caused their disease are also being made to
feel that they have deserved it. (Sontag, 1978, pp. 55-57)
Medical personnel as well as laypersons may blame a sick person
because of the perceived psychogenesis of an illness: MOne of the
most devastating consequences of peptic ulcers is the widely held
belief that the gastrointestinal alteration is brought about exclusively
by psychic stress. Members of the health care team who adhere to this
belief are prone to blame the individual for creating the illness
M
(Lambert § Lambert , 1979)
.
Thus, in contradistinction to the sick role model, the individual
may be blamed for the disease itself, weak resistance to disease
entities, failure to observe preliminary signs of illness, failure
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to seek medical care immediately, and/or failure to get well. Note,
however, that although the individual may be perceived as responsible
for the illness, there is rarely any question of the undesirability
of illness, or the unintentional nature of the person's activity. In
addition to the above noted changes in medical views and health care
philosophy, the discrepancy between Parson's sick role model and
current beliefs regarding individual responsibility in illness may be
attributable, in part, to confusion between the sociological level of
analysis and the level of individual psychological experience
(Herzlich, 1973; Levine $ Kozloff, 1978). Despite changes in attitudes
regarding personal responsibility for illness, the sick role model may
describe general social expectations for some illnesses; however, it
does not adequately deal with the attitudes, interpretations, and
behavior of individuals.
Questions of responsibility and willful recovery are of vital
importance in the reactions of the sick person and other individuals:
"The way in which social action is seen, interpreted, and reacted to,
both within and without illness situations is often based crucially on
the attribution of individual responsibility" (Robinson, 1973, p. 55).
Even if, in a broader social sense, the individual is not held re-
sponsible for his or her illness, the perceived role of the individual
in the etiology or prevention of the illness are likely to be very
important to the individual's understanding of the illness and the
reactions of others toward the sick person.
Several researchers have studied the extent to which individuals
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share Parsons' (1951) notions of the privileges and obligations accom-
panying the sick role. Twaddle (1969), based on interviews with 29
men, concluded that when the elements of the sick role were examined
individually, Parsons' analysis described the modal response of his
subjects. When the elements were treated collectively, however, the
Parsonian model described the attitudes and behavior of only a small
minority of the respondents. Similarly, Segall (1976) interviewed
housewives and found that although few respondents "disagreed
completely" with Parsons' conception of the sick role, many responses
were "uncertain." A majority of the respondents did indicate that a
sick person cannot be held responsible, but clear-cut agreement was
observed for only one component of the sick role- -sick persons have
an obligation to try to get well. Even stronger criticism of the
applicability of the Parsonian model to individual expectations or
perceptions of others' expectations was expressed by Berkanovic (1972):
"the sick role does not identify distinguishable areas in the
cognitive process by which these respondents form behavioral expecta-
tions of the ill. The data support the suggestion that Parsons'
system level analysis of the sick role as an ideal type is inadequate
as a unit of analysis at the social-psychological level" (p. 58).
The applicability of the "sick role" concept, and the legitimacy
of sick role incumbency, is also widely recognized to be a function of
the characteristics of illness—nature, severity, and duration (e.g.,
Freidson, 1970; Gordon, 1966; Robinson, 1971, 1973; Wilson, 1970).
The Parsonian model of the sick role is a temporary social role, and
is generally regarded as appropriate for acute illnesses and conditions
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(e.g., pneumonia, appendicitis, kidney stones, etc.). Freidson (1970)
argued that the privileges and obligations posited by Parsons do not
hold for some chronic illnesses, but he acknowledged that the sick role
model does hold for some acute illnesses. Moreover, Freidson noted
that the individual is not exempted from blame for some illnesses
(e.g., venereal diseases), and he or she may suffer stigma for other
illnesses (e.g., venereal diseases, mental illness, and even cancer).
The characteristics of chronic illness or permanent disability
depart in crucial ways from Parsons' formulation of the sick role.
With chronic illness or disability, the sick person cannot, by
definition, be expected to get well, nor is he or she totally exempted
from "normal social role responsibilities." For the chronically ill
or disabled person, exemption from normal role responsibilities is
typically partial rather than total, since many chronically ill persons
are ambulatory (Kassebaum § Baumann, 1965). According to Robinson
(1973) , the incompatibility between having a chronic (and perhaps
severe) illness condition and the temporary nature of the position of
"patient, !f results in "a redefinition of the chronically symptomatic
person's 'normal health.' That is, the chronic condition gradually
becomes incorporated by the symptomatic person and others into the
definition of the symptomatic person's 'normal health' M (p. 59).
The tendency to incorporate chronic illness or incapacity into a
conception of "normal health" is supported by research in which re-
spondents were asked to indicate whether or not a person with various
conditions was "ill." Gordon (1966) found that persons were most
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frequently regarded as ill for illness conditions with a serious, un-
certain, or worsening prognosis. Persons with a controllable illness
condition or in the process of being cured were the next most
frequently identified as ill, and persons with a chronic condition or
permanently disabled by a past condition were the least likely to be
classified as ill. Gordon (1966) interpreted these data as evidence
for "two distinct unrelated statuses and complementary role expecta-
tions associated with illness conditions' 1 (p. 99). Expectations for
ill persons --those with serious and uncertain prognoses- -correspond
to Parsons' conception of the sick role, and the role pressure applied
by others "serves to discourage normal behavior" (p. 79). The second
set of expectations referred to persons in the "impaired role"- -persons
with a known and nonserious condition. For persons regarded as im-
paired, role pressure tended to "support normal behavior" (p. 98).
Unlike the sick role, the impaired role is relatively permanent, and
is typically accompanied by a loss of status (Gordon, 1966; Siegler §
Osmond, 1973).
In short, Parsons' sick role model describes the general social
expectations for the person who is sick with some illness conditions.
The attachment of a diagnostic label, typically by a physician (or
other authority) , serves to legitimize the status of the sick person
as ill, and to define the privileges and obligations of the sick
person and others. The sick role is a socially disapproved, albeit
legitimate, social role which is temporary and rather unstable. The
sick role model is largely limited in its applicability to some acute
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illnesses; chronic illness appears to depart in crucial ways from the
fundamental elements of Parsons' model. The sick role model is not
easily translated into expected individual reactions regarding illness,
and it does not address the long-term social consequences of having
been labeled "ill" or, in the case of chronic illness, of being
permanently labeled "ill." Statements of labeling theory and stigma,
however, have attempted to answer questions regarding the long-term
social consequences of being labeled "ill." Although the labeling
approach has stimulated some interesting research, it has not been
well-articulated, and there is a lack of consensus regarding the
principle elements of the theory, the limits of the theory, and the
phenomena to which it applies (Schur, 1971). In the following section,
no attempt will be made to present the issues and scope of the labeling
perspective; rather, this discussion will include selected aspects of
the literature which may contribute to an understanding of the social
consequences of chronic illness.
Labeling and stigma
Entry to the sick role is usually accomplished by the attachment
of a diagnostic label of "ill" by a medical doctor or other authority.
Illness, within the sociological scheme of things, is regarded as a
social category of deviance which derives its meaning from the social
interpretation and evaluation of a biological abnormality (e.g.,
Freidson, 1970; Parsons, 1951; Sedgwick, 1973; Veatch, 1973). Thus,
illness is "partly biologically and partly socially defined" (Parsons,
1951, p. 431). In order to constitute deviance and, thus, illness,
the
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biological condition must be perceived as abnormal and negative:
All sickness is essentially deviancy . That is to say, no
attribution of sickness to any being can be made without
the expectation of some alternative state of affairs which
is considered more desirable. . . . All illness, whether
considered in localized bodily terms or within a larger view
of human functioning, expresses both a social value-judgment
(contrasting a person T s condition with certain understood
and accepted norms) and an attempt at explanation (with a
view to controlling the disvalued condition). (Sedgwick,
1973, pp. 32-36)
Thus, illness, sociologically defined, is a socially constructed
deviancy. Labeling a person as ill --imputing biological and social
deviance to a person- -involves a social judgment (e.g., Freidson, 1970;
Sedgwick, 1973; Veatch, 1973). The labeling perspective (e.g., Lemert,
1964, 1967) is not concerned with the reasons for a person possessing
a deviant attribute such as illness, but with the effect of the attri-
bute being recognized formally and publically. Conceptualizing ill-
ness as a socially deviant condition does not imply blame, since
"legitimated11 and "nonlegitimated" forms of social deviancy are dis-
tinguished in the literature. With respect to illness, Parsons (1958)
argued that "to be ill is thus to be in a partially and conditionally
legitimated state. The essential condition of its legitimization . . .
is the recognition by the sick person that to be ill is inherently
undesirable , that he therefore has an obligation to try to
T get well'
and to cooperate with others to this end" (pp. 176-177).
Although the concept of illness as social deviancy is widely
accepted in the sociological literature, the "deviant" nature of
illness has not gone unchallenged. Robinson (1973) has argued that
illness does not conform to usual definitions of deviancy. Cohen
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(1966), for example, noted that deviant roles are typically dis-
valued (i.e., typically low status, undesirable roles), but that not
all disvalued roles are deviant. What distinguishes the deviant and
the disvalued role, according to Cohen (1966), is that the deviant
knows what he or she is doing and is capable of doing otherwise, but
chooses instead to violate a normative rule. Unlike the deviant,
the disvalued person does not intentionally violate a normative rule
and so may not legitimately be held accountable for his or her
behavior. According to this distinction, the role of the sick person
is disvalued, rather than deviant. Recall, however, that when Parsons
(1951) chose to refer to the sick role as a deviant role, he made a
similar point in arguing that the involuntary nature of illness dis-
tinguished the sick role from other deviant roles. Robinson (1973)
further maintained that since illness is an expected aspect of
everyone's life, and society anticipates that its members will become
ill at times , illness does not involve the violation of a normative
rule, and thus does not constitute deviancy... However, for the purposes
of the present analysis, it matters little whether illness is regarded
as "deviant" or simply "disvalued."
Clearly, there are varying degrees to which a person may adopt
the sick role, and thus, varying degrees to which the illness may
affect the person's activity and identity. Lemert (1964, 1967) has
differentiated between primary and secondary deviant roles. Primary
deviant roles are roles which have a minimal impact on a person's
normal social roles and activities, while secondary deviant roles
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require more extensive reorganization and redefinition of a person's
identity and social roles. Freidson (1970) borrowed this distinction
to illustrate the existence of different types of deviant roles in
health and illness. Minor medical problems, for example, produce only
a primary role; the individual with a cold, because the condition is
minor and transitory, typically does not fully require the exemptions
and responsibilities of the sick role. The person with a serious ill-
ness (e.g., appendicitis, polio), however, adopts the sick role com-
pletely, and it temporarily becomes a secondary role. In the case of
chronic illness or disability, the condition is likely to lead to a
permanent secondary role, and the person develops a moral or social
"career" (Goffman, 1963; Lemert, 1964).
The ijuportance of the distinction between primary and secondary
deviant roles, as Field (1976) noted, is that it highlights the
critical role of the reactions of the individual and others to the
deviation. If it is perceived by the individual and others aware of
it as an acceptable change in the normal behavior or condition of the
individual, "then it will not lead to any substantial redefinition of
the individual, nor, in the case of disease, will it lead to entry into
the 'sick role.' Such 'normalizing' of primary deviance is a common and
frequent part of our daily life, and it may continue even in the face
of very extreme departures from the normal and expected. . . . However
. . . when a person's behavior persistently fails to meet the expecta-
tions of others ... a search for an explanation of the unusual
behavior will be initiated" (Field, 1976, p. 337). The label chosen to
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interpret or explain the unusual behavior or condition is critical in
determining the subsequent reactions of the individual and others.
The label of "illness" and the role of the sick person are not
socially valued, and can temporarily or permanently reduce an indivi-
dual's status. An important consequence of any medical diagnosis or
label is that it can stigmatize or "spoil" the identity of the person
to whom it is applied. Recognition of the attribute or label by others
can lead to the person being perceived primarily in terms of the dis-
valued attribute rather than other personal qualities (e.g., Deiribo,
Ladieu-Leviton, § Wright, 1956; Goffman, 1963; Hunt, 1966; Safilios-
Rothschild, 1970; Wright, 1964), and can permanently affect the person's
identity, particularly when the person is perceived not only as
"different," but as "inferior" (cf. Shontz, 1975). The person per-
ceived to possess a stigma (i.e., any attribute which discredits or
lowers the status of a person once it is known) may be evaluated less
favorably, perceived to have other "imperfections" or "defects" on the
basis of the original one, and subject to considerable social dis-
crimination.
Goffman (1963) has described the effects of negative social atti-
tudes and the stigmatizing label:
An individual who might have been received easily into
ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can
obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom
he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other
attributes have on us. He possesses a stigma, an undesired
differentness from what we had anticipated. ... By
definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma
is not quite human. On this assumption, we exercise
varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively,
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if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances. We
construct a stigma- theory, an ideology to explain his
inferiority and account for the danger he represents,
sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on other
differences, such as those of social class. . . .
We tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on
the basis of the original one, and at the same time
to impute some desirable but undesired attributes,
often of a supernatural cast, such as "sixth sense"
or "understanding" . . . Further, we may perceive his
defensive response to his situation as a direct ex-
pression of his defect, and then we see both defect
and response as just retribution for something he or
his parents or tribe did, and hence a justification
for the way we treat him. (pp. 5-6)
The stigma associated with illness, and the threat of a "spoiled"
identity, may contribute to the denial of symptoms and reluctance to
seek medical care (Field, 1976; Safilios -Rothschild, 1970; Tuckett,
1976).
The degree of devaluation or stigmatization of the sick person,
and the extent to which the condition becomes an integral part of the
person's identity, are in large part a function of the nature of the
illness. As noted earlier, there are dimensions along which illnesses
vary, and these dimensions are important in determining the reactions
to illness of the person and others
,
especially those with whom he or
she interacts. To review briefly, Fabrega and Manning (1972) identified
four important dimensions of illness: (a) the duration of the illness
or "disease episode," (b) the prognosis, or the extent and possibility
of cure, (c) the degree of discomfort, incapacity, and disability, and
(d) the stigmatization, or "potential for self-degradation." Freidson
(1970) has suggested that variations in the abhorrence of disease are
determined by two independent criteria, personal responsibility and
seriousness of the condition, and Safilios -Rothschild (1970) has
50
similarly indicated a relationship between perceived personal responsi-
bility and the strength of a stigma attached to an illness. For the
individual labeled "ill," many of these factors are likely to affect
his or her self-perception and the perception of the person by others.
Illnesses of a short-term acute nature are easily recognized and
quite familiar to most people. Such illness generally has a rapid
onset, clear and unambiguous symptoms, temporary discomfort and incapa-
city, and a self-limiting course (Coe, 1970; Field, 1976). With short-
term acute illness, "the label of illness is often all encompassing
and becomes the central organizing feature in the life of the ill
person and often of his family. However, it is understood that this is
only for a temporary period and that complete recovery will follow"
(Field, 1976, p. 340). Short-term acute illness is the prototype for
the sick role model (Parsons, 1951); the nature and consequences of
acute illness correspond closely to the Parsonian formulation. The
person is unambiguously labeled ill, is permitted to suspend normal
activities, and receives special privileges for the duration of the
illness. The sick role is, however, expected to be temporary, and the
ill person is required to resume normal activities with the recovery
of health.
Generally, there is no permanent stigma or devaluation associated
with short-term acute illness (cf. Parsons, 1951). Indeed, the person
who has not had the flu, measles, mumps, an allergy, etc., is, statis-
tically, the "deviant":
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Most sickness leaves no taint of deviance or disorderly-
conduct on the person's reputation. No one is interested
in ex-allergics or ex-appendectomy patients, just as no
one will be remembered as an ex-traffic offender. In
other instances, however, the physician acts primarily as
an actuary, and his diagnosis can defame the patient, and
sometimes his children, for life. By attaching
irreversible degradation to a person's identity, it brands
him forever with a permanent stigma. The objective con-
dition may have long since disappeared, but the . . .
label sticks. Like ex-convicts, former mental patients,
people after their first heart attack, former alcoholics,
carriers of the sickle- cell trait, and (until recently)
ex-tuberculotics are transformed into outsiders for the
rest of their lives. . . . The medical label may protect
the patient from punishment only to submit him to inter-
minable instruction, treatment, and discrimination.
(Illich, 1976, p. 84)
Although some short-term or curable illnesses may carry a stigma
that survives the duration of the illness (e.g., venereal disease), it
is long-term, chronic diseases for which the label of illness poses
potentially severe social consequences for the sick person. With
chronic illness, which characteristically has a much more insidious
onset, and a less clearly defined duration and prognosis, the course
of the disease and the social consequences of the illness are less
certain. Unlike acute illness, for which the nature of the illness
and the role of the' sick person are rather clearly defined, and the
social impact is typically limited to the short duration of the illness
itself, chronic illness has long-term effects which are often of great-
est concern (Field, 1976). Treatment of chronic illness usually takes
the form of control rather than cure, since the disease processes that
are characteristic of chronic illness are usually not reversible.
Thus, even if the disease process is arrested, the effects of the ill-
ness (e.g., physical disability) and the label often persist.
52
Clearly, not all chronic illness stigmatizes the sick person.
Fabrega and Manning (1972), in fact, have distinguished two types of
chronic illness—stigmatizing and non-stigmatizing- -based on social
attitudes toward the illness. Social attitudes toward an illness
are largely determined by the objective characteristics and popular
conceptions of the illness. Although all chronic illnesses may be
similar in the nature of the onset, course, and duration of the disease
process, labeling of the illness by the "lay public" as stigmatizing
or non- stigmatizing can have a profound impact on the self-perception
of the sick person and perceptions of the person by others:
"Clinically, emotionally, and socially the consequences of these types
of illness are long-term and persistent; the illness leads, to a greater
or lesser extent, to modifications of the person's conduct and
character as perceived by both himself and others" (Field, 1976, p. 341).
Illnesses for which the physical impairments or incapacities are mini-
mal or not readily apparent will generally be non-stigmatizing.
Stigmatizing long-term illnesses are typically those for which the
physical impairments are observable and further are socially unaccept-
able. Chronic illness of any kind is likely to lead to a redefinition
of the person's conduct and character, but the person with a non-
stigmatizing chronic illness has some control over the impact of the
disease on his or her life, whereas the person stigmatized by a chronic
illness fThas much less control due to the coerced and stigmatizing
identity attributed to him" (Field, 1976, p. 341).
A similar distinction has been offered by Goffman (1963) , who
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differentiated the discredited person, about whom the "differentness"
is known or evident, and the discreditable person, about whom it is
neither known nor immediately observable. In both instances, the
illness is likely to have an impact on the person's activity and
identity, since the sick person often must decide (or be instructed)
to restrict certain activities and change health habits. But the
person with a stigmatizing chronic illness may have unnecessary changes
in his or her lifestyle and activities imposed by the attitudes and
reactions of others (cf. Shontz, 1975).
Thus, the sick person not only has to cope with the physical con-
sequences of chronic illness, but he or she may also have to adjust
to the unknown social and psychological consequences of a newly ac-
quired "spoiled" identity. Even if the person's illness or disability
cannot be directly observed (i.e., the person is "discreditable"), he
or she may share or accept the anticipated negative reactions of
observers; a stigmatizing illness can "spoil" an individual's concep-
tion of him or herself. Davis (1963), for example, described the
problems facing polio victims:
Unless he has been impaired from birth or early childhood,
so that his primary identity is that of a handicapped person,
it is more than likely that he will share, at least initially,
many of the prejudiced and squeamish attitudes that are
commonly shown toward the handicapped. He will tend, openly
or secretly, to place a high value on many activities and
pursuits that are closed to him because of his impairment.
His attempts, if any, to be accepted by "normals" as "normal"
are doomed to failure and frustration: not only do most
"normals" find it difficult to include the handicapped person
fully in their own category of being, but he himself, in
that he shares the "normal" standards of personal evaluation,
will in a sense support their rejection of him. (p. 138)
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Experimental research by Kleck and his colleagues (e.g., Kleck,
1966, 1969; Kleck, Ono, $ Hastorf, 1966) has consistently demonstrated
the negative interpersonal consequences of stigma, such as. a physical
disability. An interesting issue is whether observers' negative
reactions are based on the sick or disabled person's condition per se,
or the attributions about the person made on the basis of the condition.
Although the crippling effects of polio may directly contribute to the
social isolation described by Davis (1963), Macgregor's (1951) study
of persons with facial deformities suggests that it is the attributions
about the person, rather than the condition itself, which negatively
affects social interaction. Facial deformities do not directly inter-
fere with a person's capacity for social interaction and normal acti-
vities, but they do lead to negative evaluations of a person by others,
and sometimes by the person him or herself. Persons with facial defor-
mities are perceived by others, and sometimes themselves, as lacking
social competence or moral character because of their physical appear-
ance, and it appears to be these attributions, rather than the indivi-
dual's condition, which hinder social interaction. Macgregor (1951)
concluded that "such an affliction, therefore, is more of a social
handicap than a physical one for the individual's suffering results
from the visibility of the defect and what it means to others as well
as to himself" (p. 630)
.
Thus, the social position of the sick person can be viewed largely
as a consequence of social reactions to the person's condition, rather
than the illness per se. The sick are not intrinsically less valuable
or "deviant" because of their illness or disability, but because others
impute to them an undesirable difference (Freidson, 1965; Kitsuse, 1962;
Lemert, 1964, Sedgwick, 1973). These social reactions can have a
strong impact on the identity of the sick person. If the illness (or
its physical effects) are stigmatizing, it can assume a central role in
redefining the person's identity: • "The new identity is incorporated in
and structured by the reactions of the person and others interacting
with them toward the stigma. What results is the development of a new
set of stable definitions of the person's conduct and character"
(Field, 1976, p. 345).
In social reactions to illness, as previously noted, there are
counteracting pressures toward sympathy and aid of the unfortunate
(e.g., Safilios -Rothschild, 1970). Just as the sick person may
develop a perception of the illness as a "blessing in disguise" which
revealed unknown personal virtues or strength, or true values and
friends, observers may attribute a superior character to the victim
of misfortune (e.g., Herzlich, 1973; Shontz, 1975), particularly if
the person appears to be coping well and not suffering as a result of
the illness. Further, because of strong social and moral norms which
proscribe open rejection or mistreatment of unfortunate people,
behavior toward the sick person is likely to reflect ambivalent
attitudes
.
In summary, the labeling and stigma perspectives suggest that one
of the critical variables in the social construction of illness is the
extent to which the identity of the sick person is "spoiled" or stigma-
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tized by the imputed deviance Cor devaluation) inherent in being labeled
"ill." Although these theoretical perspectives are useful in describ-
ing the way in which social judgments about a person's physical
condition, such as the attachment of a disease label, may lead to
permanent changes in the individual's identity and social status, they
are too general to predict reactions to particular illnesses or illness
characteristics, except perhaps acute versus chronic illnesses. To be
of predictive value, the labeling and stigma approaches require know-
ledge of social beliefs and attitudes toward specific illnesses and
illness characteristics, and these data are generally not available
(for exceptions, see Jenkins § Zyzanski, 1968; Monteiro, 1973; Pratt,
1956; Titley, 1969). Without knowledge of shared attitudes or con-
ceptions of particular illnesses (e.g., coronary heart disease, cancer)
or features of illness (e.g., duration, severity, prognosis), it is
difficult to predict whether or not an illness will affect the
perceptions of a person by others, and "spoil" the identity of its
bearer. In short, it seems clear that the processes of labeling and
stigmatization are important in social reactions to the physically ill,
but these formulations are too general and vague to predict the social
consequences of an illness for an individual.
The sick role model (Parsons, 1951) and the labeling and stigma
approaches are complementary, in that Parsons' analysis best applies
to illness of an acute nature, whereas the labeling and stigma
approaches primarily address the social consequences of chronic illness,
since the label persists at least as long as the condition to which it
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is applied. Both perspectives emphasize social roles and norms in-
volving illness, to the neglect of psychological reactions and inter-
pretations of illness. Social-psychological approaches provide
cognitive counterparts to sociological models of the roles and
behaviors associated with illness, and bring a distinctively psycho-
social perspective to the study of responses to illness.
Social Psychological Perspectives
Although social psychologists have only begun to actively research
problems of health, illness, and medicine (Taylor, 1978), social psycho-
logy has the potential to make valuable contributions to these areas,
including issues regarding social reactions to victims of physical ill-
ness. Individuals who are victims of negative life events, such as
illness, are likely to have a special need for the support and reassur-
ance of others (Coates § Wortman, in press), but there is considerable
evidence in the social psychological literature to indicate that people
are unlikely to be supportive and compassionate in their reactions to
victims. In describing the processes underlying observers' reactions
to victims , social psychological theories have identified motivational
and cognitive factors which may lead people to react negatively to the
victims of misfortune. In the following sections, these theories will
be reviewed and applied to the social perception of victims of physical
illness.
58
Motivational factors
From a social psychological perspective, individuals are assumed
to be involved, more or less continuously, in attempts to make sense of
the world (Heider, 1944, 1958), and to have motivations which are likely
to affect the way in which they perceive the world and explain events
in their lives. Knowledge of suffering, especially undeserved suffer-
ing, is difficult to understand and accept, and poses a potential
threat to the posited needs underlying people T s perceptions of the
world. One such formulation, the ITjust world hypothesis" (Lerner, 1965,
1970, 1971; Lerner § Miller, 1978), proposes that individuals have a
fundamental motivation to believe in a world where justice prevails.
From this vie\\; observers 1 reactions to the physically ill may be
affected, at least in part, by a desire to maintain a belief in a
just world.
Just world hypothesis, Lerner and his colleages (e.g., Lerner,
1965, 1970, 1971; Lerner $ Miller, 1978; Lerner § Matthews, 1967;
Lerner § Simmons, 1966) have postulated a fundamental desire of
people to believe in a "just world11 - -a relatively stable and predictable
world where people "get what they deserve and deserve what they get."
Maintaining a belief in the world as an orderly, stable, and predictable
place is viewed as part of a continuous effort by people to understand
the world and interpret events in their lives. Lerner (1970, 1971) has
argued that if we can believe that only trbad" people will suffer, the
world seems more just and predictable, and we will be protected from
undeserved suffering ourselves (cf. Walster, 1966; Wortman, 1976).
Thus, according to the just world hypothesis, observers' perceptions
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of victims and the causes of misfortune function in part to maintain a
belief in a just world, and to minimize the potential threat of un-
deserved suffering to observers.
The major focus of research generated by the just world hypothesis
is the phenomenon of blaming a seemingly innocent victim of misfortune
(cf. Ryan, 1971). Knowledge that a person is suffering through no fault
of his or her own, that a negative event has happened to someone by
chance, threatens the individual's conception of a just world: "The
person who sees suffering or misfortune will be motivated to believe
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that the unfortunate victim in some sense merited his fate" (Lerner %
Simmons, 1966, p. 203). The observer of undeserved misfortune, accord-
ring to the just world hypothesis, can either decide that the world is
not so just after all, and that innocent people sometimes suffer, or the
observer can alter his or her perception of the victim or the victim's
behavior so he or she appears to have deserved the suffering.
Since the observer is presumably motivated to maintain a belief
in a just world, the conflict between knowledge of undeserved suffering
and the belief that the world is just can be resolved by the observer
convincing him or herself that the victim was in some way responsible
for the misfortune. If the victim is perceived as behaviorally respon-
sible for his or her own suffering (e.g., having engaged in foolish
or careless acts) , the suffering is no longer unjust. Another means
of maintaining a belief in a just world when confronted with apparently
undeserved misfortune is to decide that the victim, though innocent by
deed, deserves the fate because of undesirable personal attributes
(i.e., "bad people deserve to suffer").
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It is iniportant to clarify the difference between moral judg-
ments and attributions of causality or responsibility (e.g., Harvey
§ Rule, 1978; Pepitone, 1975), since these judgments are not isomorphic
and are easily confused. In the present context, the attribution of
causality to an individual suggests that he or she engaged in an act
which directly or indirectly contributed to the occurrence of the
illness. Attributions of responsibility, on the other hand, refer to
the culpability or blameworthiness of the person, and represent a
moral judgment (cf. Ross § DiTecco, 1975). Thus, a person who is not
perceived to have had a causal role in the occurrence of an illness may,
nevertheless, be held responsible for its occurrence (e.g., negligence).
In terms of the just world hypothesis, observers will derogate the
victim's character only if the victim is perceived as innocent (i.e.,
not responsible for the illness).
Thus, to maintain confidence in a predictable and just world,
victims can be perceived to deserve their fate as a consequence of
having a lfbad" character or engaging in "bad" acts (Lerner § Miller,
1978) . If we believe that people do not suffer unless something is
wring with them or their behavior, we will feel protected from un-
deserved suffering ourselves. Despite moral and social norms which
encourage compassionate reactions toward the unfortunate, the results of
research on the just world hypothesis suggest that the more innocent
the victim (in terms of behavioral responsibility) , or the more severe
the suffering, the greater the extent to which the victim will be
derogated by observers. Further, just world effects (i.e., victim
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derogation) are more likely to occur when the victim's suffering is
seen as continuing (Lerner § Simmons, 1966), and when the observer
does not identify with, or feel attracted toward, the victim (Lerner,
1974). In general, the less responsible the victim is perceived to
be for his or her fate, or the worse the fate, the more likely it is
that the victim will be derogated by others.
Several delimiting conditions for just world effects have been
noted by Lerner and Miller (1978). According to this most recent for-
mulation of the just world hypothesis, there are three factors which
determine when observers will react to the suffering of others by
derogating their character: (1) Derogation will not occur when the
victim is perceived as behaviorally causing his or her own suffering,
since their is little injustice in suffering as a result of your own
acts; (2) if the victim is of high status or highly attractive, the
observer is more likely to blame the person's actions rather than
character, especially when the victim's character is beyond reproach;
and (3) if the observer expects to be in a similar situation, he or
she is more likely to react to the victim with empathy, and to focus
on external causes of the misfortune.
Research on the just world hypothesis has ranged from laboratory
experiments in which some participants were ostensibly subjected to
electric shock (e.g., Lerner § Matthews, 1967; Lerner § Simmons, 1966),
to studies using written reports of the suffering of others. In
laboratory research, for example, Lerner and his associates found
that observers tend to devalue and to ascribe negative characteristics
t
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to an innocent person who they believe is going to receive painful
electric shocks (Lerner $ Matthews, 1967; Lerner § Simmons, 1966).
Research using written scenarios of injustice and suffering has con-
centrated on observers' reactions to reported cases of rape (e.g.,
Calhoun, Selby, § Warring, 1976; Jones § Aronson, 1973; Smith, Keating,
Hester, § Mitchell, 1976). These investigations have yielded fairly
consistent support for the just world hypothesis.
A similar hypothesis regarding observers' perceptions and reactions
to victims has been advanced by Walster (1966), who emphasized a desire
for perceived control, rather than justice, as the motivation for
blaming people who experience misfortune. Walster (1966) asserted
that people do not want to believe that severe negative events can hap-
pen at random, since this belief iinplies that they could become
victims of similar, unavoidable misfortunes. Rather than acknowledging
their own vulnerability by conceding that a similar negative outcome
could happen to them, observers will tend to blame a person involved in
the event:
If a serious accident is seen as the consequence of an
unpredictable set of circumstances, beyond anyone's
control or anticipation, a person is forced to concede
the catastrophe could happen to him. If, however, he
decides that the event was a predictable, controllable
one, if he decides that someone was responsible for
the unpleasant event, he should feel somewhat more able
to avert such a disaster. (Walster, 1966, p. 74)
By attributing responsibility for a negative outcome to a person, and
convincing themselves that the person is different or somehow less
capable than they are, observers can reassure themselves that they can
avoid similar negative outcomes.
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Thus, both the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1965, 1970, 1971;
Lemer $ Miller, 1978) and Walster's (1966) analysis suggest that
observers will tend to attribute negative events to factors other
than chance, although the two formulations differ in the motivations
presumed to underlie observers' reactions. Like the just world hypo-
thesis, Walster (1966) has argued that the more serious the negative
outcome, the greater the tendency to blame a person for the event.
However, unlike the just world analysis, Walster' s (1966) formulation
predicts only that a person , rather than chance, will tend to be
blamed for a negative event. If a person other than the victim is in-
volved in the event (e.g., an accident), and can plausibly be held
responsible for the event, then the victim will not necessarily be
blamed or derogated for the misfortune (Wortman, 1976). In contrast,
the just world hypothesis explicitly predicts that it is the person
who suffered the misfortune--the victim- -who will be blamed or derogated.
The innocence of the victim is central to the just world formulation;
if the victim is innocent, assigning blame to a nonchance factor, such
as another person, may enhance an observer's perception of control, but
it does not restore justice.
Thus, according to Walster (1966), reactions to victims of mis-
fortune are influenced by observers' desire to view negative outcomes
as the result of controllable (or avoidable) factors, so that they can
avert the recurrence of a similar misfortune to themselves. The desire
to believe in a predictable and controllable world posited by Walster
(1966) corresponds to the motives presumed to underlie the process of
attribution in general (e.g., Header, 1958; Kelley, 1972). For
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example, Kel3ey (1972) maintained that "attribution processes are to be
understood not only as a means of providing the individual with a
veridical view of his world, but as a means of encouraging his effective
exercise of control in that world" (p. 22).
The just world hypothesis and Walster's formulation have been
tested using a variety of negative events, including accidents and
crime (especially rape), but to date, few efforts have been made to
apply these analyses to observers' reactions to victims of physical
illness (see Wortman § Dunkel-Schetter, 1979, for an exception). This
failure to examine illness as a form of misfortune is curious, since,
as Bakan (1968) noted, "disease is one of the most conspicuous
manifestations of suffering and invites itself as a starting point for
understanding suffering" (p. 3), including observers
T reactions to the
suffering of others. In contrast, the clinical literature, as we
have seen, has devoted considerable attention to reactions to physical
illness, but has focused almost exclusively on the reactions of the
victims themselves or their immediate families, and their concerns
and fears about the anticipated reactions of others.
The perception of illness as "singling out" individuals in a
seemingly random and arbitrary fashion, as evidenced inthe clinical
reports of personal adjustment to illness, often dominates the sick
person's "search for meaning" and need to assign responsibility or
blame for the illness. Mattsson (1977), for example, described the
inability of children to view their illness as a result of chance:
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Uncertainty as to why pain and suffering occur is a
psychic stress to anyone. The preschool child in
particular has little ability to comprehend the
causality and nature of an illness and tends to inter-
pret pain and other symptoms as a result of mistreatment,
punishment, or frbeing bad." In a child's mind nothing
happens by chance, and he looks for reasons for an event
such as illness, . . . They might then blame themselves
or other family members for causing the disease, (p. 185)
Difficulty accepting the apparent random or arbitrary nature of negative
events, as suggested by the just world hypothesis and Walster, is by no
means limited to children:
That their child had been stricken at random by a chance,
impersonal blow was very difficult to accept, just as it
is generally difficult for human beings to feel that they
are living in a meaningless world devoid of norms or of a
framework of rewards and punishment for behavior. (Chodoff
et al., 1964, p. 746)
The personal difficulty in accepting the seemingly random nature
of illness and other negative life events suggests that a need to be-
lieve in a just or controllable world may influence victims 1 , as well
as observers' reactions to misfortune. In fact, the just world
hypothesis has recently been extended to include both self and other
reactions to misfortune (e.g., Bulman § Wortman, 1977; Lerner § Miller,
1978). Following Bulman and Wortman (1977), Lerner and Miller (1978)
have suggested that victims may join observers in blaming their own
character or actions for a misfortune, in an effort to make sense of
the event and maintain a belief in a just world. Consistent with much
of the clinical evidence reported earlier regarding self- attributions
of responsibility and self-derogation by victims of physical illness,
Lerner and Miller (1978) concluded that "people will often alter their
conceptual system, in this case their perception of their own worth, to
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impose order and justice on random events in their lives" (p. 1044).
In an effort to cope with the unpredictable and threatening nature
of serious illness, the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1970, 1971;
Lerner § Miller, 1978) and Walster's (1966) analysis would predict
that, like many victims themselves, observers will be motivated to either
blame or derogate the victims of physical illness. Contrary to the
sociological view that a judgment of "sickness" is not a judgment of
"badness," that people are not perceived to be responsible or account-
able for their illnesses, and that illnesses, like other events, happen
to a person (Mechanic, 1968; Parsons, 1951), the just world hypothesis
suggests that observers will tend to perceive a sick person as either
"bad" or blameworthy. A similar prediction is derived from Walster's
(1966) analysis since, unlike accidents, there is rarely another person
involved in an individual's illness (i.e., a "perpetrator"), unless,
perhaps, the illness is perceived to be contagious.
However, there are explicit norms proscribing rejection of ill and
disabled persons, unlike victims of other misfortunes, for which there
are only general norms prescribing compassionate treatment (e.g., there
are no norms which specifically proscribe rejection or blame of rape
victims). The strength of these norms may tend to inhibit derogation
or blame, or at least create ambivalence in observers' reactions to
victims of physical illness (cf. Wortman § Dunkel-Schetter, 1979).
Alternatively, the prospect of serious, perhaps life-threatening,
illness may more strongly violate a person's belief in a just world
than other negative life events, and thus may be more likely to elicit
victim derogation or blame by observers.
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To the extent that observers derogate or blame victims of physical
illness, as the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1970, 1971) and Walster's
(1966) analysis would predict, it is important to emphasize that the
reactions of observers, like the reactions of the victims themselves,
represent efforts at coping with an unpredictable, uncontrollable, and
potentially life-threatening event. Although physical illness
obviously poses the greatest threat to the victim him or herself, in
that it may threaten the individual's life or livelihood, as well as
their fundamental beliefs about the world, knowledge of serious illness
and undeserved suffering can also be very threatening to observers,
since it implies that they could experience a similar fate. The just
world hypothesis suggests that blame or derogation of the physically
ill by observers can be understood as an attempt to make sense of the
world, of undeserved pain and suffering, and not as simply an insensi-
tive biased response.
An important determinant of whether an observer responds to a
victim of misfortune with compassion or rejection is the extent to
which the observer identifies with the victim. To the degree that the
observer identifies with the victim, he or she is likely to respond
with understanding and sympathy, rather than derogation (Lerner §
Matthews, 1967; Lerner § Miller, 1978). According to the just world
hypothesis, the identification of an observer with a victim is
defined as the perception of a common fate , as opposed to personal
similarity (Lerner $ Matthews, 1967; Lerner § Miller, 1978).
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However, Lerner and Miller (1978) themselves noted that "as
events become close to (an observer 's) world, the concern over in-
justices increases greatly, as does the need to explain or make sense
of the events" (p. 1031). This would suggest that identification with
a victim, in terms of situational or personal similarity, would enhance
observers 1 sense of vulnerability, in a manner perhaps similar to that
described by Mechanic (1972)
:
Basic to the imderminirg of a sense of invulnerability are
social comparison processes. It is much less difficult to
explain injury to people of unlike characteristics with-
out threat to oneself in that one can attribute the injury
to aspects of the person that are different from one's own.
When such persons are more like oneself- -in terms of age,
sex, lifestyle, or routine- -it is much more difficult
not to perceive oneself at risk. (p. 1135)
With reasoning compatible with the just world hypothesis, Mechanic
(1972) has argued that individuals' psychological survival depends upon
their ability to protect themselves from fears and anxieties involving
low-risk occurrences to which everyone is exposed, or dangers they are
powerless to prevent. According to Mechanic, the relatively strong
sense of invulnerability which people maintain through defense and
coping processes can be undermined by the death of a close friend or
other "near misses." From a just world perspective, an increased sense
of vulnerability should enhance observers 1 need to believe in a just
world, and their tendency to blame or derogate the victim.
An alternative motivation which may influence observers' reactions
to victims has been proposed by Shaver (1970, 1975). Shaver's (1970,
1975) "defensive attribution" hypothesis is antithetical to the fomu-
lations of Lerner (1970, 1971; Lerner $ Miller, 1978) and Waister
(1966), and may explain why observers apparently do not derogate or
blame victims with whom they identify, despite a presumably enhanced
sense of vulnerability.
Defensive attribution . Shaver (1970, 1975) has suggested, follow-
ing the just world hypothesis and Walster's (1966) analysis, that be-
cause people want to believe that negative outcomes do not happen by
chance, they will often blame the victim rather than attribute the
negative event to chance. However, Shaver proposed that people are
also strongly motivated to protect their self-esteem. If observers
anticipate being in the same situation as the victim, derogating or
blaming the victim might imply that they would also be at fault if
they experienced a similar misfortune. Thus, according to the "defen-
sive attribution" model, observers 1 reactions to victims will reflect
a desire to avoid being blamed in the future.
Shaver's (1970, 1975) defensive attribution hypothesis suggests
that the magnitude of observers' negative reactions to victims will
depend on the perceived likelihood that they will experience a similar
misfortune in the future. The more observers believe that they could
experience a fate similar to the victim's, the greater their motivation
to attribute the event to chance, rather than the victim, in an effort
to protect themselves from possible future blame. Shaver (1970)
suggests that when outcomes are severe, observers will prefer to believe
in an arbitrary and capricious world than to believe that they might
be blamed for a similar event or outcome in the future.
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Like Lerner's (Lerner § Matthews, 1967; Lerner $ Miller, 1978)
conception of identification with the victim (i.e., perceived common
fate), Shaver (1970) defines "relevance" to the victim in terms of
situational relevance- -the perceived likelihood that the observer will
someday find him or herself in similar circumstances as the victim.
Both the just world and defensive attribution hypotheses suggest that
situational relevance is more critical than personal relevance or
similarity in defining the observer's sense of vulnerability. However,
these formulations differ in their predictions regarding the effect of
perceived personal vulnerability on observers' reactions to victims.
Shaver's (1970, 1975) model, as noted, predicts that victims are less
likely to be derogated or blamed when their situation is perceived by
observers to be relevant or similar to their own. In contrast,
Lerner's (1970, 1971) and Walster's (1966) analyses seem to suggest
that the more likely observers perceive their own victimization to
be, the more threatening the event, and thus the more observers will
tend to derogate or blame the victim. Lerner (Lerner § Matthews,
1967; Lerner § Miller, 1978), however, has also indicated that
identification with a victim will tend to moderate just world effects
and lead to compassion toward the victim.
The research evidence generally supports Shaver's (1970, 1975)
prediction, and indicates that identification with the victim is an
important delimiting condition for just world effects. In studies by
Shaver (1970) , Chaiken and Darley (1973) , and Sorrentino and Boutellier
(1974) , observers who perceived their own victimization as more likely
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tended to judge the victim more positively, presumably to avoid
being blamed themselves in the future. However, identification with
the victim could also result in more positive reactions by observers
because of heightened empathy with the victim, rather than a desire
to protect one's self-esteem and avoid future blame (e.g., Aderman,
Brehm, $ Katz, 1974; Clore § Jeffrey, 1972).
The defensive attribution model suggests that victims of serious
illness will be responded to with compassion rather than rejection
when observers perceive themselves as likely to experience a similar
fate in the future. With the dramatic rise in the incidence of chronic
illness, and more and more people facing the prospect of death pre-
ceded and prolonged by chronic illness, people may be increasingly
likely to identify with victims of serious illness, and thus to react
positively to them, and attribute their illness to chance. However,
Parsons (1951) has argued that people are unrealistically biased
toward a confidence that "everything will be all right, 11 that they
are "motivated to underestimate the chances of their falling ill,
especially seriously ill,'1 and that if they do become ill, they tend
to overestimate the likelihood of a rapid and complete recovery (p. 443).
To the extent that Parsons (1951) is correct, and observers under-
estimate their chances of becoming ill, they will be less likely to
identify with victims of physical illness and, according to the just
world hypothesis, will tend to derogate or blame the victims of
serious illness for their misfortune.
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Thus, social psychologists have proposed two opposing motivations
which may influence observers' reactions to victims of misfortune--a
desire to maintain a belief in a just (or controllable) world, and
a desire to protect one's self-esteem and avoid blame. These views
are somewhat analogous to the two opposing ideas which have shaped
lay and medical concepts of illness and which are, according to
Balint (1957), psychologically motivated:
According to the first, the patient was healthy, whole,
and "good" until somethingin him turned "bad."
According to the second, the "bad" thing had nothing
to do with the patient- -it came from outside and is, in
the truest sense of the word, a "foreign body." In
both cases the "bad" thing threatens him with pains,
privation, or even destruction unless he can defend
himself against it or get rid of it altogether . . .
The psychological source of this (second) theory is the
belief--and hope--alive in all of us, that we are
essentially "good" and that anything "bad" must come
from outside, (p. 254)
In addition to these motivational factors, cognitive or
information-processing biases may lead observers to blame victims of
physical illness. Like the motivational hypotheses just presented,
these formulations suggest that observers will tend to derogate or
blame victims of physical illness, but unlike motivational accounts,
they do not view observers' perceptions and attributions regarding
victims as efforts to satisfy fundamentals needs or motives.
Cognitive factors
Cognitive formulations, instead of positing basic needs and
motivations which influence or lfbias" people's perceptions, emphasize
general cognitive principles or tendencies which structure individuals'
perceptions of the world. Much of the current theory and research on
social perception and attribution is heavily rooted in Heider f s (1958)
analysis of "naive" or "common-sense" psychology, and it is Heider T s
principle of cognitive balance which will be considered first.
Cognitive balance . Heider f s (1958) general principle of
cognitive balance, underlying much of common- sense psychology,
involves three main concepts --unit formation, sentiments, and bal-
anced state. Briefly, separate entities (e.g., people, objects, etc.)
comprise a unit , according to Heider (1958), when they are perceived
to !Tbelong together" (e.g., a person and his or her act). Sentiments
refer to a positive or negative valuation attached to entities, usually
persons or objects. The concept of a balanced state denotes "a situ-
ation in which the perceived units and experienced sentiments co-exist
without stress" (p. 176). Generally, Heider (1944, 1958) hypothesized
that the relationship between units and sentiments would tend toward
a balanced state.
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There are several ways in which the concept of a balanced state
can be utilized to explain negative reactions toward victims of mis-
fortune. Perhaps the most pertinent example of cognitive balance,
cited in the opening of this chapter, is the perceived relationship
between virtue and outcomes (cf. Lerner, 1970, 1971). In Heider's
terms, goodness and happiness form a unit relation; they are often
thought of as belonging together. Justice, an "ought" in Heider 1 s
analysis, requires a balance between virtue and outcome; justice is
conceived as a fit between goodness and happiness, and wickedness
and unhappiness. Given either condition- -a virtue or an outcome- -a
person will tend to assume the existence of the other: fMisfortune,
sickness, and accident are often taken as signs of badness and guilt.
If (a person) is unfortunate, then he has committed a sin" (p. 235).
Thus, victims of physical illness may be derogated or blamed not
because of a fundamental need to maintain a belief in a just world
(Lerner, 1970, 1971), but because there is a cognitive-perceptual
relationship or "fit" between wickedness and unhappiness, badness
and misfortune.
The principle of cognitive balance is also germane to notions
regarding stigmatization and the perception of the sick or disabled
on the basis of a disvalued or "deviant" attribute. Heider (1958)
suggested that our perceptions of an individuals personality tends
to be highly unified, such that a person's traits tend to be perceived
by others as uniformly positive or negative (cf. Asch, 1952). In
Heider f s (1958) words,
L
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We tend to have an over-all like or dislike of a person.
Where several sentiments can be distinguished, they tend
to be alike in sign. For instance, liking and admiring
go together; the situation is unbalanced if a person
likes someone he disrespects. In other words, the unit
of the person tends to be uniformly positive or negative.
This is known as the halo phenomenon, (p. 182)
This phenomenon specifies a mechanism by which people may "behave as
if there were a natural incompatibility between the presence of a
physical disability and 'positive traits and qualities' 11
(Safilios-Rothschild, 1970, p. 123).
As an example of this tendency to overestimate the uniformity or
"homegeneity" of a person, Heider (1958) points to the relationship of
external appearance to more central personality traits. A balanced
situation exists if there is a correspondence or fit between external
and internal characteristics—"if what looks good is truly good"
(p. 183), or vice versa. As evidence of a perceived relationship
between appearance and personality, Heider cites Spiegel's (1950)
experiments on children's concepts of beauty:
The beautiful person ... is the good person; the ugly
person is bad. . . . The child forms a total concept
which expresses the tendency that certain qualities of
things "go together," or "belong together," such as
beauty and goodness. The result of such an intellectual
tendency is that a concept becomes a collection of quali-
ties that "belong together" but which are not integrated
into a unified whole in which the subordinate parts are
inherently and necessarily articulated. This looseness
obviously fits the child's concept of beauty; the
beautiful person is good, rich, strong, health, has a
car, can sing, dance, etc. (Spiegel, 1950, p. 21).
Thus, if several traits or characteristics of a person are considered,
the observer will tend to perceive all of them as positive or negative
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(Heider, 1958). This implies, in the case of a diseased or disabled
person, that observers will tend to perceive the person's other traits
as negative on the basis of the disvalued or stigmatizing characteristic,
or, if little else is known about the person, observers will tend to
attribute negative characteristics to the person.
Finally, Heider (1958) noted that the impressions we form of
another person refer to dispositional characteristics-- relatively-
stable and enduring properties of the person. When illness is chronic,
it becomes a relatively enduring characteristic of the person, and
is thus more likely to influence an observer's perception and evaluation
of a person than acute illness, which is only a temporary property of
the person (cf. Parsons, 1951).
Since Heider (1958) , theories and research of attribution
processes and human judgment have concentrated on laypersons' explana-
tions and judgments about events, particularly human behavior (e.g.,
Jones § Davis, 1965; Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, §
Weiner, 1972; Kelley, 1967, 1971, 1972; Slovic, Fischhoff, §
Lichtenstein, 1977). Researchers have identified a number of cognitive
"biases" and "heuristics" believed to affect social judgment. Many of
these factors may affect observers' inferences regarding victims of
misfortune, and each will be briefly discussed.
Cognitive biases and heuristics . One of the most widely accepted
"biases" in attribution is the divergence in the perspectives and
attributions of actors and observers. Following Heider 's (1958)
observation that people underestimate the impact of social and environ-
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mental forces and overestimate the role of dispositional causes of
behavior, Jones $ Nisbett (1971) argued that actors tend to attribute
the causes of their behavior to aspects of the situation, whereas
observers tend to attribute the causes for the same behavior to dis-
positions or personality characteristics of the actor. This divergence
in explanations for a person's behavior occurs, theoretically, because
actors have more information about themselves and the impact of the
situation, while for observers, the actor is the most salient feature.
Observers 1 bias toward dispositional attributions (cf. Ross, 1977)
may lead them to overestimate the causal role of the victim's own
behavior in the occurrence of the illness, and to interpret the victim's
current behavior (e.g., fear, anxiety, depression, etc.) as evidence
of negative dispositions. For example, "an observer may reason that
the cancer patient is complaining because he or she is 'weakwilled,
selfish, and cowardly' M (Wortman § Dunkel-Schetter, 1979, p. 133).
In a similar vein, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) discuss cognitive
vrheuristicsM used by people to assess the probability of an uncertain
event. One judgmental heuristic- -availability- -describes situations
in which people assess the frequency of a class, or the probability of
an event, by the ease with which instances of the event can be
brought to mind: "For example, one may assess the risk of heart attack
among middle-aged people by recalling such occurrences among one's
acquaintances" (Tversky § Kahneman, 1974, p. 27). Use of the
availability heuristic may lead to biased predictions since some classes
or events may be more or less difficult to retrieve from memory, to
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imagine, and/or to associate with another event. Recall that whether
observers react positively or negatively to victims of serious mis-
fortune (Lerner, 1970, 1971; Lerner § Miller, 1978; Shaver, 1970, 1975)
seems to depend largely on observers' perceptions of the likelihood
that they will experience a similar fate. If occurrences of a similar
illness among one's family, friends, or acquaintances are not easily
recalled, imagined, etc., observers may underestimate the probability
of experiencing a similar misfortune (cf. Parsons, 1951) and, as a
result, may tend to derogate or blame victims of physical illness.
There is also evidence that observers, from the vantage point of
hindsight, tend to perceive events as having been almost inevitable
(Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff $ Beyth, 1975). Knowledge that an event
actually occurred tends to increase the observer's postdicted likeli-
hood that the event would occur, although observers are largely un-
aware of the effect of outcome knowledge on their perceptions. As a
result, observers 1 impressions of what they would have known without
knowledge of the actual outcome are biased, as are their impressions of
what they and others actually did know in foresight (Fischhoff, 1975).
With respect to the present analysis, this suggests that observers, in
hindsight, may perceive a person's illness as an almost inevitable
consequence of the person's actions or habits (e.g., not eating
properly, going outside in the rain, etc.), and may blame the person
for not having known the consequences of the behavior, or for having
engaged in the behavior, knowing the consequences.
According to Kelley (1967, 1971), the observer relies primarily
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on the principle of covariation to validate attributions of causality--
the observer attributes an event to the conditions (viz., person,
entity, or occasion) with which the presence or absence of the event
covaries. For example, to the extent that illness is perceived to be
selective—to "single out" individuals --it is, in Kelley's (1967, 1971)
model, a low consensus event. As suggested previously in the dis-
cussion of lay explanations of illness, if victims and observers are
concerned with why a particular (and seemingly innocent) person became
ill, the lack of consensus would imply that something about the victim's
behavior or character is responsible for the singular misfortune. Lack
of consensus may single out the individual as a cause of the illness
in the same way that the illness "singled out" the individual.
Further, although observers may view an external disease agent
(e -g-> germs, viruses) as a necessary cause of an illness, it is probably
not sufficient
,
given perceived selective occurrence of the illness.
That is, since most people are presumably exposed to germs and viruses
on a regular basis, disease agents are not sufficient to explain why
one person became ill and another did not. Moreover, because people
have little control over contact with disease agents, they may be
motivated to identify a single cause perceived as both controllable
and necessary to the occurrence of illness (cf. Janoff-Bulman, 1977),
such as an aspect of the victim's behavior or character (e.g.,
"resistance"). Alternatively, Kelley's (1973) analysis of causal
schemata in the attribution process suggests that as the extremity of
events increases, so does the tendency of people to explain events
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in multiple necessary rather than multiple sufficient causal terms.
Applied to the present context, this implies that observers are more
likely to believe that a number of causal factors must all be present
for a serious illness to occur.
A related heuristic which may be used by observers in attributing
causality for misfortune is the correspondence or fit between the
magnitude of the perceived cause and the magnitude of the effect: In
general, we would expect that factors will be perceived as causal to
the degree that their magnitudes resemble the magnitude of the effects
they are adduced to explain" (Nisbett § Wilson, 1977, p. 51). Nisbett
and Wilson (1977) propose that when people are confronted with "large
effects," they will seek comparably "large causes" for explanation.
This suggests that victims and observers of serious illness may tend
to prefer causes such as God's will, fate, or even the behavior of
the victim, to relatively "small" causes such as germs or viruses.
This is consistent with Balint's (1957) observation that "external
agent" or "natural cause" notions of disease causation best fit ill-
nesses of short duration (i.e., acute illnesses). People may find it
very difficult to believe that a virus could cause a life- threatening
or disabling illness.
In addition to these cognitive biases and heuristics which may
affect observers' attribution processes, people may have more sub-
stantive "theories" of disease, including beliefs about disease
causation and transmission, as well as beliefs regarding specific ill-
nesses. Such an intuitive, a priori theory (Ajzen, 1977; Nisbett §
Wilson, 1977) would represent a person's understanding of illness--how
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it occurs, why it occurs, what it means --and might affect the person's
perceptions and attributions about victims of physical illness. As
previously noted
, knowledge of people's beliefs regarding illness,
especially the perception of a particular illness as stigmatizing or
non- stigmatizing, is important for understanding and predicting the
social consequences for a victim of illness.
Summary
Illness is a socially and biologically defined condition, and has
social as well as physical consequences. Illness seems, in many
respects, to involve moral evaluations, despite the supposed exemption
for responsibility inherent in labeling someone "ill" (Parsons, 1951):
".
. . on every level, from getting sick to recovering, a moral battle
raged" (Zola, 1972, p. 492). In short, illness poses a threat to the
world of everyday understanding, activities, and interaction, and may
have very negative social consequences for the sick person.
What, then, are the conditions under which victims of physical
illness will be reacted to with compassion, and what are the conditions
under which they will be derogated or blamed because of illness? The
various sociological and social psychological perspectives suggest a
number of variables potentially important in the social construction
of illness. A key variable, evident in each of these formulations, is
a characteristic defining the illness itself- -duration. Parsons' (1951)
classic sick role analysis suggests that for short-term acute illnesses,
individuals are likely to be exempted from responsibility for their
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condition. The labeling and stigma approaches, however, indicate
that illness of a chronic nature is likely to have a permanent effect
on a person's social identity, perhaps even "spoiling" the person's
identity, depending on social attitudes toward the illness.
Similar hypotheses regarding the impact of illness duration can be
derived from social psychological theories of the motivational and
cognitive factors which influence observers' reactions to victims. In
contrast to acute illness, chronic illness is more likely to be per-
ceived as a severe outcome (cf. Herzlich, 1973), and the person's
suffering is more likely to be perceived as continuing. Thus, to the
extent that observers do not anticipate a similar fate, they are more
likely to attribute responsibility to the victim's character or behavior
for chronic illness, in an attempt to maintain a belief in a just (or
controllable) world. Finally, cognitive biases in the attribution
process, including Nisbett and Wilson's (1977) magnitude of cause and
effect "teurostic," also tend to indicate that "guilt-free germ theories"
are not likely to be invoked in the explanation of chronic illness.
Short-term acute illness, on the other hand, is likely to be
perceived as less severe and accompanied by only temporary pain and
discomfort. Moreover, from a social psychological perspective, observers
are probably more likely to anticipate having a similar condition
(perhaps because of the relative ease with which acute illness episodes
can be recalled) , and are therefore less likely to blame the sick person
for the illness. Indeed, given the number of important differences
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between acute and chronic illness, there may be a discontinuity in
the processes underlying reactions to these two types of illness.
That is, the processes governing observers' reactions to victims of
acute illness may differ from the processes involved in reactions to
the chronically ill. For example, since most acute illnesses are
probably not severe enough to engage a "search for meaning" or violate
a person's belief in a just world, observers' reactions to acutely ill
persons may be guided by social role expectations (e.g., Parsons, 1951),
rather than any complex motivational or cognitive processes.
The duration of an illness is one aspect defining its perceived
severity (Herzlich, 1973), but the degree of suffering (i.e., physical
pain, discomfort, and incapacity) can also be viewed as an index of
severity. The just world (Lerner, 1970, 1971; Lerner § Miller, 1978)
and Walster's (1966) hypotheses would predict that the more severe the
illness, the greater the threat to the individual's belief in a just
(or controllable) world, and the greater the motivation to assign blame
to factors other than chance. Thus, the longer the duration of an ill-
ness, or the greater its severity, the more likely it is that observers
will derogate or blame victims of physical illness.
Finally, as noted repeatedly in earlier discussions, it is im-
possible to ignore the influence of the specific characteristics of
illnesses and lay beliefs regarding particular illness conditions.
Social "theories" or preconceived notions regarding particular illnesses
may dictate the range of observers' responses by defining the possible
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causes for the illness, and the extent to which the person is
stigmatized or devalued because of the illness. In fact, entire
'mythologies" of certain illnesses (e.g., TB, cancer) may develop
among lay persons (Sontag, 1978). These beliefs and attitudes regard-
ing particular illnesses --what causes them, what "type" of person
"gets" them, etc. --are likely to be important mediators of the
processes underlying observers' reactions to victims of physical
illness
.
The present study is an attempt to confirm and extend the just
world hypothesis to illness as a form of misfortune. The just world
hypothesis was selected as the major theoretical foundation for this
study since it is the most clearly articulated and best substantiated
analysis of observers' reactions to victims of misfortune. Illness,
unlike other types of misfortune used in investigations of the just
world hypothesis, seems especially likely to elicit "just world"
reactions since it clearly involves pain and suffering, strikes
"innocent" people, is often unanticipated and uncontrollable, and has
effects which may be permanent and visible to others. Unlike the
sociological analyses of reactions to illness, the just world hypo-
thesis also makes explicit predictions regarding the effects of
several of the variables identified as important in the literature-
-
the duration and severity of an illness.
Briefly, in the present study respondents were given written
information about the health of a person, and were asked to complete
a detailed questionnaire about their impressions of the person, and
their attributions about the person's state of health. The
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information provided was manipulated to describe illnesses varying in
duration (acute versus chronic) and in severity (mild versus severe)
.
Six different illnesses were described (three acute and three chronic
illnesses), in an effort to assure some generalizability of the
results across specific illnesses, and to determine the extent to which
the characteristics of a particular illness affect observers' percep-
tions and reactiois to victims of physical illness.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Overview
The respondents were presented with written information about a
person in the form of a job application. The "medical history"
section of the application form contained the experimental manipulations
by specifying illness conditions varying in duration (acute versus
chronic) and severity (mild versus severe) . After reading the informa-
tion provided in the application, the respondents completed a question-
naire designed to measure the (a) perceived characteristics of the
person, (b) attitudes toward the person, (c) perceptions of the person's
illness, and (d) beliefs regarding the etiology of the illness, in-
cluding the perceived responsibility of the person.
Respondents
The respondents were 238 students enrolled in an introductory
psychology course at the University of Massachusetts. The students
received course credit for their participation in the study.
Design
The design was a 2 x 6(2) hierarchical between- subjects design,
in which six illnesses were nested within two levels of duration
(acute versus chronic) , and crossed with two levels of severity (mild)
versus severe). The three illnesses nested within the acute condition
were kidney infection, pneumonia, and gastroenteritis, and within the
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chronic condition, diabetes, coronary heart disease, and leukemia.
The design also included a no-illness control group (see Table 1).
Procedure
The study was conducted during a regularly scheduled class session,
and the experimental task was introduced to the participants as a person
perception and interpersonal judgment task. The completed application
forms and the questionnaire were randomly distributed, and the partici-
pants were asked to read the information contained in the application
and to respond to a questionnaire about their impressions of the
person. The respondents were informed that they would each be asked
questions about their general impression of the person, and that each
respondent would also be asked detailed questions about one specific
aspect of the person, such as their employment or medical history.
In fact, all respondents were administered a questionnaire which in-
cluded detailed questions regarding their impressions of the person's
medical history.
Each respondent received one of thirteen versions of a completed
application (representing the twelve experimental conditions and the
no-illness control condition), and the questionnaire. The application
form, ostensibly completed by an actual job applicant, contained basic
demographic information about the stimulus person, including personal
information, the applicant's educational, employment, and medical
history, and interviewer comments. The interviewer comments were in-
cluded to provide ambiguous information regarding the applicant's
personality (e.g., "David has a tendency to be critical of himself"),
88
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and contained statements which are readily accepted as accurate descrip-
tions of personality (Ulrich, Stachnik, § Stainton, 1963). The ex-
perimental variables were manipulated within the medical history
section; all other information provided was identical across conditions.
After reading the application form, the respondents completed a
questionnaire which included ratings of the stimulus person on a series
of adjective scales, perceived similarity and attitude toward the
person, and a series of detailed questions regarding the person's
health and the information provided in the medical history.
Independent Variables
Illness duration (acute versus chronic) and illness severity
(mild versus severe) were manipulated by varying the information con-
tained in the medical history section of the completed application
received by the respondents. The medical history section contained a
preliminary screening item which required the applicant to rate his
or her present health, and to elaborate on ratings other than "good"
or "excellent." In the no-illness control condition, the health rat-
ing by the applicant was "excellent"; in all experimental conditions,
the applicant's self-rating of present health was "fair." To counter
the implausibility of an applicant rating him or herself in "fair"
health, the application form stated that all applicants were required
to submit a medical report by a physician.
To manipulate illness duration and severity, the information pro-
vided in the applicant's explanation for the "fair" rating of current
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health was varied. The explanation revealed a mild or severe case of
kidney infection, pneumonia, or gastroenteritis in the acute conditions,
or a relatively mild or severe case of diabetes, coronary heart disease,
or leukemia in the chronic conditions
.
The second question in the medical history section asked whether
the applicant had been hospitalized within the past year. The response
to this item was varied to underscore the severity manipulation. In
the severe conditions (all six illnesses) , the medical history indicated
that the applicant had been hospitalized within the past year. Prior
hospitalization was also noted in the applicant's explanation of the
health problem.
The information contained in the medical history for each of the
experimental conditions was as follows:
Acute conditions
Kidney infection (mild)
I am currently recovering from a mild kidney infection which I
developed two weeks ago. Otherwise, I am in generally good health.
Kidney infection (severe)
I am currently recovering from a severe kidney infection which I
developed two weeks ago. Because of serious complications, a high
fever, and considerable pain, I had to be hospitalized for several
days for observation and treatment. Otherwise, I am in generally
good health.
Pneumonia (mild)
I am currently recovering from a mild case of pneumonia which I
developed two weeks ago. Otherwise, I am in generally good health.
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Pneumonia (severe)
I am currently recovering from a severe case of pneumonia which I
developed two weeks ago. Because of serious conplications, a high
fever, and considerable pain, I had to be hospitalized for several
days for observation and treatment. Otherwise, I am in generally
good health.
Gastroenteritis (mild)
I am currently recovering from a mild case of gastroenteritis
(inflamination of the stomach and intestinal lining) which I
developed two weeks ago. Otherwise, I am in generally good health.
Gastroenteritis (severe)
I am currently recovering from a severe case of gastroenteritis
(inflammation of the stomach and intestinal lining) which I
developed two weeks ago. Because of serious complications, a
high fever, and considerable pain, I had to be hospitalized for
several days for observation and treatment. Otherwise, I am in
generally good health.
Chronic conditions
Diabetes (mild)
During an examination two years ago, my doctor detected a mild
form of diabetes, and recommended a program of diet, exercise
and occasional medication to manage the condition.
Diabetes (severe)
I was hospitalized two years ago with diabetes after suffering a
diabetic coma. Since then, I have been following a prescribed
program of diet, exercise, and insulin therapy to reduce the
possibility of hypoglycemia, insulin shock, or the complications
commonly associated with diabetes.
Coronary heart disease (mild)
During an examination two years ago, my doctor detected signs of
coronary heart disease, and recommended a diet and exercise
program to minimize the possibility of a heart attack.
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Coronary heart disease (severe)
I was hospitalized two years ago with coronary heart disease after
suffering a major heart attack. Since then, I have been following
a prescribed program of diet, exercise, and medication to reduce
the possibility of another heart attack, although I still suffer
occasionally from shortness of breath and chest pain.
Leukemia (mild)
During an examination two years ago, I was diagnosed as having
leukemia (a cancer which results from the uncontrolled production
of abnormal white blood cells). I underwent short-term treatment,
with positive results. Most of the symptoms are gone, my doctors
are optimistic that the disease will continue in remission, and
I am currently leading a fairly normal life.
Leukemia (severe)
I was hospitalized two years ago for leukemia (a cancer which
results from the uncontrolled production of abnormal white blood
cells). I underwent long-term chemotherapy and radiation treat-
ments, with mixed results. I am currently leading a fairly normal
life, but some of the symptoms and side effects from treatment
remain, and I occasionally experience considerable fatigue and
pain.
Dependent Measures
All respondents completed a questionnaire containing the following
measures, with the noted exceptions for the no-illness control group.
Victim derogation . On 7 -point bipolar adjective scales, the
respondents rated the person on sixteen general personality attributes.
Positive poles were intelligent, unselfish, courageous, valuable,
mature, happy, clean, honest, imaginative, active, fortunate, warm,
friendly, responsible, good, and strong. The participants also re-
sponded to a more general attitude item by rating their personal feel-
ings toward the person on a 7-point scale ranging from "very negative"
to "very positive."
Perceived similarity . To assess the extent to which respondents
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perceived themselves to be similar to the stimulus person, they were
asked to rate their similarity to the person on a 7-point scale
anchored by "very dissimilar" and "very similar."
Health ratings . To verify the experimental manipulations, the
respondents were asked to list any "illnesses or health problems"
reported by the person, and to rate the person's state of health and
the permanence of the person's illness or condition on 7-point scales.
To assess personal experience or familiarity with the illness, the
respondents were asked whether they, a very close friend, or a member
of their family had ever had the illness or condition reported by the
applicant. In the control condition, the respondents were asked only
to evaluate the person's state of health.
Perceived vulnerability. To measure the perceived threat of the
illness to the respondents (i.e., their perceived vulnerability),
respondents in the experimental conditions judged the likelihood that
(a) they themselves and (b) the average person in this country would
develop the illness or condition at some time in their life. The two
likelihood ratings were indicated on 7-point scales ranging from "very
unlikely" to "very likely."
Causal beliefs . The respondents were asked two open-ended
questions regarding (a) their beliefs about the causes of the particu-
lar illness, and (b) measures which could prevent the illness. These
items were omitted in the questionnaire for respondents in the no-
illness control group.
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Person responsibility . Respondents were asked several questions
about their perceptions of the person's responsibility for the illness,
including (a) how careful the person was about his/her health before
developing the illness, (b) the extent to which the person could have
done something to prevent the illness, and (c) the extent to which the
person is to blame for the illness. On 7 -point scales ranging from
"not at all responsible" to "completely responsible," the respondents
also judged the responsibility for the illness of four person-related
factors --genetic makeup, character or personality, behavior, and
life- style or personal habits.
With the exception of the item regarding prevention of the illness,
which was omitted, these questions were modified for respondents in the
no- illness control group to ask about the person's health . The
respondents in the control group were asked their perceptions of the
person's carefulness about his/her health, the extent to which the
person is responsible for his/her health, and the responsibility of
heredity, character, behavior, and lifestyle for the person's health.
General responsibility . To measure the perceived responsibility
for the illness (or health, for the control group) of the person
vis-a-vis other factors, the respondents were asked to rate, on 7-
point scales, the responsibility of six factors --the environment, the
person, other people, chance, God, and fate. The respondents were also
permitted to specify any other factor which they believed was respon-
sible for the person's illness (health).
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Illness ratings . The next series of questions asked the respon-
dents to rate the person's illness on twenty dimensions, such as
mild- severe, good-bad, painless -painful, curable- incurable, and
controllable-uncontrollable. These ratings provided additional
manipulation checks for the duration and severity factors, and inform-
ation on other dimensions along which the illnesses may vary.
Respondents in the no- illness control condition rated the person's
health on these dimensions, with the exception of the three dimensions
which refer specifically to illness: curable -incurable, acute-
chronic, and not contagious -contagious.
Belief in a just world . Following completion of the questionnaire,
the respondents were administered the Just World Scale (Rubin § Peplau,
1975). Respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point continuum
their degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the twenty items
on the Just World Scale (e.g., "People who meet with misfortune
often have brought it on themselves").
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Overview
The data for the experimental conditions were analyzed by a
2 x 6(2) hierarchical between- subjects unweighted means analysis of
variance. This analysis provides tests of the main effects for
Duration and Severity, the pooled variability of each set of three
illnesses about its appropriate mean, and the two-way interactions of
Duration x Severity and Illness x Severity. Subsequent to the analyses
of variance, several multiple comparison procedures were employed to
address the following differences among experimental and control
group means (Dunn, 1961; Kirk, 1968; Myers, 1972): (a) Dunnett's
procedure was used to evaluate comparisons of the no-illness control
condition with the grand mean of the experimental conditions and the
cell means representing each effect of interest in the experimental
design (viz., Duration, Severity, and Illness effects); (b) pairwise
differences among the six illness conditions, and the Duration x
Severity cell means, were analyzed with the Newman- Keuls procedure
(cW* -05); and (c) selected comparisons between the mild and severe
conditions within each illness were evaluated according to the Bon-
ferroni t_ procedure, in order to identify the specific differences
which may have contributed to significant Illness x Severity inter-
actions. Correlations among selected measures were also examined,
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although they generally tended to be of low magnitude, given the
restricted range within cells.
It should be noted, at the outset, that in many of the analyses
which follow, a significant effect for Illness was obtained in the
analysis of variance, but the Newman-Keuls comparisons yielded no
significant differences among the illnesses. This apparent discrepancy
is attributable to the different conceptual issues addressed by each
of these statistical procedures. Rather than conducting pairwise com-
parisons among the illnesses separately within the acute and chronic
conditions, subsequent comparisons were made among the six illnesses,
without reference to Duration. Conceptually, the analysis of variance
effect for Illness nested within Duration conditions is best described
as a goodness-of-fit test which assesses the degree to which Duration
exhausts the variability among the illnesses. Given a significant
Illness effect, it is of interest to consider comparisons among the
illnesses independent of their classification as acute or chronic.
Statistically, the analysis of variance comparisons comprised by the
pooled Illness effect involve six pairwise comparisons (i.e., three
comparisons within each Duration condition), whereas the Newman-Keuls
comparisons among the six illnesses control an experimentwise error
rate associated with fifteen comparisons. Accordingly, the magnitude
of observed differences among a set of illness means may be significant
by the analysis of variance, and yet fail to exceed the critical dif-
ference for the Newman-Keuls procedure.
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Manipulation Checks
All respondents correctly reported the person's illness, and their
ratings of the person's state of health confirmed the experimental
manipulations (see Table 2). The overall rating of state of health in
the experimental conditions was 4.35, compared to a mean rating of 1.86
in the no- illness control condition. In the acute, chronic, mild, and
severe conditions, as well as in each of the six illness conditions,
the person was rated as significantly more ill than the no- illness
control condition (all p_s < .01 by Dunnett's test). Among the experi-
mental conditions, the stimulus person was perceived as more ill in the
chronic (F (1,226) = 4.57, £ < .04) and severe conditions
(F (1,226) = 25.63, p_ < .001). However, there was also a Duration x
Severity interaction (F (1,226) = 5.29, p_ < .05), which reflected a
"ceiling" effect in perceived illness: In the acute-severe, chronic-
mild, and chronic-severe conditions, the stimulus person was perceived
as more ill than in the acute-mild condition, but there were no
significant differences among the former conditions (0^= .05).
Finally, there was a main effect for Illness (F (4,226) = 5.08, p_ < .01),
although Newman- Keuls comparisons revealed no statistically significant
differences among the six illness means.
Additional verification of the experimental manipulations was
provided by ratings of the illnesses on the dimensions of mild-severe,
acute-chronic, short-lived-persistent, and short- long. There was a
main effect for Duration on each of these measures: The illnesses
nested within the chronic condition were perceived as significantly
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more severe, chronic, persistent, and long than illnesses nested within
the acute condition (see Table 2) . There was a main effect for Severity
on the ratings of mild-severe and short- long: In the severe conditions,
the illnesses were perceived as significantly more severe and long than
in the mild conditions. For both the mild-severe and acute-chronic
ratings, a Duration x Severity interaction revealed ceiling effects
similar to the effect observed for state of health ratings. In the
severe conditions, acute and chronic illnesses were rated as more
severe than illnesses in the chronic-mild condition, which in turn
were perceived as significantly more severe than illnesses in the acute-
mild conditions (F (1,225) = 6.96, p_ < .01). Similarly, for the acute-
chronic rating, chronic- severe illnesses were rated as more chronic
than chronic-mild illnesses, and both chronic-severe and chronic-mild
illnesses were evaluated as more chronic than illnesses in the acute-
mild and acute-severe conditions (F (1,219) = 6.37, p_ < .02).
Thus, both the primary manipulation check measures and supple-
mentary ratings confirmed the experimental manipulations. A person
with any of the illnesses described was perceived as being in poorer
health than a person with no known health problems, and the person
with an illness of a chronic and/or severe nature was perceived as
being in poorer health than a person with an acute and/or mild illness.
Moreover, respondents accurately perceived the chronic illnesses as
more permanent than the acute illnesses, and confirmed the manipula-
tions of illness severity.
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Victim Derogation
Ratings of the personal attributes of the stimulus person revealed
a consistent, but very weak trend toward more negative evaluation of
the person as a function of illness (see Figure 1) . A multivariate
analysis of variance of the evaluations of the person (excluding the
rating of fortunate-unfortunate) by the experimental and the no-illness
control group yielded a weak, but significant effect (F (15,236) =
2.32, p = .004). In the univariate analyses of variance, illness was
the only variable which had a consistent effect on evaluations of the
person; there was a significant main effect for Illness on ten of
the sixteen bipolar ratings, and a marginally significant effect for two
of the remaining six items (see Table 3). Subsequent comparisons re-
vealed significant differences among the illness means for ratings of
courageous, mature, clean, fortunate, and strong. With the exception
of the ratings of dirty- clean, the differences observed among the
illness means were differences bet\\reen leukemia and the other five
illnesses. The person with leukemia was perceived as more courageous,
more mature, less fortunate, and stronger than the person with any of
the other illnesses, among which there were no significant differences.
For the rating of cleanliness, the person with gastroenteritis was
rated significantly less clean than the person with leukemia; none
of the means for the other illness conditions differed significantly.
Compared to the person ratings in the no- illness control con-
dition, mean ratings of the stimulus person in the experimental con-
ditions were generally lower. Leukemia was the only illness for which
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Figure 1. Mean person ratings for the
control (n = 21) and experimental conditions
(n = 238)
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the evaluation of the person consistently exceeded the mean for the
control group (see Figure 2). However, by Dunnett's test, which
controls for the experimentwise error rate and the non- independence of
comparisons , few of the illness means differed significantly from the
control group, and all but one of these differences occurred for the
ratings of happy and fortunate (see Table 3) . Compared to the
person with no illness, the person described as having a kidney in-
fection, pneumonia, gastroenteritis, or diabetes was perceived to be
significantly less happy, and the person with diabetes or leukemia
was regarded as significantly less fortunate. For the evaluation of
courageousness, the mean rating for each of the illness conditions
exceeded the rating for the no- illness control condition, although
only the rating of the person with leukemia was significantly higher
than the control group rating.
On the general attitude item, for which the respondents indicated
their personal feelings toward the person, there was also a significant
main effect for Illness (F (4,227) = 8.46, £ < .001), although Newman-
Keuls comparisons revealed no significant differences among the six
illness means. Again, the mean evaluation of the person by the no-
illness control group (M = 4.43) was more positive than the mean rating
for each of the illness conditions, with the exception of leukemia
(M = 4.72). However, none of the experimental-control group compar-
isons achieved statistical significance by Dunnett's test (a^= -01).
The average within-cell correlation between the mean of the person
ratings and the general attitude item was .638.
unintelligent intelligent
selfish unselfish
cowardly crit4 courageous
worthless valuable
immature mature
sad <3L 5 7 happy
dirty clean
dishonest 7 honest
unimaginative 12 3 imaginative
passive 0 5 7 active
unfortunate P5 7 fortunate
cold 5 warm
unfriendly friendly
irresponsible responsible
bad
weak 4 0'
good
strong
o
q No- illness control condition
O Leukemia condition
A Other illness conditions
Figure 2. Mean person ratings for the control
(n = 21), leukemia (n = 39), and other illness con-
ditions (pooled, n = 199)
.
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Perceived Similarity
Analysis of variance of respondents' ratings of their similarity
to the stimulus person revealed no significant differences as a function
of the experimental variables. Likewise, although all ratings of
perceived similarity in the experimental conditions were somewhat lower
than the ratings in the no-illness control condition, Dunnett's test
yielded no significant differences between experimental and control
group means. The average within-cell correlations between perceived
similarity and the mean person rating and attitude item were .377 and
.450, respectively.
Illness Familiarity § Perceived Vulnerability
There was a significant main effect for illness on responses
regarding illness familiarity (F (4,227) = 31.64, p < .001). Sub-
sequent comparisons revealed that respondents in the pneumonia and
diabetes conditions reported significantly greater personal familiar-
ity with the illness than respondents in the other four illness
conditions. The average within-cell correlation between familiarity
ratings and respondents' estimates of the likelihood that they and
the average person would develop the illness were .318 and .239,
respectively.
Analyses of variance of experimental group respondents' judg-
ments of the likelihood that they themselves and the average person
would develop the illness revealed very different patterns of results
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for these two likelihood ratings. For the ratings of the likelihood of
oneself developing the illness, there was a significant main effect for
Duration (F (1,227) = 11.11, £ < .01): Respondents judged themselves
to be less likely to develop a chronic illness (M = 2.58) at some time
in their life than an acute illness (M = 3.25). There was also a
marginal Duration x Severity interaction (F (1,227) = 3.42, £ < .07);
Newman- Keuls comparisons indicated that respondents perceived them-
selves to be significantly less likely to develop a mild or severe
chronic illness, compared to a mild acute illness. Estimates of the
likelihood of developing a severe acute illness were intermediate, and
did not differ significantly from the ratings in the other Duration x
Severity cells.
In contrast, for estimates of the likelihood that the average
person would develop the illness, there were significant main effects
for the other two experimental variables --Severity (F (1,227) = 6.61,
£ < .02) and Illness (F (4,227) = 9.68, £ < .001). Respondents judged
the average person to be more likely to develop a mild (M = 4.24) than
a severe illness (M = 3.80). With respect to the illness effect,
Newman- Keuls comparisons among the six illness means did not yield any
significant differences.
There were, however, substantial differences between respondents'
ratings of their own likelihood of developing an illness, and their
estimates of the likelihood that the average person would develop the
illness (see Figure 3). For each of the six illness conditions,
correlated t-tests revealed that respondents perceived themselves to
O———C Average person
• • Respondent
i
<£5 O) -P -H O 3
Gd
Figure 3. Mean ratings of the likelihood of oneself
and the&Maverage person" developing an illness (approximate
n per cell = 40) . Higher values indicate greater likeli-
hood.
d 05 t/) O ©
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be significantly less likely than the average person to develop the
illness: kidney infection (t (40) = -3.55, £ < .001), pneumonia
(t (38) = -4.05, p_ < .001), gastroenteritis (t (36) = -3.26, p_ < .01),
diabetes (t (38) = -4.01, p_ < .001), coronary heart disease
(t (40) = -6.00, £ < .001), and leukemia (t (37) = -4.76, £ < .001).
Causal Beliefs
Verbatim responses to the two open-ended questions are presented
in Appendix C. In general, there seemed to be a close correspondence
between the causes identified by a respondent, and the preventive
measures recommended. It was not uncommon for a respondent to indicate,
for example, that "improper eating habits" were the cause of an illness,
and to suggest that a person "eat properly" to prevent the illness.
The strongest association between causes and prevention seemed to occur
for causes related to behavior, or behavioral aspects of one's life-
style, such as eating, exercise, and relaxation habits. A popular
response to the prevention item was simply to "take care of oneself"
generally, and this response was also given by respondents who
indicated that they did not know the cause of an illness.
For kidney infection, there was a relatively high proportion of
respondents who indicated that they had "no idea" or did not know the
cause (26.31, n = 10). The most frequently cited factors were an
external agent, such as germs, a virus, bacteria, or an infection
(28.9%, n = 11), and eating habits or diet (18.4%, n = 7). Other
causes mentioned by more than a single respondent were drinking
Ill
(10.5%, n = 4), Mnot taking care of oneself 1 in a general or an un-
specified manner (7.91, n = 3) , heredity or genetics (7.9%, n = 3)
,
impurities or a cold in the kidneys (5.3%, n = 2), and a constitutional
weakness of the kidneys (5.3%, n = 2)
.
For pneumonia, low resistance to disease or being "rundown" was
the factor mentioned most frequently (38.5%, n = 15), often in con-
junction with a reason such as "not taking care of oneself" in a
general or an unspecified manner (33.3%, n = 13), or specifically in
terms of a previous illness condition, especially a cold (25.6%, n = 10),
lack of sleep or rest (20.5%, n = 8) , eating habits or diet (10.3%,
n = 4) , occupational pressure or overwork (10.3%, n = 4) , stress
(7.7%, n = 3) , or exercise habits (5.1%, n = 2) . In fact, pneumonia
was the only illness for which the concept of "resistance" was
prominent in respondents' causal attributions. Two other frequently
mentioned factors seemed to be perceived as having a more direct
causal role: an external agent such as germs, a virus, bacteria, or
an infection (20.5%, n = 8) , and weather conditions, specifically,
exposure to cold and/or dampness (15.4%, n - 6) . Other factors
cited by more than one respondent were chance (5.1%, n = 2) and not
dressing appropriately for weather conditions (5.1%, n = 2).
The two major factors perceived to cause gastroenteritis were
stress, anxiety, worry, tension, or nervousness (86.1%, n = 31), and
eating habits or diet (58.3%, n = 21). The causal attributions for
gastroenteritis were those which might be expected for peptic ulcers
and, in fact, two respondents explicitly likened the illness to ulcers.
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Other perceived causes which were mentioned by more than a single
respondent were an external agent--germs, a virus, bacteria, or an
infection (11.11, n = 4), occupational pressure or overwork
(11.1%, n = 4), and external pressure, unspecified (5.61, n = 2)
.
The most frequently mentioned cause of diabetes was heredity or
genetics (54.01, n = 20), although a surprisingly high proportion cited
eating habits or diet as a cause (40.5%, n = 15). More than 10% of the
responses were purely descriptive, although many of these were inaccu-
rate, such as "blood difficulties" or "body not producing enough sugar."
Obesity or weight were mentioned by 8.1% (n = 3) , and exercise habits
or inactivity were cited by 5.4% (n = 2) of the respondents.
Coronary heart disease was the illness for which the most causal
factors were mentioned; all but four of the respondents who cited a
cause mentioned multiple causes, often as many as three or four
causal factors. Stress, anxiety, worry, tension, or nervousness were
mentioned frequently (55.0%, n = 22), as were eating habits or diet
(45.0%, n = 18) and exercise habits or inactivity (42.5%, n = 17).
Also mentioned by a relatively large proportion of respondents were
heredity or genetics (25.0% , n = 10), obesity or weight (20.0%, n = 8)
,
and smoking (17.5%, n = 7). Additional factors which were cited by
more than a single respondent were high blood pressure or cholesterol
level (15.0%, n = 6) , occupational pressure or overwork (12.5%, n = 5)
constitutional weakness of the heart (7.5%, n = 3), and "not taking
care of oneself" in a general or an unspecified manner (5.0%, n = 2).
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For leukemia, a large proportion of respondents indicated that they
did not know the cause of leukemia or that the cause was unknown
(29.4%, n = 10), or they simply described the condition (11.8%, n = 4).
The only cause cited frequently by respondents in the leukemia condition
was heredity or genetics (52.9%, n = 18). Additional causes mentioned
by more than one respondent were chance (5.9%, n = 2), God's will
(5.9%, n = 2), exposure to radiation or carcinogens (5.9%, n = 2),
chemicals or foreign substances in food (5.9%, n = 2), and smoking
(5.9%, n = 2). Despite the relatively high proportion of respondents
who indicated that they did not know the cause (s) of leukemia, and the
relatively few number of causes mentioned, several respondents
explicitly indicated that multiple factors were necessary for leukemia
to occur: "I don't think that any one thing can make you get it";
"I think it is a freak thing caused by many factors."
It is important to note that even among respondents who cited the
same causal factor, such as "stress" or "heredity," the factor may be
attributed different roles in the occurrence of illness. For example,
some respondents seemed to suggest that stress has a direct causal
role in the occurrence of an illness, whereas other respondents seemed
to regard stress as a factor which simply "sets the stage" for disease
by lowering the individual's resistance. Similarly, heredity may be
treated as a pathogenic factor itself, or it may be accorded a
"contributing" or "facilitating" role, and regarded as necessary but
not sufficient for the development of disease. For instance, in the
leukemia condition, one respondent indicated that a person is "born
114
with cancer cells," whereas another respondent who cited genetics as
the cause added that no "one thing can make you get it." Although,
for the most part, the responses were logical, if not accurate, there
were instances of seemingly illogical reasoning. One respondent, for
example, stated that leukemia "probably has something to do with
genetics," and added "it may be an indiscriminate disease." Similarly,
another respondent in the leukemia condition reported that "it just
happens, so I suppose chances are 50/50."
Person Responsibility
Analyses of variance revealed a consistent pattern of results for
responses to the items measuring perceptions of the person's respon-
sibility for the illness (see Table 4) . There was a main effect for
illness on the item regarding perceived carefulness about health, and
main effects for both Duration and Illness for the measures regarding
prevention, blame, and the responsibility of heredity, character,
behavior, and lifestyle. There were no main effects of Severity on
any of the person responsibility items.
For perceived carefulness about health prior to developing the
illness, there was no significant difference between the acute and
chronic conditions. However, Duration had a significant effect on
all of the remaining person responsibility items. Compared to the
chronic condition, respondents in the acute condition judged the
person to be more able to have prevented the illness (F (1,227) = 27.09,
p < .001) and more to blame for the illness (F (1,227) = 29.35,
p_ < .001). For ratings of the extent to which the person could have
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prevented the illness, there was also a Duration x Severity interaction
(F (1,227) = 4.78, p_ < .03): Compared to the mild conditions, the person
with a severe acute illness was perceived as more able to have prevented
the illness, while the person with a severe chronic illness was per-
ceived to be less able to have prevented the illness. On the ratings
of the responsibility of the four person-related factors, heredity was
judged to be significantly less responsible for acute than chronic ill-
nesses, while character, behavior, and lifestyle were perceived to be
significantly more responsible for acute than chronic illness (see
Table 4).
Compared to the no- illness control group, the person with an ill-
ness was judged by respondents in the experimental conditions to be
significantly more careless about his/her health prior to developing
the illness (p_s < .01 by Dunnett's test). Interestingly, the extent
to which the ill person was blamed for the illness in both the acute
(M = 3.97) and chronic (M = 2.96) conditions was significantly less
than the degree of responsibility attributed to the person for health
CM = 5.24) in the no- illness control group. That is, the person
without an illness was credited with greater responsibility for his/her
health than the person with an illness was blamed for the illness.
With respect to the perceived role of specific factors in health
and illness, heredity was perceived to be significantly less responsible
for acute illness (M = 3.38) than for chronic illness (M = 5.06) or for
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health (M = 4.62). In contrast, character, behavior, and lifestyle
were perceived to be significantly less responsible for chronic illness
(M = 2.82, 3.24, and 3.78, respectively) than for acute illness
(M = 3.83, 4.43, and 4.72) or for health (M = 4.29, 4.76, 5.24). The
responsibility ratings for heredity were negatively correlated with
blame (average within-cell r = -.175), whereas the ratings for
character (r = .505), behavior (r = .513), and lifestyle (r = .496)
were positively correlated with blame. The only factor which was
related to respondents' estimates of their own likelihood of develop-
ing the illness was heredity, with which there was a low negative
correlation (r = -.103). Overall, lifestyle was perceived to be the
factor most responsible for health and acute illness, whereas heredity
was perceived to be the greatest factor in chronic illness. According
to the overall pattern of responsibility judgments, the person-related
factor perceived to be the least responsible for health and chronic
illness was character, whereas for acute illness, heredity received
the lowest mean responsibility rating (see Figure 4)
.
The analysis of variance main effects for Illness and subsequent
comparisons for each of the person responsibility items yielded some
interesting qualifications to this general pattern of results (see
Table 5). For each of the illness conditions, the person was per-
ceived to have been more careless about his/her health prior to
developing the illness than the person with no known illness
(p_s < .01 by Dunnett's tests), although the difference between the
experimental and control group was only marginal for leukemia
118
O --O Control condition
• Acute condition
O O Chronic condition
Heredity Character Behavior Lifestyle
Figure 4. Mean responsibility ratings of heredity,
character, behavior, and lifestyle for the no- illness
control condition (n = 21) , and the acute (n = 120) and
chronic (n = 119) experimental conditions. Higher values
indicate greater responsibility.
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(p_ < .05). There were also significant differences among the illnesses
in respondents' ratings of carelessness: The person with coronary heart
disease was judged to have been significantly more careless about
his/her health, and the person with leukemia was perceived to have been
significantly less careless, compared to the other illnesses. Mean
carelessness ratings in the kidney infection, pneumonia, gastro-
enteritis, and diabetes conditions were intermediate, and differed
significantly from the ratings for both coronary heart disease and
leukemia, with the exception of the rating for kidney infection, which
did not differ significantly from the rating for leukemia
(a^= .05 for Newman- Keuls comparisons).
The pattern of responses to the item regarding prevention closely
paralleled the extent to which the person was blamed for an illness.
The person with leukemia was judged to be significantly less able to
have prevented the illness, and was blamed significantly less than the
person with any of the other illnesses (a^= .05). Similarly, the
person with a kidney infection or diabetes, although perceived to be
significantly more able to have prevented the illness than the person
with leukemia, was judged to be significantly less able to have
prevented the illness, and less blameworthy, than the person with
pneumonia, gastroenteritis, or coronary heart disease - 05 )-
Only the degree of blame in the leukemia, kidney infection, and diabetes
conditions was significantly less than the degree of responsibility
attributed to the person for health in the no- illness control condition
(p_s < .01 by Dunnett's tests); mean ratings of blameworthiness in
the
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pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and coronary heart disease conditions did
not differ significantly from the mean rating of responsibility of the
person for his/her health by the control group. Overall, the average
within- cell correlation between blame and perceived carefulness was
-.466, and between blame and prevention, r = .677 .
For the ratings of responsibility of the four specific factors
of heredity, character, behavior, and lifestyle, a slightly different
pattern of results for Illness emerged (see Figure 5) . The pattern
of responses to these four items were quite similar for pairs of the
illnesses: leukemia and diabetes, coronary heart disease and kidney
infection, and pneumonia and gastroenteritis. For leukemia and
diabetes, character was judged to be the least responsible factor for
the illness, and heredity received the highest mean rating of responsi-
bility; differences between leukemia and diabetes and the other four
illnesses on these two items were statistically significant by Newman-
Keuls comparisons (a^= .05). Compared to the ratings of responsibility
for health in the no-illness control condition, character, behavior,
and lifestyle were perceived to be significantly less responsible for
the illness of a person with leukemia or diabetes (p_s < .01 by Dunnett's
tests). For kidney infection and coronary heart disease, character was
also judged to be the least responsible factor (albeit more responsible
than for leukemia or diabetes) , and lifestyle was perceived to be the
factor most responsible for these two illnesses, although not signifi-
cantly more responsible than for pneumonia and gastroenteritis. There
were no significant differences between these two illness conditions
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Figure 5. Mean responsibility ratings of heredity,
character, behavior, and lifestyle for each of the ill-
ness conditions (approximate n per cell = 40). Higher
values indicate greater responsibility.
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and the control group on ratings of the responsibility of heredity,
character, behavior, and lifestyle. For pneumonia and gastroenteritis,
lifestyle was also perceived to be the factor most responsible for the
illness, but heredity was judged to be the least responsible factor, and
was rated significantly lower than for the other illness conditions and
the no- illness control group.
There were also marginal Illness x Severity interactions for five
of the seven person responsibility items. For diabetes and gastro-
enteritis, an increase in severity lead to a decrease in perceived abil-
ity to have prevented the illness, blameworthiness, and attribution of
responsibility to character, behavior, and lifestyle. In contrast, the
person with severe leukemia, relative to the mild condition, was
perceived to be more able to have prevented the illness and more blame-
worthy, and character, behavior, and lifestyle were judged to be more
responsible for the illness. For the other three illnesses, there was
no consistent pattern of interaction across the five measures.
Moreover, for each of the items for which the analyses of variance
yielded an Illness x Severity interaction, Bonferroni t>tests indicated
that only the differences between mild and severe diabetes were signi-
ficant.
General Responsibility
The six general responsibility items measure the perceived respon-
sibility for the illness of the person vis-a-vis other factors, namely,
the environment, other people, chance, God, and fate. Analyses of
124
variance for these items again yielded main effects for Duration and
Illness, and no main effects for Severity.
There were significant main effects for Duration on all of the
general responsibility items except other people and chance (see Table 6).
The environment was judged to be significantly less responsible for
chronic illness than for acute illness (F (1,227) = 19.75, £ < .01) or
for health (jd < .01 by Dunnett's test). There was a marginal Duration
x Severity interaction for attributions of responsibility to the environ-
ment (F (1,227) = 3.59, £_ < .059): Compared to the mild conditions, the
environment was judged to be more responsible for severe acute illness,
and less responsible for severe chronic illness. Consistent with the
results for the blame item, the person was also perceived to be less
responsible for chronic illness than for acute illness (F_ (1,227) =
20.86, p < .001) or for health (£ < .01); the average within-cell
correlation between blame and attribution of responsibility to the
person was .605. In the ratings of the responsibility of other people,
however, there was no significant difference as a function of Duration,
although other people were judged to be significantly more responsible
for a person's health than for chronic illness (g_ < .01 by Dunnett's
test). Blame was positively correlated with each of these factors:
environment (r = .253), person (r = .605), and other people (r = .145),
but only attributions of responsibility to the environment were related
to respondents' estimates of their own likelihood of developing the
illness (r = .134)
.
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Attributions of responsibility to chance also did not differ signi-
ficantly as a function of Duration; there were no differences between
the attribution of responsibility to chance for acute illness, chronic
illness, or health. Like the ratings of the environment and the person,
Duration had a significant effect on responsibility ratings for God and
fate, but the order of the means was reversed. God was perceived to
significantly more responsible for chronic illness than for acute ill-
ness (F (1,227) = 7.78, p_ < .006). Similarly, fate was judged to be
significantly more responsible for chronic than for acute illness
(F (1,227) = 5.60, p_ <.02). Dunnett's tests yielded no significant
differences between experimental and control group means for the
attribution of responsibility to God and fate. Blame was negatively
correlated with each of these factors: chance (r = -.408), God (r =
-.114), and fate (r = -.128), although none of these factors were
correlated with respondents' estimates of their own likelihood of
developing the illness.
The main effect for illness was significant for each of the
general responsibility items, and subsequent Newman-Keuls comparisons
revealed significant differences among the six illness means for all
of the items except other people (see Table 7) . The environment
received the lowest responsibility rating for diabetes, and the highest
responsibility rating for pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and coronary
heart disease, among which there were no significant differences.
For comparisons among the illness conditions and the control group, the
environment was perceived to be significantly less responsible for
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diabetes (|> < .01) and leukemia (p < .05) than for health. Similarly,
the person was judged to be significantly less responsible for
diabetes and leukemia than for health (g_ < .01) or for kidney infection,
pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and coronary heart disease fag^- .05).
For ratings of the responsibility of the person, there was also an
Illness x Severity interaction (F (4,227) = 3.63, £. < .01): Compared
to the mild condition, there was a decrease in attributions of respon-
sibility to the person in the severe condition for all illnesses
except leukemia, for which there was an increase in responsibility
attributed to the person in the severe condition. However, diabetes
was the only illness for which the difference was significant by
Bonferroni t- tests. On the responsibility attributions to other people,
there was also a significant Illness main effect, but there were no
significant differences among the six illnesses by Newman-Keuls
comparisons. For experimental -control group comparisons, other people
were perceived to be significantly less responsible for leukemia than
for a person's health; there were no differences in the attributions
of responsibility to other people for health and for the remaining
five illnesses.
The factors of chance, God, and fate each received the highest
mean responsibility ratings for leukemia. However, for attributions
of responsibility to chance, there were no significant differences
between leukemia and the other illnesses, with the exception of
coronary heart disease, for which chance was perceived to be signifi-
cantly less responsible. Moreover, there were no significant dif-
ferences between the responsibility ratings of chance by the no- illness
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control group and the experimental groups. For mean ratings of the
responsibility of God, the only significant difference among the
illnesses was for leukemia, for which God was perceived to be signifi-
cantly more responsible than for gastroenteritis. Again, there were
no significant differences in attributions of responsibility to God
for a person's health by the no- illness control group, and attributions
by the respondents in the illness conditions. For attributions of
responsibility to fate, leukemia differed significantly from the
control and each of the other illness conditions (all gs < .05); fate
was judged to be more responsible for leukemia than for health or for
kidney infection, pneumonia, gastroenteritis, diabetes, and coronary
heart disease.
Illness Ratings
There were a number of significant main effects for each of the
experimental variables on the series of ratings of the illnesses, as
well as numerous experimental -control group differences (see Figure 6).
For Duration, there were significant main effects on all but five of
the twenty ratings --internal -external , common-rare, controllable-
uncontrollable, not embarrassing-embarrassing, and passive-active
(see Table 8). Compared to acute illness, chronic illness was per-
ceived to be more severe, long, strong, incurable, bad, chronic,
interesting, threatening, unfair, and persistent, and less painful,
fast, uncomfortable, contagious, and dirty (see Figure 7). Comparisons
with the ratings of health by the no- illness control group, which
in-
130
mild
short
1
1
2 05..
painless 1 20::*"3*" 4
s low-
internal
common
weak
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controllable
uninteresting
non- threatening
comfortable
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7 dirty
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O No- illness control condition
Experimental conditions
Figure 6. Mean illness ratings for the
control (n = 21) and experimental groups (n = 238)
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mild i 2
short i 2
painless i 2
slow i 2
internal i
common i 2
weak i 2
curable i or:
good i 2
acute i 2
controllable i 2
uninteresting i 2
non - threatening i 2
comfortable i 2
not embarrassing i 2
not contagious i <
fair i 2
short-lived i 2
clean i 2
oassive i 2
7 severe
7 long
7 painful
7 fast
7 external
7 rare
7 strong
7 incurable
7 bad
7 chronic
7 uncontrollable
7 interesting
7 threatening
7 uncomfortable
7 embarrassing
7 contagious
7 unfair
7 persistent
7 dirty
7 active
O Acute condition
Chronic condition
Figure 7. Mean illness ratings for the
acute (n = 119) and chronic conditions (n = 119)
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eluded all but the ratings of curable- incurable, acute -chronic, and
not contagious -contagious, indicated that both acute and chronic
illnesses were perceived as more severe, painful, internal, bad,
threatening, uncomfortable, and unfair than health (all p_s < .01 by
Dunnett's tests). Further, acute illness was perceived to be less
long (p <.01), less common (p_ <.05), less strong (p <.01), and
less clean (p_ < .01) than health. Chronic illness was also perceived
to be slower (p_ < .05) and more persistent (£ < .01) than health.
For Severity, there were significant main effects on the ratings
of mild-severe, short-long, painless -painful, slow-fast, weak-strong,
curable- incurable, non-threatening-threatening, and comfortable-
uncomfortable (see Table 8). Relative to the mild condition, severe
illness was judged to be more severe, long, painful, fast, strong,
bad, threatening, and uncomfortable (see Figure 8). Thus, both chronic
and severe illness were perceived as more severe, long, strong, bad, and
threatening. The effects of Duration and Severity differed for three
of the ratings: Chronic illness was perceived as less painful, fast,
and uncomfortable than acute illness, whereas severe illness was per-
ceived as more painful, fast, and uncomfortable than mild illness.
In addition, there were Duration x Severity interactions for the
ratings of mild-severe, acute-chronic, and curable-incurable, and
Illness x Severity interactions for the ratings of mild-severe,
short-long, and curable-incurable. For the ratings of mild-severe and
acute-chronic, the Duration x Severity interactions revealed ceiling
effects in the perception of duration and severity which were previously
135
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non -threatening 1
comfortable
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7 painful
7 fast
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7 bad
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7 unfair
7 persistent
7 dirty
7 active
O Mild condition
Severe condition
Figure 8. Mean illness ratings for the
mild (n = 124) and severe conditions (n = 114)
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discussed. The Illness x Severity interaction for the mild-severe
rating reflected a similar effect: Compared to the mild condition,
Bonferroni t- tests indicated that all of the illnesses were perceived
as more severe in the severe condition, but the increase in perceived
severity was not significant for coronary heart disease and leukemia
(kidney infection, t (225) = -6.86, p < .01; pneumonia, t (225) =
-4.46, p_ < .01; gastroenteritis, t (225) = -3.06, p_ < .01; diabetes,
t (225) = -4.65, p_ < .01; coronary heart disease, t (225) = -1.12,
ns; leukemia, t (225) = -2.13, ns)
.
On the curability ratings, the Duration x Severity interaction
revealed a tendency for severe acute illness to be perceived as more
curable than mild acute illness, whereas severe chronic illness was
judged to be less curable than mild chronic illness (F (1,225) = 6.28,
p < .02). The Illness x Severity interaction (F (4,225) = 8.15,
p < .001) indicated that, compared to the mild condition, ratings of
incurability increased for severe pneumonia, diabetes, and leukemia,
and decreased for severe kidney infection, gastroenteritis, and
coronary heart disease. However, only the differences for diabetes
(t (225) = -5.03, p_ <.01) and coronary heart disease (t (225)
=
2.67, £ < .10) approached significance. Finally, the Illness x
Severity interaction for ratings of short-long (F (4,227) = 3.08,
p_ < .02) revealed that all of the illnesses, except coronary heart
disease, were perceived as longer in the severe condition, compared
to the mild condition, although the increase was significant for only
kidney infection (t (227) = -.304, p_ < .05) and diabetes (t (227)
=
-3.03, p < .05).
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Experimental-control group comparisons for Severity indicated that,
compared to the mean ratings for health, both mild and severe illness
was perceived as more severe, painful, internal, bad, threatening,
uncomfortable, unfair, and dirty (see Table 8). Further, mild illness
was judged to be more short (p_ < .05) and more weak (p_ < .01) than
health, and severe illness was perceived to be more slow (p_ < .05)
and more rare (p_ < .05) than health.
There was a significant main effect for Illness on each of the
twenty ratings (see Table 9). For the ratings of internal -external,
good-bad, not embarrassing-embarrassing, and passive-active, Newman-
Keuls comparisons yielded no significant differences among the six
illnesses. For ratings on the other sixteen dimensions, there were
a number of different patterns among the six illnesses. On four of
the ratings, short -long, curable- incurable, acute -chronic, and short-
lived-persistent, Newman-Keuls comparisons among the illnesses
revealed differences primarily between the acute and chronic illnesses.
For the ratings of short- long and acute-chronic, each of the acute
illnesses- -kidney infection, pneumonia, and gastroenteritis --was
judged to be significantly more short and more acute than each of the
chronic illnesses. Each of the acute illnesses was also perceived to
be significantly more curable than each of the chronic illnesses; among
the chronic illnesses
,
coronary heart disease was perceived to be
significantly more curable than diabetes. Finally, each of the acute
illnesses were perceived to be significantly less persistent than
each of the chronic illnesses and, among the acute illnesses, pneumonia
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was perceived to be significantly less persistent than gastroenteritis
^
a
EW
= "° 5 £or the COTnParisons for each item).
There were distinctive effects for individual illnesses on the
remaining items (see Figures 9-14 for rating profiles of each illness)
Leukemia differed from most of the other illnesses on four of the
ratings. Leukemia was judged to be significantly less fast and more
unfair than each of the other five illnesses, among which there were
no significant differences. Leukemia was also perceived to be
significantly more uncontrollable than the other illnesses, with the
exception of kidney infection, for which the difference was not
significant. On judgments of common- rare, leukemia was rated as
significantly less common than each of the other illnesses, among
which there were additional differences: Each of the acute illnesses
was perceived to be less common than coronary heart disease, and
diabetes did not differ significantly from either the acute illnesses
or coronary heart disease on this rating.
Both leukemia and diabetes were perceived as significantly more
interesting than kidney infection, pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and
coronary heart disease (oW= .05). Diabetes alone was judged to be
significantly less painful than each of the other five illnesses.
Diabetes was also judged to be significantly less uncomfortable and
less dirty than each of the other illnesses, although there were
differences among the other illnesses on these two ratings. Gastro-
enteritis was rated significantly more uncomfortable than coronary
heart disease, but the mean ratings for kidney infection, pneumonia,
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Figure 9. Mean illness ratings for kidney infection (n = 41)
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Figure 10. Mean illness ratings for pneumonia (n = 40)
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Figure 11. Mean illness ratings for gastroenteritis (n = 38)
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Figure 12. Mean illness ratings for diabetes (n = 39)
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Figure 13. Mean illness ratings for coronary heart disease (n = 41)
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Figure 14. Mean illness ratings for leukemia (n = 39)
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and leukemia did not differ from the ratings for these two illnesses.
On the ratings of clean-dirty, kidney infection and pneumonia were
judged to be significantly more dirty than coronary heart disease,
while the cleanliness ratings for leukemia and gastroenteritis were
intermediate.
Leukemia and coronary heart disease both differed significantly
from the other four illnesses on the ratings of mild- severe and
non- threatening- threatening. Leukemia and coronary heart disease were
perceived as significantly more severe than kidney infection, diabetes,
and gastroenteritis, among which there were no significant differences;
pneumonia, which received an intermediate rating of severity, was per-
ceived as significantly more severe than gastroenteritis. Leukemia
and coronary heart disease were also judged to be significantly more
threatening than the other illnesses, among which only pneumonia and
gastroenteritis differed (ow= .05 for the comparisons for each item).
Finally, pneumonia had distinctive effects on the ratings of weak-
strong and not-contagious -contagious. Pneumonia was perceived as a
significantly more weak than leukemia; there were no significant
differences between pneumonia or leukemia and the other four illnesses.
Pneumonia was also judged to be significantly more contagious than each
of the other illnesses, among which there were no differences.
For experimental -control group comparisons, again several different
patterns emerged. There were no significant differences in the ratings
of health and of illness on the dimensions of controllable-uncontrol-
lable and not embarrassing-embarrassing. For seven of the dimensions,
r
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ratings of each of the illnesses differed significantly from the
ratings of health made by respondents in the no- illness control
condition* Compared to health, each of the illnesses was perceived to
be significantly more severe, painful, internal, bad, threatening,
uncomfortable, and unfair (gs < .01 by Dunnett's tests). In addition,
each of the acute illnesses was perceived to be significantly less
long and less clean than health (ps < .01). For ratings of slow- fast,
common-rare, and uninteresting-interesting, leukemia was the only
illness for which ratings differed significantly from the control:
Leukemia was perceived to be significantly less fast, more rare, and
more interesting than health (jd < .01). Finally, pneumonia was
judged to be more weak (p < .01) and less persistent Q> < .05) than
health, whereas diabetes (g_ < .01) and coronary heart disease (£ < .05)
were perceived to be more persistent than health.
Belief in a Just World
The average within-cell correlations between scores on the
Belief in a Just World Scale and the primary dependent measures were
very low in magnitude. BJW scores were not related to the mean
person rating (r = .028), general attitude toward the person
(r = -.060), perceived personal similarity to the person (r = -.066),
blame (r = -.054), or responsibility attributed to the person
(r = -.002). There were, however, weak negative correlations between
BJW scores and respondents' estimates of the likelihood that they
themselves (r = -.203) and the average person (r = -.194) would
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develop the illness. A median split of BJW scores revealed a slight
tendency (t (229) = 1.87, £ = .062) for respondents in the high BJW
group to perceive themselves as less similar to the stimulus person
(M = 3.23), compared to respondents in the low BJW group (M = 3.67).
However, there were no differences between respondents with low and
high BJW scores on the overall rating of the person, general attitude,
blame, and attributions of responsibility to the person.
Summary
The major findings of the present study may be summarized as
follows:
1) The experimental manipulations appeared to be very effective,
although the manipulations of Duration and Severity were not completely
orthogonal in respondents 1 perceptions of the illnesses. The observed
"ceiling" effects in ratings of state of health, severity, chronicity,
and curability are consistent with Herzlich's (1973) observation that
the seriousness of an illness is not a specific attribute but a "super"
attribute which represents an accentuation of features of the illness
such as painfulness, chronicity, and prognosis.
2) Although the mean ratings of the person and general attitude
were generally in the direction predicted by the just world hypothesis
(i.e., more negative than the control), there was only weak evidence
of victim derogation in respondents' evaluation of the sick person.
Moreover, there was consistent evidence of aggrandizement of the
leukemia victim.
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3) Neither the presence of an illness nor the characteristics
of the illness (viz., duration and severity) affected respondents'
perceptions of personal similarity to the stimulus person. In terms
of situational similarity (i.e., common fate), respondents perceived
themselves to be less likely to develop a chronic than an acute illness,
and perceived themselves to be much less likely than the average person
to develop any of the illnesses. The perceived likelihood of oneself
developing an illness was positively related to attributions of respon-
sibility to the environment, and negatively related to attributions of
responsibility to heredity.
4) According to their open-ended explanations, the respondents
generally believe kidney infections to be caused by external agents
(e.g., germs) and/or eating habits, pneumonia to be caused by lack of
resistance and/or a failure to take care of oneself, gastroenteritis
to be caused by stress and/or eating habits, diabetes to be caused by
heredity and/or eating habits, coronary heart disease to be caused
by stress and/or eating or exercise habits, and leukemia to be
caused by heredity.
5) Attributions regarding person and general responsibility were
not affected by the severity of the illness, and there appeared to be
no effect of Duration, Severity, or Illness on attributions of
responsibility to chance. With respect to Duration, the person with
a chronic illness was perceived to be less able to have prevented the
illness and less blameworthy than the person with an acute illness.
In addition, heredity, God, and fate were judged to be more responsible
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for chronic than acute illness, whereas character, behavior, life-
style, the environment, and the person were perceived to be less
responsible. Attributions of responsibility to heredity, chance, God,
and fate were negatively related to blame, while attributions to
character, behavior, lifestyle, the environment, the person, and
other people were positively related to blame.
6) Among the six illnesses, the attributions of responsibility
for leukemia were especially distinctive. The person with leukemia was
generally perceived to be less careless, less able to have prevented
the illness, and less blameworthy than the person with any of the
other five illnesses. In addition, heredity, God, and fate were judged
to be more responsible for leukemia than the other illnesses, and the
person and character were perceived to be less responsible. In
contrast, the person with coronary heart disease, about whom judgments
frequently differed from judgments regarding the person with diabetes
or leukemia, was perceived to be more careless, more able to have
prevented the illness, and more blameworthy; lifestyle and the
environment were blamed more, and chance less, compared to most of the
other illnesses.
7) The sick person, conpared to the healthy person, was perceived
to have been more careless about his/her health prior to developing
the illness. The blame attributed to the sick person for the illness,
however, was less than the responsibility with which the healthy person
was credited for his or her own good health. For individual illnesses,
the degree of blame attributed to the person with pneumonia,
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gastroenteritis, and coronary heart disease did not differ from the
degree of responsibility with which the healthy person was credited.
Health resembled acute illness in that character, behavior, lifestyle,
the environment, and the person were perceived to be more responsible
than for chronic illness. Health was similar to chronic illness in that
heredity was perceived to be more responsible than for acute illness.
8) Perceptions of illness were affected by both Duration and
Severity, as well as the particular illness. Chronic illness was per-
ceived to more severe, long, strong, incurable, bad, chronic, interest-
ing, threatening, unfair, and persistent, and less painful , fast, un-
comfortable, contagious, and dirty than acute illness. Severe illness,
compared to mild illness, was perceived to be more severe, long, pain-
ful, fast, strong, bad, threatening, and uncomfortable. The effects of
Duration and Severity on perceptions of illness diverged on three
dimensions: Chronic illness was perceived as less painful, fast, and
uncomfortable than acute illness, and severe illness was perceived as
more painful, fast, and uncomfortable than mild illness.
9) Distinctive perceptions of individual illnesses occurred
primarily for the chronic illnesses. Leukemia was generally regarded as
less fast and less common, and more unfair and uncomfortable than the
other illnesses. Leukemia and diabetes were perceived to be more
interesting than the other illnesses, and leukemia and coronary heart
disease were judged to be more severe and threatening than the other
illnesses. In addition, diabetes was perceived to be less painful,
more comfortable, and more clean than the other illnesses.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Hie introduction to the present study described social psycholo-
gical models of reactions to victimization, and discussed issues per-
taining to morality and responsibility in social judgments regarding
victims of physical illness. The just world hypothesis, which provided
the conceptual foundation for the present study, and other psychological
and sociological perspectives on reactions to victimization were pre-
sented. In the following discussion, the just world hypothesis and
other theoretical perspectives will be considered in light of the pre-
sent findings, and the implications of the results regarding observers'
perceptions of the sick person, their attributions of responsibility
for illness, and their perceptions of illness will be discussed.
Finally, methodological issues will be considered, as well as potential
directions for future research.
Perceptions of the Person
The just world hypothesis that the sick person would either be
derogated or blamed for the illness was not supported by the results
of the present study. In fact, the reverse was true: The person
perceived as the most unfortunate and the least responsible for the
illness --the leukemia victim- -was evaluated more positively than both
the healthy person and the person described as having another illness.
For the person with a kidney infection, pneumonia, gastroenteritis,
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diabetes, or coronary heart disease, there was a very weak effect of
the presence of illness on the overall perception of a person's attri-
butes, but virtually no effect on the perception of specific attributes,
or as a function of the duration or severity of the illness. Apparently,
in most cases, knowledge that a person is ill, even chronically ill,
does not influence observers' general perceptions of the person, or
perceptions of the person's specific attributes. However, knowledge that
a person has leukemia does appear to engender a more positive perception
of the person. This enhanced attractiveness of the leukemia victim is
difficult to interpret, inasmuch as none of the theoretical perspectives
previously discussed predicts, or can account for, more positive
perceptions of a person's attributes as a result of illness. The
perception of the person with leukemia as more mature, courageous, clean,
unfortunate, and strong, and the perception of leukemia itself as more
severe, threatening, rare, interesting, unfair, etc., appears to
represent more than simply a response of compassion toward the leukemia
victim.
One explanation for this effect may be the conception of the sick
person as a martyr, or one who has achieved an "exceptional personality"
through great or constant suffering (cf. Herzlich, 1973). This explana-
tion is a clear contradiction of the just world hypothesis, which
explicitly predicts that rejection will be strongest when the victim
is perceived as a martyr, although "martyr" was operational ized by
Lerner and his colleagues as a victim who suffers for the sake of
others (Lerner, 1970; Lerner $ Simmons, 1966). The just world
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hypothesis notwithstanding, it seems plausible that people perceived to
be innocently and unfairly victimized by a serious, life-threatening
misfortune may be romanticized and perceived to have special or excep-
tional personal qualities. Sontag (1978), referring to leukemia as
the 11 1 white T or TB-like form" of cancer, noted that despite the
divergence in the popular mythologies of TB and cancer, leukemia has
succeeded TB in contemporary fiction as the "romantic disease which cuts
off young life" (p. 18). The leukemia victim, unlike the victims of
other cancers, seems especially likely to be regarded "romantically."
Leukemia is the "pure" form of cancer that does not involve any growth
or tumor, and thus, for which there is no mutilating surgical cure.
Moreover, in contrast to other cancers, leukemia is generally regarded
as a disease for which the person is not to blame. This probably true
because leukemia has not been linked to any personal behaviors or habits,
such as smoking, and leukemia is the predominant form of childhood
cancer, accounting for almost half of all childhood deaths to cancer.
Although none of the existing theories of reactions to victims
can account for the enhanced attractiveness of the leukemia victim
observed in the present study, the fact that the leukemia victim's
behavior and character were not blamed could be explained by Shaver's
(1970) "defensive attribution" hypothesis and a delimiting condition to
just world effects (Lerner § Miller, 1978): the perception of a common
fate. However, in the present study, respondents perceived themselves
to be very unlikely to develop leukemia, and significantly less likely
to develop this disease than the average person. Moreover, Shaver
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(1970) argued that the anticipation of a common fate will lead to
attributions to chance, particularly in the face of severe misfortunes,
but in the present study, there was no relationship between the perceived
likelihood of developing an illness and attributions of responsibility
to chance, and no effect of the presence, or the duration or severity
of illness, on attributions of responsibility to chance.
Thus, the just world hypothesis may be more limited in its gener-
alizability than previously supposed. According to the just world
hypothesis, only when an observer cannot attribute some misdeed or
blameworthy behavior to the victim will he or she decide that the suf-
fering is deserved because the victim is an undesirable, bad person.
Conversely, if the victim's character is beyond reproach, the observer
will prefer to blame the person's actions rather than character (Lerner
§ Miller, 1978). But how will observers react to a victim whose char-
acter and behavior are beyond reproach, such as a person with leukemia?
Under these circumstances , observers ' attributions are clearly con-
strained by the reality of the situation, a reality which would have to
be severely distorted in an effort to maintain a belief in a just world
by blaming a victims' character or behavior. If the injustice of
undeserved suffering cannot be denied, the observer may attempt to make
sense of the event within a broader framework of meaning, for example,
by attributing the misfortune to God or fate. This appeared to be the
case in the present study; God and fate were perceived to be more
responsible for leukemia than for health or the other illnesses, and
leukemia was the only illness for which God and fate were spontaneously
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mentioned in the open-ended explanations of illness. Attributions to God
and fate, while they may render misfortunes meaningful and explain the
selective occurrence of misfortune, do not clearly support an observer's
belief in a just or controllable world, except perhaps in some ultimate
scheme of things.
Perceptions of Vulnerability
It is interesting to note that observers 1 perceptions of vulner-
ability support Parsons (1951) assertion that people are motivated to
underestimate the likelihood of their becoming ill, especially
seriously ill. The data indicate that, relative to their estimates for
the "average person," people do underestimate their own chances of
developing an illness, although it is impossible to determine from these
data whether observers' estimates are biased by motivational factors,
as Parsons (1951) suggested, or by cognitive factors, such as informa-
tional or perceptual differences. The relationship between familiarity
with an illness and observers r estimates of both their own and the
average person's likelihood of developing an illness does suggest,
however, that at least one cognitive heuristic- -availability--may
affect observers' judgments regarding the probability of an illness,
although it does not appear to affect differentially judgments regard-
ing oneself and another person.
There was no relationship between perceived vulnerability (i.e.,
common fate) and attributions of blame to the victim, but there was a
weak negative relationship between the perceived likelihood of develop-
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ing an illness and attributions of responsibility to heredity. Again,
leukemia was distinctive, in that heredity was the causal factor to
which leukemia was almost exclusively attributed, in both the open-
ended explanations and the responsibility ratings. Among the causes of
misfortunes previously examined in studies of reactions to victimi-
zation, heredity is a cause unique to illness. While heredity seems to
be an important and plausible cause of illness, particularly "mysterious"
illnesses for which there are no known environmental or behavioral
causes, it does not seem to serve any of the motives posited to underlie
observers' reactions to victims: Belief in a just world (Lerner, 1970,
1971; Lerner $ Miller, 1978), belief in a controllable world (Walster,
1966), and self-esteem or self-protection from blame (Shaver, 1970).
The person has no control over his or her heredity and can hardly be
considered to "deserve" its negative effects, although, as the present
study suggests, the perception of heredity as the cause of illness may
protect the person from blame. However, if observers do not anticipate
a similar fate, the motive for self-protection from possible future blame
is presumably not aroused. Thus, if attributions to heredity have any
motivational basis in the present study, the motive would appear to be
the perception of one's own invulnerability to a similar fate. That
is, unlike attributions of responsibility to behavior, the environment,
etc., the attribution of responsibility to the victim's genetic makeup
implies that the observer, with a different genetic makeup, is unlikely
to develop the illness. This interpretation is supported by the
data
from the present study; heredity was the only factor for which
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attributions of responsibility were negatively related to the perceived
likelihood of oneself developing the illness.
Attributions of Responsibility for Illness
The sick person, compared to the healthy person, was perceived to
have been more careless about his or her health prior to developing the
illness. Without additional evidence, there is little reason to believe
that a person who becomes ill was more careless about his or her health
than a person who does not, but the knowledge that a person is ill is
apparently used by observers to infer greater carelessness. While not
providing direct support, these data are consistent with Fischhoff's
(1975; Fischhoff $ Beyth, 1975) "creeping determinism
1
' hypothesis that
observers, in hindsight, will tend to perceive an outcome as having
been almost inevitable. There were no differences in perceived care-
lessness as a function of the duration or severity of the illness, but
there were differences among particular illnesses, most notably, the
perception of the person with coronary heart disease as having been
the most careless, and the perception of the person with leukemia as
having been the least careless.
Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no effect of Severity on
attributions of responsibility, and there was a reversal for Duration:
The person with a chronic illness was perceived to have been less able
to have prevented the illness, and less blameworthy, than the
person
with a less serious, acute illness. However, in terms of
specific
illnesses, the person with leukemia, as previously noted,
was perceived
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to have been the least able to have prevented the illness and the least
blameworthy, followed by the person with diabetes or kidney infection;
the person with pneumonia, gastroenteritis, or coronary heart disease
was perceived to have been more able to have prevented the illness and
more blameworthy.
These data also indicate that, although the sick role model
(Parsons, 1951) may accurately describe general social expectations, it
does not seem to apply to judgments regarding the blameworthiness of an
individual sick person. Illness, in many cases, does not seem to be
regarded as an event which simply happens to people, and for which they
are exempted from responsibility. Rather, the sick person is sometimes
perceived to have failed in his or her obligation to maintain good
health, and to be responsible for an illness which results. Interest-
ingly, at the individual level of analysis, the sick role model appears
to more accurately describe reactions to chronic illness, than the acute
illnesses to which it theoretically applies.
In terns of the specific factors to which respondents attributed
responsibility for illness, heredity, God, and fate were perceived to
have been more responsible for chronic than acute illness, and were
negatively related to blame. In contrast, character, behavior, life-
style, the environment, and the person were perceived to have been more
responsible for acute illness, and were positively related to blame.
Thus, the more serious, chronic illnesses did not lead respondents to
attribute responsibility to the person's character or behavior, as the
just world hypothesis predicts, to the most controllable factors, as
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Walster (1966) predicts, or to chance, as Shaver's (1970) defensive
attribution hypothesis predicts. While attributions to heredity, God,
and fate for chronic illness do not appear to restore justice or
enhance the observer's sense of control, attributions to heredity may,
as previously suggested, reduce the observer's sense of personal
vulnerability, while attributions to God and fate may serve to explain
the selective and seemingly random occurrence of a serious illness in a
particular individual.
It is interesting to note that the attribution of chronic illness
to heredity, God, and fate is consistent with Nisbett and Wilson's
(1977) hypothesis that causes are selected to explain events based on
the correspondence or fit between the magnitude of the cause and the
effect. That is, chronic illness is a "larger" event than a short-term
acute illness, and heredity, God, and fate seem to be relatively "large"
causes compared to viruses or the victim's behavior. The open-ended
explanations also confirm the suggestion in the introduction that people
may find it difficult to believe that a relatively "small" cause such
as a virus could cause a life -threatening or disabling illness. Viruses
were not mentioned as a cause of chronic illnesses by any respondents,
although some cancers, including leukemia, have tentatively been linked
to viral infections. Similarly, causal attributions for illness may be
based on properties other than magnitude common to the perceived cause
and the event. For example, heredity, like chronic illness, is
relatively constant and enduring- -a permanent characteristic of the
person. Heredity does not seem a likely cause of a short-term, non-
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recurring illness, except inasmuch as it may be perceived to influence a
person's general resistance to disease.
Data from the control group allowed for some interesting comparisons
of attributions of responsibility for health versus illness. Ross and
DiTecco (1975) have suggested that there may be an asymmetry in the
assignment of credit and blame, because morally good behavior is often
perceived to have external determinants in that it is dictated by a
socially shared ought standard. Thus, blame may often be attributed
for failure to adhere to an ought standard, but adherence may receive
little praise. Ought standards for health were clearly evident in
the open-ended responses regarding the causes and prevention of illness,
and were quite pronounced for pneumonia, which was most frequently
described as a result of failure to take care of oneself, to do the
things one ought to do, like eating properly and dressing appropriately
for inclement weather. Moreover, health is often taken as a given,
the normal, natural state of the individual which he or she is supposed
to maintain, while illness is regarded as biologically and socially
disvalued or deviant (cf. Herzlich, 1973; Parsons, 1951). Thus, it
might be expected that people would be held responsible or blamed for
their illnesses, but not praised or given credit for good health.
The data from the present study, however, suggest that people are
credited for their good health. In general, assuming similar scale
properties , the blame attributed to the sick person for illness was
less than the responsibility with which the health person was credited
for his/her good health. For individual illnesses, the degree of
blame
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attributed to the person with pneumonia, gastroenteritis, or coronary
heart disease did not differ from the degree of responsibility with
which the healthy person was credited, whereas the blame attributed to
the person with a kidney infection, diabetes, or leukemia was less than
the responsibility attributed to the healthy person. The person with
any of the latter three illnesses was also perceived to have been less
able to have prevented the illness than the person with penumonia,
gastroenteritis, or coronary heart disease. These data could be inter-
preted to mean that a person is perceived to be accountable for his or
her state of health, whether sick or healthy, unless the person develops
an illness which he or she is perceived to have been unable to have
prevented, in which case the person's responsibility is diminished.
In terms of the specific factors to which health and illness were
attributed, heredity, character, behavior, lifestyle, the environment,
and the person were all perceived to be responsible for health, whereas
in explanations of illness, respondents distinguished heredity, on
the one hand, and character, behavior, lifestyle, the environment, and
the person, on the other. Thus, health resembled acute illness, in that
character, behavior, lifestyle, the environment, and the person were
perceived to be more responsible than for chronic illness, and was
similar to chronic illness, in that heredity was perceived to be more
responsible than for acute illness. There was no difference in the
perceived responsibility of chance, God, and fate for health versus
illness, although, as previously noted, God and fate were perceived to
be more responsible for chronic than acute illness, largely because
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of the perceived role of these factors in the occurrence of leukemia.
Thus, all of these factors were perceived to be responsible for a
person's health, but were distinguished in terms of their contribution to
specific kinds of departures from health, namely, acute versus chronic
illness, or a particular illness.
Although the responsibility ratings provide a quantitative basis
for comparisons across experimental conditions, the data they yield are
deceptively simple; the open-ended responses regarding perceived
causality revealed much more complex perceptions of disease causation.
Although there were many simple, straightforward responses such as
"genetics" or "virus," there were also numerous responses which dis-
cussed the interaction of two or more factors, or a chain of causes
in the etiology of illness. There were references to the individual's
constitution, prior and current physical state, emotional states, and
health habits, as well as contemporaneous causes. In addition, some
responses implied distinctions between necessary and sufficient causes,
or direct and indirect causes. One of the more prominent examples is
the concept of "resistance"; it was not uncommon, for instance, for
respondents to imply that both an external agent (e.g., virus) and
"lack of resistance" were necessary for an illness such as pneumonia
to occur (cf. Kelley, 1972).
Finally, despite data from the responsibility ratings and the open-
ended responses, the perceived role of the individual in the etiology
of illness is not entirely clear. Attribution researchers have noted
the difficulties and ambiguities inherent in attenpts to distinguish
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explanations on the basis of internal versus external, or person versus
environment factors, and these ambiguities are quite apparent in the
present data. Perhaps the most extreme example in the present study
is the positive relationship between attributions of responsibility to
the environment and the perceived blameworthiness of the person.
Similarly, when respondents identified "eating the wrong foods" as the
cause of an illness, it is not clear whether they perceive as the cause
of the illness the person and his or her eating habits, or the food, or
both.
Herzlich (1973), describing the causal conceptions held by her
respondents, a sample of middle-class and professional people in France,
classified the causes into two major categories: the "way of life" and
individual factors. The individual factors, considered to have a
secondary, passive role in the occurrence of illness (viz., resistance),
included predispositions, constitution, temperament, nature of the
individual, capacity for resistance, etc. The "way of life," however,
which included the environment and everyday forms of behavior (e.g.,
eating, work and leisure activities, etc.), was considered to be
largely external to the person, and to be the principal and active
determinant of disease. The way of life was conceived by Herzlich f s
respondents as the modern, urban way of life, and was experienced as
something unhealthy and constraining, and uniformly undesirable in its
impact; city of life was almost unanimously perceived to produce "a
world of fatigue and nervous tension" (p. 20). In the present study,
however, the respondents seemed to regard lifestyle, the concept
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most similar to "way of life," as more internal to the person, or at
least as something for which the individual is to blame. This dif-
ference may be attributable to social or cultural differences, such as
the increasing enphasis on personal responsibility for health in this
country (e.g., Crawford, 1977; Gustaitis, 1978; Knowles, 1977), or
perceived mobility and ability to escape urban life. Still, there are
numerous ambiguities in the perceived role of the individual in the
etiology of illness via behavior, lifestyle, and environmental
influences
.
Perceptions of Illness
Although there was considerable homogeneity in the open-ended
explanations for each illness, the range of responses across the six
illnesses revealed rather complex "theories" of disease. For example,
despite numerous references to Mnot taking care of oneself" as a cause
contributing to illness (especially acute illness), the notion of
"resistance" was largely limited to explanations of the occurrence of
pneumonia. It is not clear why resistance is not perceived to play a
role in the occurrence of other illnesses, such as kidney infections,
except that people report being more familiar with pneumonia, and many
have probably read or been told that if they become "rundown" and
neglect a cold, they will be susceptible to pneumonia. Still, it is
interesting that resistance was not perceived to play a prominent role
in the etiology of chronic illness and acute illnesses other than
pneumonia.
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Many of the responses seem to reflect a blend of common sense and
popular conceptions or beliefs about a particular illness. For example,
the explanations of coronary heart disease present a stereotypic picture
of the person with coronary heart disease similar to the media image
of the stressed, overworked, and overweight executive. Even more
interesting were the explanations of gastroenteritis, a condition with
which most respondents were not familiar. The open-ended responses
suggested that respondents used peptic ulcers as a prototype of gastro-
intestinal disorders. Perhaps based on the popular view of ulcers as a
psychogenic disorder, the person with gastroenteritis was depicted as
a nervous or anxious kind of person, or a person under considerable
stress, who eats the wrong foods. In fact, gastroenteritis can be
caused by a number of different factors, including food and chemical
poisoning, viruses, intestinal flu, infections, and food allergies,
and is not considered to be psychological or emotional in origin.
Since gastroenteritis was the only gastrointestinal illness presented
in this study, it is impossible to determine the extent to which other
GI disorders would be assimilated to ulcers, although it does appear
that well-known illnesses, including ulcers, may serve as prototypes in
lay understanding and explanation of unfamiliar illnesses.
The existence of popular conceptions of individual illnesses is
relatively clear from the homogeneity of responses for each illness.
From the open-ended explanations of each illness emerges a fairly
distinct picture of who develops the illness, and how or why the illness
occurs. However, what is not evident from these data is whether these
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conceptions are illness-specific, or whether they are derived from
broader, more general lay "theories" of disease, theories which might be
organized in terms of anatomy (e.g., heart conditions versus GI disor-
ders), transmission (e.g., contagious versus not contagious), type of
person affected (e.g., children, elderly, women, inactive people, etc.),
origin (e.g., psychological versus physical), or prognosis (e.g., acute
versus chronic, curable versus incurable, non-fatal versus fatal).
Although the illness ratings revealed perceptions which were unique to
specific illnesses, the open-ended responses provide some evidence of
broader "theories" of illness. For example, consistent with the
responsibility ratings, heredity was almost exclusively cited as a cause
of chronic illnesses, and bacterial or viral infections were confined to
explanations of the acute illnesses.
There were also several references to an infection or cold "settling 1
in some part of the person's body, such as the kidneys. These refer-
ences may reflect what Davis (1963) described as the "layman's migratory
theory of pathology," the notion of an illness, frequently a "cold,"
moving through the body and "settling," almost arbitrarily, in some part
of the body. As a simplification of medical concepts such as residual
inflammation and referred pain, Davis (1963) suggested that this
"migratory theory" provides a "ready-made rule-of- thumb explanation"
for many transient pains not considered serious enough to warrant
medical attention. The unanswered question, posed by Davis (1963), is
the extent to which such a theory derives from popularized modern
developments in virology, or from primitive notions of disease etiology
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involving, for example, the ingestion of symbolically evil substances.
Methodological Issues
This study raises several methodological issues for social psycho-
logical research on reactions to victimization and social judgments
regarding illness. One of the more important issues is the uniformity
of observers T reactions to victims of different misfortunes, and the
necessity of studying reactions to different kinds of misfortune.
The data from the present study suggest that observers' reactions to
victims of physical illness may differ substantially from reactions to
victims of electric shock (e.g., Lerner $ Matthews, 1967; Lerner §
Simmons, 1966) or rape (e.g., Calhoun, Selby, Warring, 1976; Jones §
Aronson, 1973; Smith, Keating, Hester, § Mitchell, 1976), for example.
While there may, in fact, be cognitive or motivational processes which
underlie observers' reactions to victims of any serious misfortune,
the present study indicates that the nature of the misfortune, and
observers' prior beliefs about the causes of that class of events,
may also be important determinants of reactions to victimization, and
may restrict the generalizability of these processes. Although observers
in the present study did blame the victims of some illnesses, particu-
larly acute illnesses and illnesses popularly believed to have behav-
ioral causes, there was little evidence of derogation, and the leukemia
victim was regarded more positively than the healthy person, despite
observers' belief that the leukemia victim was the most unfortunate and
the least blameworthy.
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Moreover, there is little reason to believe that illness as a mis-
fortune departs in crucial ways from the events addressed by theory and
research on reactions to victimization. Illness is a serious and often
life-threatening event with which everyone has had experience, and to
which everyone is vulnerable. Illness often involves considerable
suffering, and seems to single out individuals in an arbitrary and un-
just manner. Although "just world" effects should be strongest when
the victim is perceived to have suffered a serious misfortune and to be
genuinely innocent, these were precisely the conditions which produced
a reversal of the just world hypothesis in the present study. This
suggests that the reality of the situation may impose strong limits on
the motivations and perceptions of observers, and on the "counterintui-
tive" hypotheses of social psychologists. It seems unlikely that many
people would have such a strong motivation to maintain a belief in a
just or controllable world that they would derogate or blame a victim
of leukemia.
In addition to issues regarding the limits of the just world
hypothesis, there are questions regarding the generalizability of the
present results to other illnesses and contexts, particularly situations
involving actual contact with a victim of physical illness. It is clear
from the present study that for any set of illnesses, there will be
variability unique to each illness. It is also evident that leukemia
is somewhat unique in the reactions it elicits from observers, and it
seems unlikely that many illnesses, including other cancers, would
evoke similar reactions. However, apart from illnesses that carry a
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strong social stigma (e.g., venereal diseases), which were excluded from
the present study, there is no reason to suspect that the results for
illness duration and severity would not generalize to other illnesses.
Although the use of written reports may maximize control of exper-
imental variables , there are a number of additional factors introduced
when an observer interacts with a victim of physical illness, and these
factors can be expected to restrict the generalizability of the present
results. For example, the observer is probably less likely to blame a
sick friend or family member, than an acquaintance or stranger, since
beliefs about the person's attributes are likely to be more stable,
and the observer will have greater knowledge of the person's actual
health-related behavior. Similarly, actual contact with a sick person,
or exposure to visible suffering, may tend to elicit sympathy or com-
passion or, conversely, may evoke physical aversion. Moreover, actual
behavior toward the sick person is likely to be more strongly governed
by social norms than a person's private beliefs and attitudes toward
the sick person. In short, the present results may be limited in their
generalizability by additional factors which determine an observer's
feelings about the sick person and his or her illness, and beliefs
regarding appropriate behavior toward the sick person (Wortman § Dunkel-
Schetter, 1979), as well as processes which may influence the relation-
ship between the observer's behavior and attitudes (e.g., Bern, 1972).
A second methodological issue concerns the attributional options
provided subjects in just world research. Typically, the subject is
asked only whether, or to what extent, the victim's character or
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behavior is to blame for the misfortune, although questions about the
responsibility of chance or a perpetrator are sometimes included.
However, researchers rarely confirm their own notions regarding the
possible causes of events, such as misfortunes, by asking open-ended
questions about subjects' explanations of the event. Without such
"untutored" causal explanations (cf. Harre § Secord, 1973; Orvis,
Kelley, § Butler, 1976) or at least a larger array of attributional
options (e.g., fate, God, society, other people) , respondents' oppor-
tunities to make sense of the event via attributions to causes other
than the victim's behavior or character are severely restricted. More-
over, potentially complex attributional analyses, which may identify
multiple causes or distinguish necessary and sufficient factors, are
reduced to several independent ratings of factors specified by the
researcher.
A related methodological issue concerns the ambiguity inherent
in attempts to classify attributions in terms of their focus on factors
internal or external to the person, and the importance of clearly
distinguishing between attributions of causality and attributions of
responsibility. In the present study, for example, attributions of
causality to the person's genetic makeup were negatively associated
with attributions of responsibility to the person,, \tfhereas attributions
of causality to the person's lifestyle or the environment were positively
related to attributions of responsibility to the person. Thus, at
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least for illness, the perception that something about the person caused
the illness does not necessarily mean that the person will be blamed or
held responsible for the illness. Similarly, the person may be held
responsible when more external factors, such as their lifestyle and the
environment, are perceived to have caused the illness. If similar
distinctions are made by the sick person him or herself, some of the
evidence of self-blame by victims of physical illness in the clinical
literature may, in fact, be based on attributions of causality which
have no relationship, or a negative relationship, to blame. Thus,
measurement instruments which are conceptually and technically more pre-
cise may be necessary to elucidate the perceived role of the individual
in the etiology of illness, or in the occurrence of other misfortunes.
Finally, the study raises issues regarding the appropriate control
or baseline against which to evaluate victim derogation, attributions
of responsibility, and the assignment of credit or blame. In the
present study, comparisons among the experimental groups of ratings of
the person would have indicated a relatively positive impression of the
leukemia victim, but would not have revealed the enhanced perception
of the person with leukemia, compared to the person with no illness.
Similarly, comparisons of attributions of responsibility and blame
among the experimental conditions, without reference to the ratings
by the no- illness control group, would have led to the conclusion that
people are blamed by others for their illnesses. Comparisons with the
control group, however, suggested that people are held responsible for
their state of health, whether sick or healthy, that they are not blamed
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simply because they have an illness, and that, for some illnesses, their
pcerceived responsibility for their state of health is diminished by
illness. Although there is no corresponding control condition for most
misfortunes used in previous research on reactions to victimization, it
may be possible to construct conditions which permit comparisons of the
assignment of credit as well as blame, or which provide a baseline
against which to evaluate the absolute amount of blame or derogation of
the victim.
Future Directions
The present experiment suggests a number of different directions
for future research. One of the most interesting findings which re-
quires further investigation is the enhanced attractiveness of the
leukemia victim. What are the characteristics of illnesses which elicit
such a reaction, and what are the mechanisms by which an illness leads
to more positive impressions of a person? For example, is this effect
based on assumptions about the kind of person who is likely to develop
the illness, or the kind of person who could endure such a serious
illness? Do other forms of cancer evoke a similar reaction by observers,
or is this a media- created "Love Story" effect?
Second, a major theoretical issue remains regarding the motivational
processes, if any, which underlie reactions to victims of misfortune.
Even in studies which provide support for the just world hypothesis, it
is not clear that a desire to maintain a belief in a just world moti-
vates the attributions made. The perceived restoration of justice is
not the only possible motive served by attributions of responsibility
to the victim's character or behavior, and there is little direct
evidence that observers who attribute responsibility for a misfortune
to the victim actually believe that the victim deserved the misfortune
because of his or her character or behavior. Given the limited range of
attributional options typically provided subjects in just world studies
(e.g., the victim's character, behavior, and perhaps chance), attribu-
tions to the victim may simply represent an attempt to make sense of the
event, or to reduce a sense of vulnerability created by knowledge of a
serious, seemingly random and unpredictable misfortune.
Further, very little attention has been focused on the role of
cognitive processes in reactions to victimization. For example, if
knowledge of an event tends to increase the postdicted likelihood
that the event would occur (Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff § Beyth, 1975),
are the victims and observers of misfortune likely to perceive the
misfortune, in retrospect, as having been somewhat inevitable, given
the circumstances, the victim's behavior, etc., even if no one could
have anticipated the misfortune? Similarly, if given a broader range
of possible responses, or allowed to provide open-ended explanations,
will respondents tend to select as causes those factors which are
similar to the misfortune, in terms of magnitude or some other property?
Fourth, why do people perceive themselves to be less likely than
others to develop an illness, and does this discrepancy exist for per-
ceived vulnerability to other negative life events? Is the under-
estimation of one's own vulnerability, relative to others, based on
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cognitive processes or 1'heuristics, 11 such as infoimational or percep-
tual differences (cf. Jones § Nisbett, 1971) or availability (Tversky
§ Kahneman, 1974), or is it the result of a process such as denial
or optimism? Are there important behavioral indications of a tendency
to perceive oneself as less vulnerable to illness or other misfortunes?
For example, are people less likely to seek medical attention for a
potentially serious illness, or more willing to take health-related
risks, such as smoking? Is the perceived likelihood of oneself
developing an illness affected by perceived similarity (e.g., age,
sex, lifestyle, etc.) to a known victim (cf. Mechanic, 1972)?
Fifth, would victims of physical illness perceive themselves and
their illness in a manner similar to observers? For example, would
persons with pneumonia or coronary heart disease blame themselves to
the extent that they are blamed by observers? Would they identify the
same causes of their illness? Research on actor-observer differences
in attribution (e.g., Jones § Nisbett, 1971) would suggest that the
sick person, with greater knowledge of his or her own health habits,
may tend to attribute the illness to more external factors, such as a
virus or a stressful environment, than to themselves. Conversely,
the evidence from the clinical literature of self-blame by cancer
victims contrasts sharply with the reactions of observers to the
leukemia victim in the present study.
Finally, there are many unanswered questions concerning lay con-
cepts and explanations of disease. Is the layperson's knowledge of
disease largely limited to illness-specific beliefs, or does the
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layperson have more general "theories" of disease? How well integrated
are lay beliefs regarding illness, and to what extent do they overlap
with current medical beliefs? What are the socially and psychologically
important dimensions of illness, and how do they affect the social
perception of illness and its victijns? For example, is the medical
distinction between acute and chronic illness important only inasmuch
as it expresses the extent to which the illness can be cured? What
are the essential features of an illness which define its perceived
seriousness?
In conclusion, the present study indicates that, in contrast to
the medical model that defines illness as a natural event beyond the
individual's control, people are held responsible for their health and
illnesses, unless the illness is perceived to be something which the
individual could not have prevented. In contrast to the sick role model
(Parsons, 1951), the sick person is not al\\rays exempted from respon-
sibility for an illness; for those illnesses which are perceived to be
preventable, the sick person is blamed. Although having an illness is
sometimes viewed by others as a personal failure, the presence of an
illness does not seem to negatively affect perceptions of the person,
and, in some cases, may even enhance observers' impressions of the
person, contrary to the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1970, 1971;
Lerner § Miller, 1978). Thus, individuals ma^ be held responsible for
illness, but illness does not appear to "spoil" the individual's
identity.
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APPLICATION FORM
To all applicants: Please type or print clearlv . This application and all
supporting. materials (letters of reference, medical authorization form) must
be received by this office no later than August 10, 1978. Interviews will
be scheduled within a week of receipt of your application.
PERSONAL
Last Name First Name
Keller Oavld
M.I.
S.
Phone
|
(413) 256-6882
Address
26 Pel ham Road
City State
Shutesbury MA
Zip
01072
)
Citizenship
U.S.
Date of Birth
June 30, 1940
Social Security #
527-38-7244
Marital Status %
single
EDUCATIONAL HISTORY
School Address
Jordan High School Long Beach, CA
Major Degree Date |
I.S. Diploma June, 1958
Univ. of Mass. Amherst, MA History B.S. June, 1963
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
Position Firm Dates Reference
Sales Representative AD I Business, Inc. 8/63-4/66 Mr. G. Williamson
Asst. Sales Manager Hamden Office Supply 5/66-6/71 Mr. Robert Snyder
Sales Manager Friedman & Sons 7/71 -present Mr. L. Friedman
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(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician,
MEDICAL HISTORY Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Physician's Name '
"
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good (x) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? ( ) yes (x) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
the past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
I am currently recovering from a mild kidney infection, which I
developed two weeks ago. Otherwise, I am in generally good health.
Signature Date 1 s, mg
xnr.ar David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a
great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage.
David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for
other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as
to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing.
Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure
on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing
himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and
becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While
he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for
them.
Interviewer
Date August 18, 1978
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(x> fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? (x) yes ( ) no
^e^Lfveif lltl " VT °T if y°U haVe been Vitalized withinCh past year, p ease elaborate in the space provided.
I am currently recovering from a severe kidney infection, which I
developed two weeks ago* Because of serious complications, a high
fever, and considerable pain, I had to be hospitalized for several
days for observation and treatment. Otherwise, I am in generally
good health.
Signature \uJ& tiUoL Date /LjUst /.
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST (For o£fice use onlv)
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as co whether he has
made the right decision or done Che right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer Date August 18, 1973
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(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
Medical information is strictly confidential.)
(x) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? ( ) yes (X) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized withintne past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
I am currently recovering from a mild case of pneumonia, which I
developed two weeks ago. Otherwise, I am in generally good health.
Signature )kJ<$- tdioL Date AlVjUxt t, tfQf(
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST <For °ffi« use
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned Co his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer 3* Date August 13, 1973
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MEDICAL HISTORY
(NOTE: All applicants muse submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good (x ) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? (x) yes ( ) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
the past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
I am currently recovering from a severe case of pneumonia, which I
developed two weeks ago. Because of serious complications, a high
fever, and considerable pain, I had to be hospitalized for several
days for observation and treatment. Otherwise, I am in generally
good health.
Signature }kmJjk ^dkL Date /Lwst r, mf
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST (yor office use
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise co be too frank in revealing himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer Q& Date August 18, 1973
198
MEDICAL HISTORY
(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good ( x ) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? ( ) yes (X) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
the past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
I am currently recovering from a mild case of gastroenteritis
(inflamnation of the stomach and intestinal lining), which I
developed two weeks ago. Otherwise, I am in generally good health.
Signature )kj$ ^dAL Date /LjQjt £, /W
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST (For °ffice use only>
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others 1 opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer Date August 13, 1973
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(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
Medical information is strictly confidential.)
(X) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? (x) yes ( ) no
Jhe^sfvear
11
S2 " TV heaUh ' °r " yOU have been hospitalized withinthe past yea , please elaborate in the space provided.
I am currently recovering from a severe case of gastroenteritis
^ inflammation of the stomach and Intestinal lining), which I
developed two weeks ago. Because of serious complications, a high
fever, and considerable pain, I had to be hospitalized for several
days for observation and treatment. Otherwise, I am in generally
good health.
Signature tiUoL Date AwjOit <f, (£j£
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST <?or office use only>
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself Co others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer Date August 18, 1978
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MEDICAL HISTORY
(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Or. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good ( X ) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? ( ) yes (X ) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized withinthe past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
During an examination two years ago, my doctor detected a mild
form of diabetes, and recommended a program of diet, exercise,
and occasional medication to manage the condition.
Signature Date
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST <For of£ice use ™W
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others 1 opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. AC times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer. Date August 13, 1978
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(NOTE: All applicants muse submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
MEDICAL HISTORY Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Physician's Name
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good (x) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? (x) yes ( ) no
jjj
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
the past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
I was hospitalized two years ago with diabetes after suffering a
a diabetic coma. Since then, I have been following a prescribed
program of diet, exercise, and insulin therapy to reduce the
possibility of hypoglycemia, insulin shock, or the chronic
complications commonly associated with diabetes.
Signature Date t r ml
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST (For o££lce U9e only)
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or donr the right thing. Disciplined and
controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the
inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself to
others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes
dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some
personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer Date
August 13, 1978
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(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
Physician's Name
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good (X) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? ( ) yes (x) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized withinthe past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
During an examination two years ago, my doctor detected signs of
coronary heart disease, and recommended a diet and exercise program
to minimize the possibility of a heart attack.
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others 1 opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST (For office use only)
Interviewer Date August 18, 1973
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MEDICAL HISTORY
(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Or. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health'
( ) excellent ( ) good (x) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? (x) yes ( ) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
the past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
I was hospitalized two years ago with coronary heart disease after
suffering a major heart attack. Since then, I have been following
a prescribed program of diet, exercise, and medication to reduce
the possibility of another heart attack, although I still suffer
occasionally from shortness of breath and chest pain.
Signature )kuJ^ ttUoL Date /LjUtt /, /gg£
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST (For o£fice use
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others 1 opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer Date August 18, 1973
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(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
MEDICAL HISTORY Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Physician's Name
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good (x ) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? ( ) yes (x) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
the past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
During an examination two years ago, I was diagnosed as having
leukemia (a cancer which results from the uncontrolled production
of abnormal white blood cells). I underwent short-term treatment,
with positive results. Most of the symptoms are gone, my doctors
are optimistic that the disease will continue in remission, and I
am leading a fairly normal life.
Signature Date t l mL
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a great deal
of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage. David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for other people
to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as to whether he
has
made the right decision or done the right thing. Disciplined and
controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure on the
inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing himself
to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and becomes
dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While he has
some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for them.
Interviewer Date
August 18, 1978
MEDICAL HISTORY
(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician*
-Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Physician's Name
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
( ) excellent ( ) good (x) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? (X) yes ( ) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
che past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
\
I was hospitalized two years ago for leukemia (a cancer which results
from the uncontrolled production of abnormal white blood cells), I
underwent long-term chemotherapy and radiation treatments, with mixed
results. I am currently leading a fairly normal life, but some of ;
the symptoms and side effects from treatment remain, and I occasionally
experience considerable fatigue and pain. \
Signature Date t £ fflf
INTERVIEW/PERSONALITY TEST (For office use
only)
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker
and does not
accept others' opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a
great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage.
David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need
for other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as
to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing.
Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure
on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing
himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and
becomes dissatisfied wnen
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While
he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for
them.
Interviewer
Date August 18, 1973
APPENDIX A. 2
Stimulus Materials for
the Control Condition
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APPLICATION FORM
To all applicants: Please type or print clearly . This application and all
supporting. materials (letters of reference, medical authorization form) must
be received by this office no later than August 10, 1978. Interviews will
be scheduled within a week of receipt of your application.
PERSONAL
Last Name First Name
Keller David
M.I.
G.
Phone
\
(413) 256-6882
Address
1 26 Pel ham Road
City State
Shutesbury MA
Zip
01072
Citizenship
U.S.
Date of Birth
June 30, 1940
j
Social Security $
527-38-7244
Marital Status
single
EDUCATIONAL HISTORY
School Address
Jordan High School Long Beach, CA
Major Degree Date ;
H.S. Diploma June, 1958
Univ. of Mass. Amherst, MA History B.S. June, 1963
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
Position Firm Dates Reference
Sales Representative AD I Business, Inc. 8/63-4/65 Mr. G. Williamson
Asst. Sales Manager Hamden Office Supply 5/66-6/71 Mr. Robert Snyder
Sales Manager Friedman £ Sons 7/71-oresent Mr. L. Friedman
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(NOTE: All applicants must submit the medical
authorization form completed by a physician.
Medical information is strictly confidential.)
Physician's Name
Dr. Paul A. Harris
How would you rate your present health?
(x) excellent ( ) good ( ) fair ( ) poor
Have you been hospitalized within the past year? ( ) yes (x) no
If you checked fair or poor health, or if you have been hospitalized within
the past year, please elaborate in the space provided.
MEDICAL HISTORY
Signature Date
Summary: David prides himself as being an independent thinker
and does not
accept others 1 opinions without satisfactory proof. He has a
great deal of
unused capacity which he has not turned to his advantage.
David has a ten-
dency to be critical of himself. He has a strong need for
other people to
like and admire him. At times he has serious doubts as
to whether he has
made the right decision or done the right thing.
Disciplined and controlled
on the outside, he tends to be worrisome and insecure
on the inside. David
has found it unwise to be too frank in revealing
himself to others. He pre-
fers a certain amount of change and variety and
becomes dissatisfied when
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. While
he has some personality
weaknesses, he is generally able to compensate for
them.
Interviewer
Date August 18, 1978
APPENDIX B
Experimental and Control Group Questionnaires
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APPENDIX B.l
Experimental Group Questionnaire
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This is a study of how people are perceived by others. In most previous
research on person perception, people have been asked to rate a hypothetical
person described by the experimenter. In this study, we would like to get
your impressions of real people. There are many situations in everyday life
where we only briefly encounter people, or where we have only limited written
information about a person (e.g., applications for school, jobs, loans, etc.),
We have collected a variety of fonas in which people have provided some
information about themselves, such as applications actually submitted to
schools, firms, or agencies in the local area. We have omitted the names of
the agencies or schools, and have changed the names of the applicants to
preserve anonymity and confidentiality.
We would like you to read one of these applications, and to fill out a
questionnaire about your impressions of the person. Since a questionnaire
asking more detailed questions about your perceptions of the person's medical,
educational, or employment background would be too long and time-consuming,
we are asking everyone some questions about their general impression of the
person, and more detailed questions about a specific aspect of the person.
Some people may be asked questions about their impressions of the individual's
personal or educational background, while others may be asked questions about
the person's employment or medical history. As you answer the questions, feel
free to refer back to the application at any time.
We are interested only in your impressions
—
there are no right or wrong
answers, and your answers are completely anonymous and confidential. We realize
that first impressions are sometimes vague, and some questions may be more
difficult to answer than others, but please try to answer every question. If
you have any comments or questions about this research, or if you want to elaborate
on a question, please include this information on the back of the questionnaire.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!
P.S. In another study we are conducting, we are developing a questionnaire
about people's beliefs. This questionnaire is very short and has been
added after the last page of the questionnaire for this study (this is
referred to as "piggy-backing" one study with another). We would really
appreciate it if you would also answer this questionnaire after you com-
plete the questions for this study. Thanks.
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Age:
Sex: F M
1. What is your impression of
scales by circling the number
intelligent
selfish
courageous
valuable
immature
happy
clean
dishonest
imaginative
active
fortunate
cold
friendly
responsible
bad
strong
his person? Please rate this person on the following
which best represents your impression of the person
2 3 4 5 6 7 unintelligent
2 3 4 5 6 7 unselfish
2 3 4 5 6 7 cowardly
2 3 4 S 6 7 worthless
2 3 4 5 6 7 mature
2 3 4 5 6 7 sad
2 3 4 5 6 7 dirty
2 3 4 ,S 6 7 honest
2 3 4 5 6 7 unimaginative
2 3 4 5 6 7 passive
2 3 4 5 6 7 unfortunate
2 3 4 5 6 7 warm
2 3 4 S 6 7 unfriendly
2 3 4 5 6 7 irresponsible
2 3 4 5 6 7 good
2 3 4 5 6 7 weak
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2. How similar do you think you are to this person?
very very
similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 dissimilar
3. How do you personally feel about this person?
very very
positive 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 negative
The next series of questions refer to the information provided by the person
in the medical history .
4. Please list the illnesses or health problems reported by the person, if any
5. How would you rate this person's state of health?
well 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ill
6. How permanent do you think this person's illness or condition is?
temporary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 permanent
7. Have you, a very close friend, or a member of your family ever had this illness
or condition?
yes no
8. How likely do you think it is that you will develop this illness or condition
at some time in your life?
very very
likely 12 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
9. How likely do you think it is that the average person in this country will
develop this illness or condition at some time in their life?
very very
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
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10. Why do you think people get this illness or develop this condition?
That is, what do you believe are the causes of this particular illness?
11. What do you think people can do to prevent developing this illness?
12. Before developing this illness, how careful do you think this person was
about his/her health?
very very
careful 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 careless
13. To what extent do you think this person could have done something to prevent
the illness?
could have could not have
prevented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 prevented
14. How much is this person to blame for his/her illness?
completely not at all
to blame 1134567 to blame
15. To what extent do you think this person's genetic makeup (i.e., inherited
characteristics) is responsible for his/her illness?
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
16. To what extent do you think this person's character or personality is
responsible for his/her illness?
completely not at all
responsible 12 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
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17. To what extent do you think this person's behavior , (i.e. .^something the person
did or did not do) is responsible for his/her illness?
completely not at all
responsible 12 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
18. To what extent do you think this person's lifestyle or personal habits are
responsible for his/her illness? ~
~
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsib 1e
19. On the following items, please rate how responsible you believe each factor
is for the person's illness.
ENVIRONMENT
THE PERSON
completely not at all
responsible 12 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
completely not at all
re sponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsib 1e
OTHER PEOPLE
CHANCE
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsib 1e
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
GOD
completely not at all
FATE
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
OTHER (specify)
completely not at a11
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
Please rate the person's i
mild
long
painful
fast
internal
common
weak
curable
good
acute
uncontrollable
interesting
threatening
comfortable
embarrassing
contagious
fair
short-lived
clean
active
Iness or condition on the following scales
2 3 4 S 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
severe
short
painless
slow
external
rare
strong
incurable
bad
chronic
controllable
uninteresting
hon-threatening
uncomfortable
not embarrassing
2 3 4 5 6 7 not contagious
2 3 4 5 6 7 unfair
2 3 4 S 6 7 persistent
2 3 4 5 6 7 dirty
2 3 4 5 6 7 passive
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Questionnaire #2
Please place the appropriate letter beside each statement below.
A - I agree very much
3-1 agree on the whole
C - I agree a little
D - I disagree on the whole
E - I disagree very nuch
Good deeds often go unnoticed or unrewarded.
When parents punish their children, it is almost always for a good reason.
It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail.
People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good fortune.
Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.
It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in this country.
Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as
careless ones.
Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack.
Crime doesn't pay.
In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by
the referee.
Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general
course of history good wins out.
People who meet with misfortune often have brought it on themselves.
Basically, the world is a just place.
I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has.
The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets elected.
By and large, people deserve what they get.
Parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their children.
In any business or profession, people who do their job rise to the top.
Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.
It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American
courts.
APPENDIX B.2
Control Group Questionnaire
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This is a study of how people are perceived by others. In most previous
research on person perception, people have been asked to rate a hypothetical
person described by the experimenter. In this study, we would like to get
your impressions of real people. There are many situations in everyday life
where we only briefly encounter people, or where we have only limited written
information about a person (e.g., applications for school, jobs, loans, etc.).
We have collected a variety of forms in which people have provided some
information about themselves, such as applications actually submitted to
schools, firms, or agencies in the local area. We have omitted the names of
the agencies or schools, and have changed the names of the applicants to
preserve anonymity and confidentiality.
We would like you to read one of these applications, and to fill out a
questionnaire about your impressions of the person. Since a questionnaire
asking more detailed questions about your perceptions of the person's medical,
educational, or employment background would be too long and time-consuming,
we are asking everyone some questions about their general impression of the
person, and more detailed questions about a specific aspect of the person.
Some people may be asked questions about their impressions of the individual's
personal or educational background, while others may be asked questions about
the person's employment or medical history. As you answer the questions, feel
free to refer back to the application at any time.
We are interested only in your impressions—-there are no right or wrong
answers, and your answers are completely anonymous and confidential. We realize
that first impressions are sometimes vague, and some questions may be more
difficult to answer than others, but please try to answer every question. If
you have any comments or questions about this research, or if you want to elaborate
on a question, please include this information on the back of the questionnaire.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!
P.S. In another study we axe conducting, we are developing a questionnaire
about people's beliefs. This questionnaire is very short and has been
added after the last page of the questionnaire for this study (this is
referred to as '•piggy-backing 1 ' one study with another). We would really
appreciate it if you would also answer this questionnaire after you com-
plete the questions for this study. Thanks.
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Age:
Sex: F M
1. What is your impression of
scales by circling the number
intelligent
selfish
courageous
valuable
immature
happy
clean
dishonest
imaginative
active
fortunate
cold
friendly
responsible
bad
strong
his person? Please rate this person on the following
which best represents your impression of the person :
2 3 4 5 6 7 uninte 1 1igen
t
2 3 4 5 6 7 unselfish
2 3 4 5 6 7 cowardly
2 3 4 5 6 7 worthless
2 3 4 S 6 7 mature
2 3 4 5 6 7 sad
2 3 4 5 6 7 dirty
2 3 4 ,5 6 7 honest
2 3 4 5 6 7 unimaginative
2 3 4 5 6 7 passive
2 3 4 5 6 7 unfortunate
2 3 4 5 6 7 warm
2 3 4 5 6 7 unfriendly
2 3 4 5 6 7 irresponsible
2 3 4 5 6 7 good
2 3 4 S 6 7 weak
2. How similar do you think you are to this person?
very very
similar 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 dissimilar
3. How do you personally feel about this person?
very very
positive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 negative
The next series of questions refer to the information provided by the person
in the medical history *
4. How would you rate this person's state of health?
well 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ill
5. How careful do you think this person is about his/her health?
very very
careful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 careless
6. If the person is in good health, to what extent do you think the person is
responsible for his/her own good health?
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 responsible
7. To what extent do you think this person's genetic makeup (i.e., inherited
characteristics) is responsible for his/her health?
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
8. To what extent do you think this person's character or personality is
responsible for his/her health?
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
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9. To what extent do you think this person's behavior (i.e,, something the person
did or did not do) is responsible for his/her health?
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
10. To what extent do you think this person's lifestyle or personal habits are
responsible for his/her health?
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
11. On the following items, please rate how responsible you believe each factor
is for the person's health.
ENVIRONMENT
THE PERSON
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
OTHER PEOPLE
CHANCE
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
GOO
completely not at all
FATE
responsible 12 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
completely not at all
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
OTHER (specify)
completely not at
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 responsible
Please rate the person's health on the following scales:
mild
long
painful
fast
internal
common
weak
good
uncontrollable
interesting
threatening
comfortable
embarrassing
fair
short-lived
clean
active
2 3 4 5 6 7 severe
2 3 4 5 6 7 short
2 3 4 5 6 7 painless
2 3 4 S 6 7 slow
2 3 4 5 6 7 external
2 3 4 5 6 7 rare
2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
2 3 4 5 6 7 controllable
2 3 4 5 6 7 uninteresting
2 3 4 5 6 7 non-threatening
2 3 4 5 6 7 unconforeab 1 e
2 3 4 5 6 7 not embarrassing
2 3 4 5 6 7 unfair
2 3 4 5 6 7 persistent
2 3 4 5 6 7 dirty
2 34567 passive
Questionnaire #2
Please place the appropriate letter beside each statement below
A - I agree very ouch
B - I agree on the whole
C - I agree a little
D - I disagree on the whole
E - I disagree very much
Good deeds often go unnoticed or unrewarded.
When parents punish their children, it is almost always for a good reason.
It is rare for an innocent nan to be wrongly sent to jail.
People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good fortune.
Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.
It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in this country.
Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as
careless ones.
Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack.
Crime doesn't pay.
In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by
the referee.
Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general
course of history good wins out.
People who meet with misfortune often have brought it on themselves.
Basically, the world is a just place.
I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has.
The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets elected.
By and large, people deserve what they get.
Parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their children.
In any business or profession, people who do their job rise to the top.
Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.
It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free
in American
courts.
APPENDIX C
Open-ended Responses
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Perceived Causes and Prevention of Illness: Open-ended Responses
Why do you think people get this illness or develop this
condition? That is, what do you believe are the causes
of this particular illness?
What do you think people can do to prevent developing
this illness?
Kidney Infection
Causes Prevention
I have, no Idea. I havz no Idea.
Thu illnz&s may bz hetexiltaxy. Going to thz doctor's {qk txzatmznt.
I imagine that stxeA*. probably
has somzthina to do with the.
altmznt. Qthzx than this, I
would have, absolutely no idea,
what causes kidnzy Inactions,
Takz ca/iz a I thzui kidnzysl Onz
mast (?) bz icuAJLy calm S mz&tow.
Hot much s&izssl
ImpKopzn eating habit*. Eat pAopznly.
VlAUS I don't think you can except by
tfcylng to stay healthy.
I don't know, thz causes cuiz
usually &*om bactz/iia in thz body
ivhich thz pznson cast do nothing
about.
Hot taking cojiz oi onzszl&.
FoZiom a bad dlzt.
Txy to eat thz flight foods and
kzzp thzui body healthy.
Takz periodical xzbts, eat thz
xight foods.
VsUnking Stop delinking
TailuAZ oi kidnzy to function
pKopeAly.
I havz absolutely no Idea..
Visit a physician xzgulaAly,
Having a xzgulaji checkup.
Causes Prevention
Obviously, it is a bacterial
infection. It could be. caused by
improper diet.
I don't know. Sizing as It is an
infection, the. kidney must have
been irxitatzd. It probably is
from bacteria.
.Many sources oh the illness, most
likely bacteria.
The causes axe i^iom having weak
kidney*, a cold in the kidney.
Basically, it 's just something
one develop*.
Coaid be genetic ox contracted
Impurities in kidney
Not using sanitary condition* in
the home or outside; not taking
pxopex caxe oh youxselh, so that
you get rundown and axz a likely
candidate to contract it.
?
I would say that thz problem
might be ah a. hereditary nature.
lh it were another typz o£ illness,
I might say nerves.
Weak kidneys, probably since
childhood.
I don 1 1 know what the causes oh
kidney infection axe.
I do not know, nor could I gue&s
what the causes oh kidney infection
axe.
Regularly scheduled checkups and
common sense about taking care oh
themselves .
Vrink plenty oh cranberry juice-
it cleans you out.
Not much to prevent it.
I have had many kidney infections
and two operations. To my knowledg
there is no way to prevent them.
Vrink plenty o{ fluids and see a
doctor once in awhile.
Keep clean
Get a well-balanced diet and enough
sleep. Be careful oh the cleanli-
ness oh your bathroom.
9
Probably nothing.
Take extra care oh yourself, other-
wise, there is nothing you can do.
Whatever you're supposed to do to
prevent kidney infections.
What they should do for anything.
Take good care oh themselves by
exercising and eating the right
hoods.
Causes Prevention
InizoXion in blood tknougk wound, Curtain kind oi dizt.
bad blood ilow tfoiough, po**ibly
iKom dxinking in zxczb*.
Ho idza.
Tkzy pKobably gzt thi* ilinz**
i*om all thz mattzn. that i* bzing
iiltZAzd thnougk, *omz inizttiou*
gzAm gzt* into lining ox *omztking.
Ju*t a viAal inizcXion, pznhap*
bxought on by ov&wjoaJz ok poo*,
zating.
Bad function oi the. kidnzy,
probably duuz to dizt 01 habit*,
i.z., lack oi *lzzp, pooK ZXZ/l-
<U*z habit*.
I havz no idza.
I don't know.
?oo\ dizt.
Vxinking, not zating pKopz/iJLy.
Ho idza.
Ho idza.
QKinking.
A vinu*.
Hot taking pxopzA physical cjviz
oi his body.
Ho idza.
I don't kncto—diink plznty oi mtzx?
Hot muah—maybz watdt zating habit*.
I Kzally havz no knowlzdgz oi thi*
ilinz**.
Ey zating bzttzx iood*, takz zoaz
oi kzalXh, bzing moxz con*ciou* oi
body.
Eating pKopznly, I'd bay, i* thz
only Kza*onablz dztzAAznt I could
think oi.
Takz caxz oi onz&zli.
Kzzp up vitamin* S food intakz.
Takz coaz oi thzm*zlvz*.
Hothing.
Ho idza.
Szli-con&iol.
Hothing.
Makz ptiopzn. u*agz oi thzin daily
liiz tchzdulz* to allow ion. xzcaz-
ation acAivitiz* bz tkzy pky*ical
ok pa**ivz. Takz timz to Kzlax
during thz day.
Causes Prevention
I wold toy that It U> a viAiu> f
wzakne** q\ antibodies to fright
Tmj to zat light, zxetcUz.
I bzlizvz tkz c&aaea oi thu
illnz&4 oaz friam ioocU>.
To prevent ktdnzy infection, onz
pottiblz my iA to eat flight, and
clean ioods.
No response (n=5) No response (n3 3)
Pneumonia
Causes Prevention
ThzOi xzAiMtm.cz to *icknz44 goz*
down and at *omz point thzy axz
inizcted by condition* which lead
to pneumonia. 1 feet it it>
totally chanczy at getting thU
illneA* i& you. takz good eaxe
oi yoax body.
Eat pxopzxly, exexcibe xegulaxly,
and takz genzxal good axxe o{ youA
body.
Catching a cold, not taking aviz
oi a cold, body not able to fright
the iZlnzA*.
Takz cjlkz o^ than6zlvz6 and zat
tkz light iood. Hutxition play*
a big pant in what illnzA* onz
XCCZivZA.
(J) Gznztic makziLp oi pe/ucn'4
dziznAz *y*tzm against vixuAZA ok
(2! zxpotuxe to damp, cold znvixon-
mznt ioK too long oi timz
(7) Hothing (2) Vkzaa waxmly
A cold that gets nzglzctzd and
wox&enA, ox 6omz typz oi long
pxoblzm which leads to inizction
Takz good caxe oi thziniteli when thzy
have a cold
I don't think thexe iA a tpeciiic
cauAe oi pneumonia- -pexhap* not
taking vexy good caxe oi onzAeli
would makz a penAon AUAceptibie
to it.
Eat balanced mealA, gzt enough 6teep.
Hot quAJtz auaz. I don't know. I'm not a doctox.
Causes Prevention
Vo< d/LZAAAjig pKopzAly in cold
wzathtA ok not taking cxkz oi
#iem4e£vc4 whzn flight symptoms
OvzKconiidzncz (cu> £<z/t a& kzalth
goz&] , vanity [not dxzA&ing ioK
maXhzK) .
Contact with thz cUazo^z, impKopzx
owe a 4 physical wzJUL-bdnjg
lack oi blzzp, not voting pKo-
pZKly, not tnoagk zxzkcuz, ovzk-
zxznXion
Rundown iKom too much wctfc, WKxy,
ztc. A bad cold ok i&u gvtA thz
bt6t oi thzm and pKogKZAAivzly
GzKm6
Cold
Hot taking COM, a& kimAzli
li (/on okz titzd ok susceptible
to thz genm, you mill gzt tick,
li you have a cold S don't gzt
_
KZAt $ get bzttzK a conXinuz with
noAjnat activities and gzt KzaZty
met in cold tmpz/iatuAz, you
might gzt it.
Hot enough KZ6t, pool dizt, high
izvzK iKom a cold.
Rundown pzoplz 9 ttKe**, avizltA*-
net* to Match out ion. one's kzalth
OvenwoKkzd, not enough KZ6t.
Don't takz [havz] thz timz to takz
cokc Q{ thzmtzlvz*.
Takz cokz oh thzMzlvzA—plan dstzAA
appKopKiatzly.
IncAzaAz *eli-auxvizne&4 [takz good
com. oi oneseli)
.
EzttZK COA.Z oi themselves to
pKzvznt illness
Takz cokz oi themselves, zat well,
Sleep pKOpZK houKS, ZXZKCiSZ
As soon as thzy izzi tick, should
Atop zveKything and tznd to thziK
hzaXth—ioKgzt about wonk f Mowiies,
ztc. [haJtd ta do. . .)
9
Kzzping uxuun
Stay in shapz f kzep hzalthy
Takz coaz oi themselves, Kest mil
S takz cokz ii you havz a cold.
Staying in bzd wkzn not izzluig
well, getting enough Kest s pKopeK
iood. Mao , contact a doctoK ii
you'Ke not ieeting well.
Takz bztteK caution S mtch out ioK
signs oi being ovzwoKkizd, wzak
Takz bettCK axxe oi themselves whzn
a cold ok illness come* on.
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Causes Prevention
Contact tuctft. a cextain virws Take pentciltin
Stupidity
Hot enough pxopex xest ox diet.
Hot being conditioned to various
types oh wzathex conditions.
Think about how they dxess
Pxopex xest, heatthhuZ dizt ( houx
hood gxoups) , outdoox activity as
well as insidz.
Stxess, ok it may be complicated
by this* Ran down oh body f not
taking caxe oh youx health.
Take bettzx caxz oh theix body*
sleep, zating, ztc.
Gzxms frXom othzx pzoplz, staying
out in cold weathex, not being
xesponsiblz znough to takz caxz
oh a cold, thexzby Iztting it
woxszn to pneumonia.
Bz moxz xzsponsiblz and takz caxz
oh a cold ox ilu..
Wzathex—caxzlzssness, lack o{
pxotzction
Hz just happened to get a cold
that 9devz,loped into pneumonia.
I had it as a child also. One
doesn't bxing it on by oneself.
It happens.
Guaxd against the elements
Hevex catch a cold.
Hot taking caxe oh themselves Gzt znough sleep, Mxmth, nutrition
Hot coxing iox youx health.
Poox slezp.
Rest S xzlaxation
It is friom ovex exhaustion,
utithout enough xest.
Gzt xest
A vixixs is picked up and is not
checked by a doctox as conditions
oh the cold ox cough get woxse
and pneumonia settles in the
lungs. It may come whzn a pznson
is xundown.
Keep an zye on thzix health
conditions.
Cold vixus and low xzsistancz at
paxtiojtax time woxten to become
pneumonia.
Takz caxz oh youxselh when you have
a cold.
Causes Prevention
Qvzwoxkzd, xundown, which make*
you vzxy tu&czptibiz to pnzumonia.
Gztting rundown
f tick
Hot znougk ttzzp ovzx a tong
pzxiod oh turn. Exzakdcwn oh
gz/un- kilting mzcfainUm*.
A vi,xm>—it'* a <LUza*z
Cvzxindatgzncz, ovzwoxk,
zxpo&unz to dampnz&A and/ox
coldnzA*. Pottibiy lack oh
zxzxcitz and upkeep oh thz
body. Any ok aUL oh thz abovz.
Thzy axz xundcuxi.
StxzAA, tzn&ian, not enough
ttzzp, not zating pxopzxZy
Ovzxwoxk, iowz/Ung dzh<tn*z&
causing a Zou) tzvzl oh toizxancz
hex bactzxiat inhzction
Pnzumonia it gznzxatiy dzvztapzd
by caxzizttnzt* in watching youx
kzaith. In tamz catzt a timplz
(laid tzht unattzndzd [ox ignoxzd)
may dzvziap into thit.
Gzt lot* oh tZzzp, takz vitamin*.
Mot vzxy much, bat uokzn a pzxton
catchzt a cold, takz caxz oh it.
And do not kzzp xunning axcund,
and takz caxz oh yousuzlh.
Gzt znougk tZzzp, zat batanczd
mzait, zxzxciAZ.
Eat wzJLZ and kzzp thmtzZh kzaltky
[tlzzp wz&t, ztc. )
Exzxcitz, kzzp uxuim in coZd/xainy
wzaXhzx. Von't ovzxinduigz—dxu^t
ox aZcohoZ
Thzy can txy— Ecut thz xight hoocU,
ttay aativz, gzt xz&t.
Eat xigkt, gzt znougk tZzzp, and
not izt thing* uooxxy you too much
Stay in good kzalth, dizt 9 zxzxcitz.
Bat even that cannot pxzvznt a
pzx&on &xcm contracting it.
Ey Loatching thzix kzaith bzttzx and,
ih thzy do comz down with anytiling
,
by ZirnXting thzix activities to thzy
won't gzt any tickzx.
No response (n=l) No response (n*l)
Gastroenteritis
Causes
Wills
Bad zoning habits and/oK high
degree oi occupational p/tessunes
Smofving, lack oi zxvucLse, high
cholestexol diet, overworking t
wo/vtylng
St/iess, poo* touting
Eating spicy ox i^ied ioods,
stnes*, anxiety
?OOK diet, tOO nZ/lVOUS
This pe/ison Is vzAy iaX
Heredity, not eating fUght iood,
nerves
Hot being CMziul and not Living
pKopenZy
UeAVOUS stress
WO'Viy too much and probably
didn't eat the flight amount oi
good iood, causing something
Like an utcei
Diet, nervous , tensions
Hexves, impA.opz/i eating habits
Etcrn n&tvzA $ wxong diet
Prevention
Plenty o^ xest, don't eat spicy
ioods, lots oi liquids
Eat well-balanced diets, become
unemployed
Relax, cat well, exetcise, see a
dactoA. Kzgulajdby
Eat bettex, be moxz relaxed, don't
dxink
Watch what you eat, txy to izlax
Eat bzttzn, uioajuj less
Go on a diet
Watch thein. dlzt
Take aviz oi themselves and cat
pnjopznly
Recognize tzndency to be overly
emotionally intense
ksk doctor what ioods axe o.fe. to
eat, tell them not to get so In-
volvzd In thzlA. woxk that they
WQtiJUJ
Relax, take bettzx care oi them-
selves, eat better
Follow balanced diet, txy not to
get too upset
VKobably calm down £ change diet
Causes Prevention
Qvvwonk, too much *zlf-contKol,
not znough "letting o{£ *tzam"
Inflammation of thz Luting* i*
caused by zating too *picy a food
S WKKying a bit. It also can bz
cont/tactzd ju*t fKom an illnz**.
Sound* tikz kz ate *omztking that
uxl* not clean, ok *talz ok old, ok
maybz kz caught *omz *oKt of gznm
fKom *omewhzKZ
Nzkvz tzn&ion, pooK taxing habit*,
anxiety
Bad alimzntation habit*
It could ju*t bz a viAju* cauAzd
by bactzKia
It** a viKai infection Hkz thz
flu, and can bz naught at any timz
BzcauAZ of nzKvz*, nzKvou* tzn*ion
S competition
UzKVZ*, tzn*ion, pKZ**uKZ*
I think it i* cau*zd by *omz typz
of nzKvou*nz**, *imilaK to an
uIczk
I'm not KzalZy *uaz
WoKKy, 'AiKong focd*
Tkzu could gzt it fKom nzKvz* &
tzn*ion.
Mokz honz&t *zlf-zxpKz**ion when
appKopKiatz
Medication. Nothing Keally.
Livz in an ab*olutzly *tzKilz
znvi/ianmznt whzKz thzy would havt
no fun to ab*olutzly in*uxz pKz-
vzntion of thi* iilnz**
Rzlax, foKm bzttzK eating habit*
Eat bzttzK
Hothing much if it'* a viAu*, ju*t
bz caKzful zvzn.ywhzKz you go, bz
*ukz anything you eat i* clean and
cookzd pKopekly.
Thz only pKotzction fKom vinu* <U
to *tay in good health {plenty of
*lzzp, good eating) and you oaz
*till *u*czptiblz.
Rzlax, txy to think po*itLvz, takz
bzttzK CJXA.Z of kim*zlf
Relax, have moKz confidence in
one*etf
Don't uQOKty quite *o much about
tiling*, cut dou/n on fKizd food*
Stop WKKying, *top zating junk
VKobably not much. Takz thing*
moKz ea*ily.
Causes Prevention
Worrying too mucK 9 not eating
very- welt, not in good physical
shape
Exercise, cat well baianczd meats,
cut down, on any harsh foods, xelax
more
Nerves, tenston
Possibly drtnking ok. eating the
wrong foods--acAxiic foods.
Worrying too much about certain
things—work, sex, etc.
Too ^ast eating, eating the. wrong
foods, worrying too much, being
nervous 5 high strung
Change society. The competitive
nature oh corporate capitalism as
it exists in Western society it
destructive to human nature. The
sickness o& a society in constant
anxious competition is caused by
the profit motive. As long as a
society neglects putting human need
in hront o$ profit, we will have
sick people [physiologically sick
to various degrees )
.
Care more about what they zat and
relax.
Cairn down—lower, their blood pres-
sure, take Hie one step at a time,
make an effort to sit down S tat
good meals ratiizr than grabbing
something here ox there.
People expedience unnecessary
anxiety which can be brought on
by day-to-day pressure, something
from your childhood, etc.
Work at developing an accurate per-
ception of yourself and what makes
you. tick.
Being nervous and eating the
wrong tifpes of food {junk food,
deep iried, etc. )
Relax and cat a good balance of
hood.
It could be stress like an ulcer
or a bad diet.
Eat right £ don't get hyper
Stress, worry Do not put so much emphasis on
success
Maybe nerves? Just a malfunction
oh the body. It may not be re-
lated to anything he's done.
Possibly relax more. Maybe nothing.
Causes Prevention
Eating thz wAong 'fund* o£ load. Thzy can mafee *uaz thzy zat thz
Aigkt £ood&.
No response (n=l) Nb response (n-1)
Diabetes
Causes
Vizt, hznzdity
Because thzy don't look oat fan.
thmbzlvz* . Thzin dizt i6 totally
imong £qk than. AnothzA. could be
dzpiz&Aion and lonzZinzA*.
I {zzL that diabztz* iA kzAzdita/iy
and it lb rjzatzd by thz tugaA. Izvzt
in someone 1 4 blood ttAzam.
Thzxz axz kzA.zdcta.iy fiactOAA. An
impAopzA, dizt and bzing ovzrttizight
can aJU>o contAibutz to thz dzvzlop-
mznt oh diabztzA.
Gznztic*
Scmz pzopiz oaz boKn uxith it f
otiizAA contAact it latex in LL&z.
It ka& to do taith thz amount o%
in6ulin in thz body and thz abil-
ity to mztabotizz 6ucaa4Z. (A&$o,
At/izAA, ovzAzating)
Hot znougk ±ugaA in thz blood
Pool dizt
Prevention
Get checkups, mtdn dizt
See a doctor and po^Aibly a.
psychologist.
Eating a pAopzx dizt would kzlp to
pxzvznt thu> UULnzAb.
Maintain a xza&onablz wzigkt, gzt
znougk zxzxcibz. Bat ih a pzAAon
<U gznzticaliy inclinzd towand
diabztzt, thzAz Azally isn't much
kz can do.
Hothing
CoAzhul dizt and zxzAcisz kzlp.
Bat ih thzAz <U a stAong ki&toiy
oh <Lt in youA h^M^y* y°a mz pAztty
much t>tack.
Hot anything xzatly, but maybz zat
thz njjght hoods S zxzacaaz
Eat pAapzxly
Pooa dizt Eat bzttzA
Causes axe pxobably too much Eat light
-income. o£ 6ugax and the body
couldn't take It; bad dieX.
Don't xeally know.
I think that mostly diabetes ?
is hzxeditaxy
POOX diet, pOOX exCXcise Staxt toting bettex and exexcising
mote
Blood di^icuLUes
Not enough, knowledge on tht
subject to £ind a good cote
Have no idea. Von't know whethex
it's physical ox psychological.
Good diets and exexcise
Take, caxe o£ younseli (-i.e., pxopex
dizt, exexcise, etc.)
The glucose in the blood system
Is elthex high on. low. It depends
upon what type o{ diabetic this
person Is. Some people axe moxe
susceptible to it than othexs
since it is hexeditaxy.
Getting diabetes in middle age is
vexy common. Thexe axe many con~
txibuting $actoxs, overweight, tfa*
example. But the xeal reason {ox
middle age diabetes is a
in something. I faxgot the name
oi it. Howevex, this is not as
deXximental as juvenile diabetes.
A contxol diet can pxevent this.
To maintain youx blood level you
cannot have too much ox too little
glucose, tixexeioxe a balanced diet
is the best.
Stay in shape. Von't get overweight.
Eat a pxopex diet-
Body not pxoducing enough sugax.
Kidneys axen't woxking pxopexly.
Hothing
Eating impxapexly [i.e., too much
tugax, etc. ) and genexally not
woxking it a{£, due to keeping to
the o^iice too much, pxessuxe.
And just not being awaxe o{ what
he was doing wxong.
Exexcise, eat a bettex balanced diet,
and get some activity to keep him
out oi the oiiice iox awhile.
Inhexited [genetics] Hothiwg
Causes Prevention
Whzn thz body dozi not tunn tkz
body 4ugaA4 into insulin. OveA-
wzigkt, pooa. dizt.
Too much augot consumed at zcutty
agzA, kzxzdita/ty th/iougk gznzi>
It i* a iUza&z cauAzd by thz
malhunction oh a gland that l&
xz&pontiblz fox thz amount oh
gluca^z in thz blood ttizam.
I don't know.
Latzntty qznztic, but thznz <U
no known caa&z.
I don't fenow, piobably Aomzthing
imong with thz blood 4050/1 Izvzl
tiigk blood AugaA. IzvztA
Hz/izdity
QvziconAumptlon oh Augcm, and
kzA&LLty
I think it i* kzn.zdiXaA.Lj, and it
ha& Aomzthing to do with tixz blood
Hzxzdity
It tzzrn* to bz pa&Azd on by gznz*
o^ thz panzntA. Too much tugax in
thz blood.
Hznzdity
HojizsLLty
ttAcng hoodb, too many twzzt*
Vzaxty physical* , good dizt,
ZXZACiAZ
Nothing can bz donz to pizvznt it,
but once cl pzruon knom hz ok 4/ie
ha* it, it kzipA to reduce tugan
in thz dizt.
I don't know.
Thzxz ib no cuaz.
Watch diztt, zxz/iciAZ, -izgutat
chzckup*
Watch dizt, xzmain activz, hollow
p/iogAam dzvzlopzd by a good doctoi
Cut down on 6ugan
Szz a doctoK and zat a. baianczd
dizt
Cantiol blood bugan, Izvzl
QaJizhul dizt
Hot much
Nothing
Eat light
Causes Prevention
EithzK you oaz boKn with it, and
it doesn't show up anted latzK, an.
you gzt old-age. diabztzs, which,
usually dzvzlops a{tvt thz agz o$
55-60. {Maybz iKom too muck intakz
o& sugaK?)
Eat wzll-balanczd mzals [using
natunat suqaxs xathzA than pio-
czsszd sugan.) and zxzxcisz daily
Gznztic Not much
Hzxzdity, bad panc/izas, munching
too many candy baAs
Von't zat too many candy bate
Coronarv Heart Disease
Causes Prevention
Vostibly stxzss , obzsity, hzKzdJjty Ex.zn.cUz, xzlax
StKZAS, pKZSSUKZS (J-tOffl WKk
I tSiink that onz causz may bz not
znough zxzkcLsz. I mzan many
pzoptz ovzKzat and thzy don't do
anything to cormpznsatz $OK it.
Thzy can pKobably takz moKz pKidz
in th&nszlvzs by dinting and zxz/i-
cuing a littlz bit.
This couid bz an inhztitzd diszasz. Go on thz diet that thz doeta
K
Kzcommzndzd and zxz/icisz pKogKam*
And don't gzt upszt about things
and takz tX{z as it comzs.
Hot taking good caxz oi th&nszlvzs,
ok just a wzak kzant slowly bKzak-
ing down. Smoking, not znough slzzp
Stop smoking, slzzp at Izast zigkt
kouxs, stop zvzAyday stxzss and
woAAying
Not znough zxzxcisz, ok good
fazlings about kimszld
Exz/icisz, zat 'light, &zzt good
about onzszli
OvZAJXZtght, ZXtXZmZ pKZSSUKZS,
not zating tight foods
ExzKcisz izguloAly, don't ovznwaKk
youAszti, zat light
Pzaptz dzvziop this illness faom
biAth, it Is a dzizctivz pant o{
thz body.
Hothing
Causes Prevention
Vizt, &t/iz&4
I think this illnz&A It* caused by
&txz&& and not enough zxzacUmz
I think that it could bz daz to
hzAzdity t/iaitL and clIao daz to a
pZAAon'6 dizt and zxzAdbz piac-
ticZ6
Putting too mack pKZAAUAZ
luJwzczAAOfrily) on thzm6zl$
StAZAA, fAto/vuf, anxizty
£tte*64 and how it i* handlzd by
an individual, hojizdity, dizt
OvZAWOlk,
Men-active li&z, weak [poo*]
hza/it In gznzAal, zat thz uvwng
floods, gznztic&, wowying
QvzAWzight, inactivz pzoplz a/iz
vzny AuAczp£Lblz to tiii*. Pzoplz
lAiitk high blood pxzAAuAZ ojiz alio
psionz.
High blood pKZb&uxz
Hot znough zxzacIaz and pooK dizt
High dwlzbtznol IzvzLh, lack o&
zxzn.oJU>z, 4>txz&&, bad diztb, bad
zxzAcisz paXZz/vnb
High coKbohydnatz intake 5 lack
o& zxqacUaz
By not bzJjag concz/inzd about what
othzAA think, pnjopzA dizt, lz*6
mzaZ
Don't hold thing* intidz oi you.
l{ thzn.z'6 something wiong, talk
about it. Don't zat too much,
and gzt some typz o£ zxzAdAz.
Pzoplz can txy to zat -light and
gzt somz typz o£ zxzacaaz and also
Kzgulaxly gzt checked by doctors
Stay active and don't smokz
Rzlax mate and havz moxz confidence
PxopzA zxzaxumz and dizt, and avoid
ovzAAzaction to stxzss
Stay at appKopAiate weight, do not
ovzwioik youAAzlh
ExzacUz, zat well izgulaAly
Pzoplz mast zxzicUz, vit piopzAly--
thzin. dizt mast bz low In stanches
and cholzstZAol
PKopzti dizt and zxzncisz
Exe/icisz and zat sensibly
Zzttzn. dieXs—lzss dwlzstzxol,
bzttzn. zxztdsz p/iogsuvns, less
StXZSS
Watch dizt and zxzncisz
Causes
Prevention
Smoking, lack o$ exetcue
I believe hz may kavz been cvet-
migkt, and also had quitz a b-ct
o£ Sttizss o£ kis maid'
Smoking, obzsity, hypzAtznsian
NzAvousnzss, dizt possibly bzcausz
q£ ncivousnzss
Smofexng, dJunking, no exetcc4e,
etc.
Wet and exetccie (£acfe otf]
£tet, 4-tte44
Possibly ovz/w&Lght, pznhaps it*
s
Smoking, -cniietite<i, ove/uoexg/it,
/teg ft b£ood p*e44u*e, /Ug/t
c/to£e4-te/Lo£
St*e44, too macA w^ife, family
ptiobiesn, smoking
Stte44 and 4-ttaun, impKopzx dizt,
tension, un^avo>tab£e u»/ifcotg con-
ditions, smoking
Somz pzopiz get it £*om smoking
ok not zxzA.cisi>ig to 4tay hzatthy.
Hot zating thz tight kinds oh foods
.
Wzak, i<zcji f WGKxy too much
Mot smokz, exetacse
Qizt, get moiz zxzmUsz, £e44 4t*.e44
frwm job
Stop smoking, eat sznsibiy, 4ee a
doctor, takz medication
Looszn up, don't wonjiy about what
pzopiz (Jditi tltink 40 mack
Stop smoking, delinking, etc. Keep
in shape.
Watck thzAA. diet and exercise
Have moKz wzll-balanczd meaJLs with
less cholzAtzAol. Txy to dec/iease
intensity o{ stress iul situations
by xzducing anxiety.
Keep thzix bodizs in good physical
condition U. e. 9 zcuting night,
zxzAdsz) . Penhaps somztimzs thz
iHnzss is umvoidablz.
Stop whatzvzA they're doing to in-
crease thz xisk. 1^ inherited, szz
a. physician regularly.
Don't get 40 worked up over j'cb4.
Von't 4mofee. Try and takz things
that hunt you casiz/i.
Von't overtH/afcfe, relax and enjoy
ti{z, proper diet. Have an annual,
keaith checkup.
( 1 } Jog at least tusicz a Mzek
(2] Cat down on smoking
(3) Eat thz proper kinds otf &oods
To stay cool
Causes Prevention
St*e44 in woik lituaZionA, unkzaithy
eating and zxzkzaaz hakite, ualulLZu
onz who kzzp* ma/aa motionaZ £zzl-
ing* to kun&zJLi inbtzad oq aon^-oioig
tuitfi onz who may he£p 0* whom thz
fazting* involvz {wi&z, etc.), du-
appointmznt in own 4>e££
EanZizx in li&z pzoplz thotxld become
awate otf tkzoi own physical tzndzn-
ciz6 tcuxvui tkU disease S kopz^ulZy
do thzoi beat to extAeA atte* oa
citange tkzbz condition* (exe/tcc&e,
eat awiect£i/)
He^eiictaAi/, not taiUng pKopzn zojiz
oh khvn&zLvz*
Hz/izdity, gznzticj*, and poAAibly
cLLzt to acme extent
Take cote o^ tkmbzlvzb, *zz a
doctoA. $ takz hit, advizz
1$ tftey biow that thzy cuiz pKonz
to tkz cLuzoaz, be ca/iei$u£--ph£/4-cca£
£itnz&* IzAAzn* thz -tufe o^ heatt
attack
Qvviindulgznzz o$ &atty ioodb,
not enough exe/iccie, to iome
extent kzAzcLitajiy
Do not know
Sttea-s, anxiety, bad dcet, littlz
zxz/iciAZ, ovznwzight, inhz^itzd
No response (n=l)
Exe/iciae, cut bacfe on &atty hood*
Do not know
Eat pKopznly and modznatzly zx&ictel
be ca&ne/t., avoid 4>&izaa
No response (n«l)
Leukemia
Causes
I don't btou/
Prevention
I don't know
HeAzditaxy zollaz*
I xajatty don't knew, gznztiz
pottibly
Hvizdity, iatz, luck
I Jtave no idza
Ho idza
Szz a doctor
Causes Prevention
I think thcut tkz couaza &01 tkti
illnzAA okz not clzaAly knoiw. yzt.
Sat pzKnapA it may bz kzKzditaKy.
VnzKZ iA nothing you. can do to
4>tap It. It koA to do utith tkz
count in blood czLZa, 4ome
pzoplz's bzcomz Iowzk.
It could bz iKom smoking ok $Kom
dnmicalA in food ok it might
juAt bz an abnormality in tkz
body
T'niA illnzAA iA doe. to an uncon-
tKollzd pKodaction q$ whitz blood
czIZa and can oIao bz hzKzditaKtf
PKobably koA Aomztking to do uiith
aznzticA. I don't know. It may
bz an indiAcKlminatz (Uazoaz.
Don't know
BcKn with canczK czllA
CauAzd by ovzKpKoduction o{ wkctz
blood czllA, could bz hzKzdiAuiy.
I'm not iu/te.
It 1 a 'unknown what couaza it.
It could bz kzKzdltviy. I£
doctor feneru tkz couaz tkzn tiizy
could probably dlagnoAZ tkz
WLnzAA.
I don't knout, and it'A my impKZA-
*ion that mzdlaxl tclzncz iA an-
czxtain oZao.
Nothing in pcuitiaiLaA--tkiA uAunJULy
t&UkzA suddenly even Iq tamzonz iA
leading a ^aJjily "nomal" Ufa
Nothing
I havz no idea
I izzl that a pzAAon will zithzn.
gzt thiA (Uazoaz ok not.
I don't think too mack can bz donz
to pKzvznt thiA (Uazoaz.
Don't know
Nothing
Gzt Kzgulax chzckupA to azz ii tkzy
kavz thz cUazoaz in an zaAly Atagz.
Nothing
It iA a &onm o$ canczK. TkzKZ KzaZly
iAn't anything you can do except
maybz by not smoking ok staying
away ^Kom HiKoAhima. X^tzK thz bomb
<ajoa dKoppzd pzoplz dzvziopzd Izukmla
S it wa inkzKitzd by innocent
ckildKzn.
Aa tkz couaz iA pKZAumably unknown,
not too much.
244
Causes
God'4 iatz—to my knowlzdgz, don't
know caiuz&
Gznztic iacto/u
Thz zx&ta p/ioducticn oi whitz blood
czLU
Unknown couaz 40 fax. Something
i& wkqyiq with thz blood by^tzm of
thz pzAAon.
Ho cuaz, an excels* oi whitz blood
qzLZa [which act a& an agznt against
iltnzAA ok foizign 6ub*tancz6 In
body)
I don't know. 1 bzlizvz anyonz
can gzt it. It ju&t happzn& t bo
I 4uppa4e chance* axz 50/50.
Thz couj>z6 oi Izuhzmia oaz not
zntinzly known. It is bziizvzd
to bz diiz to &omz gznztic
malfunction.
I havz no idza.
Vo not know.
A malfunction in thz cznXzn. wkznz
whitz blood czll* anz pAodaczd
Thz caa&&A ojiz gznzXic. I don't
think that any onz thing can make
you gzt It. It's thz individual'
6
body.
Prevention
Nothing zxczpt pnay
Hothing—canczx of thz blood can't
bz pKzvzntzd ok cuAzd
Thzy don't know why pzoplz gzt this,
4a it* 4 impossiblz to do anything
to pizvznt it
Szst thing is to havz a good balanczd
cLizt and watch blood sugax Izvzl U&
It kzip*)
Eating piopz/ily, taking caxz oi youA
motional statz oi mind. I£ you onz
undz/i a lot oi stxzss, you oftzn put
youA, body thAough hzll--it might bz
a way youn. body xzacts.
Stay In shapz, havz Kzgulan. chzekups,
ztc.
Rzszanch
Without knowing thz caaszs, it is
pKztty diiilcult to pKzvznt this
diszasz.
Mo idza.
Possibly abstain 3'A.om as many can.-
cinogzns as po&-6<iblz
Kzzp thanszlvzs as hzalthy as possibtz
li a pzruon kzzps his body in condi-
tion,' thzu am put up a bzttzn fight
against thz ilinzss, but thzxz is
xzallij nothing you can do to ptzvznt
gztting this iltnzss—it just happzns.
Causes Prevention
God 1 s nuZZ.
I think it has to do uuitk thz
habits, peAsonaZUy, natuAz oj the.
pzASon, backgAound uiith family.
Basically, I tliink it is a fazak
thing caused by many £actoAS.
Maybz this condition is gznztic
in natuAz. Thz turn causz is not
known. Possibly thz intake. o&
matz/Uals not natuAolly hound in
thz body on. radiation zxposuxz.
riZAZditU
Leukemia is a canczA ofa thz bZood
ttrftcc/i attack* whLtz blood czlls.
It can be caused by zxposuAZ to
canceA-causinQ agents {Aadiation,
asbestos ) oa. inheAiXzd gznzticaZly
?Aom zxczssivz smoking, gznztic
injuAizs
Thzu gzt it tkn.ou.gh hzAzditiy.
This <a a chancz, somz pzaplz gzt
it 5 somz don't, l& it'b in thz
family, you' az moaz likzly to gzt
it. (Fate)
Genztics— I bztizvz thz tvUt it
inherited
Vonatz monzy to leukemia AeszaAch.
Nothing AzaZly, bat I Zxy to just
watch u/fctfi I eat. Basically, I
don't know.
Hot much! I j it's genetic, theAz'*
nothing to do. I£ not, avo-ui thz
haAmfiul mcutzAials. Zut--what oaz
thzy?
Hot much—maybz fazquznt complete
physicals
Shonjtrtzm* Watch &oa leukemia
tsiaits in a spouse i£ you have them
yovuuzl&. Avoid excessive zxposuAZ
to cancer-pAoducing agents*
Long-tzAmi Encounagz izszatch to
dztznminz thz origin o{ blood
aznzzA. Find a cuaz, not just an
anA.esting tAzatmznt like is note
availablz.
Von't smoke, eat tight, take good
ca/iz oi youAszl£. Keep in good
physical condition.
Thzxz is no pAzvzntion.
You can't do anyt/ting about it enez
you havz it, but to pAZvznt it, youA
best bzt is to takz good cjoaz oi
youASzli [zajt pxopeAly, zxeAdsz,
go to docXoAS o£tzn ^oa checkups )
.
Zzally not too much
No response (n=»l) No
response (n=»l)

